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The Hybrid Airship Multi-Role (HAMR) Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
Mission Module project applies established systems engineering principles and processes 
to the design of an ASW payload module that examines the capability of the HAMR to 
perform persistent ASW mission support.  The concept of an ASW module was born out 
of discussion with the HAMR stakeholders, which includes COCOM commanders.  The 
concept of the ASW module is to provide the Navy with a new and unique or 
transformational means to conduct ASW. While the ASW module is hosted by the 
airship, the airship is not within the scope of the research paper.   
The large lift variant of the HAMR is expected to lift 1,000 tons, and with 
scalable technology, a variant capable of 50 ton capacity is being considered for 
development.  This smaller airship’s lift appears suitable for missions other than heavy 
lifting such as ASW.  A hybrid airship has an exceptional “time in air” or loitering 
capability, which makes it an attractive platform for the moving of materials or as a 
platform for a weapons systems.  It can fly over water or land at speeds up to 100 knots 
allowing it to take a more direct route to its destination.  Its ability to economically loiter 
offers obvious advantages for a surveillance platform.  This module and airship 
combination merges existing capabilities from the submarine, surface ship, rotary wing, 
and fixed wing aircraft in a single ASW mission module.  That mission module, carried 
by the hybrid airship, can remain on station and provide 24-7 surveillance for periods 
exceeding 10 days.   
The research and analysis used for the research follows the prescribed process 
defined by the Department of Defense acquisition reform act.  A number of specific 
systems engineering models, methods, and processes are utilized as part of this research.  
Based on detailed and thorough input from a large group of stakeholders, critical system 
functions and objectives are identified and are assigned appropriate quantitative metrics.  
To properly frame these functions, a realistic and relevant set of scenarios are developed 
and vetted by our key stakeholders. Additionally, three alternative architectures are 
generated and evaluated using the appropriate metrics.  All alternatives are quantitatively 
 xv
assessed using the Naval System Simulation (NSS), and a cost benefit and analysis was 
performed to support the best case alternative selection.  
 
System Functions 
Based on input from a variety of stakeholders, the following functions were 
determined to be fundamental to our systems engineering design: 
Detect:  This is the ability of the proposed system to search a specified 
area and detect the presence of enemy submarines in that area.  
Classify:  This is the ability of the proposed system to identify detected 
submarines correctly.  
Engage:  This is the ability of the proposed system to terminate or alter the 
mission of known enemy submarines.  
Track:  This is the ability of the system to effectively maintain an accurate 
track on an enemy target. 
Localize: This is the ability of the system to reduce the area of uncertainty 
of the location of the submarine sufficiently to engage the submarine. 
Communicate:  This is the ability of the system to effectively and reliably 
communicate with own force and allies. 
Detection can be broken down into sub-functions including queuing, search plan 
(surface & subsurface), environmental planning, surveillance, and loitering.  Sub-
functions of communications include battle group connectivity, airframe and pilot 
communications, over the horizon relay, receiving intelligence, and data transmission.  
The engage function includes the sub-functions to destroy, disable, deceive, or deter.  
Tracking encompasses the sub-functions of data collection, maintain contact, observe, 
and report.  Classify includes data processing, data comparison, determination of contact 
(friend or foe), and the determination of threat level.  Localizing a threat has sub-




The HAMR ASW module is considered in two operational scenarios:  stand alone 
patrol and maintaining a safe operating area for a CSG.  The module provides such 









HAMR Tactical ASW Concept of Operations 
 
Stand Alone Patrol 
The HAMR, equipped with the ASW module, may be used as a single patrol asset 
against open water or confined threat areas.  This would be accomplished by having the 
HAMR module strategically deploy and monitor sonar sensors.  The module would 
actively process the data returned by the sensors allowing the HAMR to aggressively 
pursue, track, and engage all unidentified submarine contacts.  Other ASW assets may be 
alerted with the modules ability to communicate with various platforms if the situation 

























Stand Alone Patrol Concept of Operations 
  
Safe Operating Area 
The HAMR ASW module may also be used to maintain a safe operating area 
(SOA) for a CSG or ESG (see figure below). The ASW module would act as a 
communications hub for all other assets allowing strategic planning using real-time data 
passed between the module and additional assets.  The module would be capable of 
deploying and monitoring sensors within a certain radius, sharing any detections and 
tracks as a result of the data returned by the sensors.  This application would ensure no 
enemy submarines could intercept forces within the SOA.  Upon detection of a threat the 

















Safe Operating Area Concept of Operations 
 
Alternatives  
  There are three alternative architectures assessed in this report.  The first 
alternative offers sensing and surveillance as well as engagement capabilities.  These 
capabilities include lightweight torpedoes, super-cavitating munitions weapon, and air 
dropped munitions, which can either have contact or proximity fusing options.  Sensing 
includes an electro-optical infrared (EO/IR) camera, water penetrating laser detecting and 
ranging (LIDAR), magnetic anomaly detection (MAD), electronic surveillance receivers, 
surface search radar, and a payload of sonobuoys to provide acoustic monitoring all day 
for up to 10 days.  It is crewed with four onboard watch standers per shift.  The second 
 xix
alternative provides no organic sub-surface engagement capability but relies on outside 
support from the P-3 community for this capability.  In lieu of the engagement capability, 
it adds enhanced sensing capability with the addition of a thin line towed array, dipping 
sonar, and a side aperture array sonar and is crewed with four watch standers per shift. 
The third alternative does not provide organic sub-surface engagement and also relies on 
outside engagement from the P-3 community.  It has the potential for an exceptionally 
lengthy loiter period, limited only to the airship’s ability to remain airborne and is 
unmanned.  It requires two remote ground operators as crew. All three alternatives 
provide full communications, the ability to render and remotely share any and all sensor 
data, to export a common operating picture (COP). 
 
Risk 
Some of the technology recommended in the ASW module has never before been 
operated on an airborne platform.  Alternative 2 applies the use of a thin line towed array. 
While this system is currently used in both shipboard and submarine applications, the use 
of this system in an aerial vehicle is unproven.  This application has been discussed with 
many subject matter experts (SMEs) who believe the process can be successfully 
achieved technically; however it affords a higher level of risk.  The balance of the 
technology selected is adapted from other airborne platforms and is currently fielded 
hence presents marginal risk in application to an ASW airship platform. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
After review of the alternatives, all three meet the stakeholders’ minimum 
requirements for the HAMR ASW mission module.  After detailed analysis of the 
modeling data, however, it becomes apparent the unmanned module, Alternative 3, 
provides the best performance against submarines under the associated scenarios.  That is 
in part from its extensive sonobuoy capacity and the utilization of agile P-3 aircraft as its 
means to engage the targets.  The modeling data clearly shows in the barrier scenario the 
HAMR ASW module carrying more sonobuoys has shorter time to detect than either a 
single P-3 or the other HAMR ASW module configurations.  Due to the importance 
 xx
placed on barrier protection in the modeling scenario, the HAMR was less effective than 
the P-3 in prosecution.  In the given barrier scenario, however, the HAMR ASW 
solutions that direct P-3s for prosecution provide a statistically significant force 
multiplier.  Based on these modeling findings, Alternative 3, HAMR ASW module is the 
better effective force multiplier. 
Manning was a key factor in the value structure defined by the stakeholders.  
With the Navy’s trend toward reducing manpower, new weapon systems must address 
the lower manning preference.  In a comparison of manning to the P-3, all three HAMR 
ASW mission module alternatives require less manning. Alternative 1 requires four 
watch standers.  Alternative 2 also requires a crew of four while Alternative 3 only 
requires two operators in a remote station for ASW.  
When comparing costs, Alternative 1 has a life cycle cost of $50.4M per unit over 
its expected 25 year life expectancy.  Alternative 2 $68.8M each over the same period 
and Alternative 3 is the lowest cost alternative at $44.4M.  
In assessing risk, many of the systems used in Alterative 1 have previously been 
integrated into the P-3 and offer a minimum of risk.  Inserting new technology in the 
form of the Tactically Integrated Sensors (TIS) combat system into a unique airborne 
application like Alternative 1 yields medium risk.  While TIS is fielded on all of the 
Navy’s aircraft carriers, it has not been applied to an airborne environment.  Alternative 2 
applies the use of a thin line towed array which is currently used in both shipboard and 
submarine applications, but airborne use of this system is unproven and affords a higher 
level of risk.  The balance of the technology selected for Alternative 3 is adapted from 
other airborne platforms, currently fielded, and present marginal risk in application to an 
ASW airship platform.  
In summary, the unmanned ASW mission module, Alternative 3, offers the 
lightest weight, the lowest cost, lowest risk, best performance, and lowest manning 





The task of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), largely the purview of the U.S. 
Navy submarine force during the Cold War and post Cold War eras, must move into the 
21st century to remain effective against current and future threats.   The Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations established Task Force ASW in 2004 and chartered it to 
develop the Navy’s ASW Concept of Operations for the 21st Century.  Task Force ASW 
found: 
 
The ASW capabilities we possess today when confronting potential 
enemies are based largely on skills developed during Cold War. To sustain 
our operational advantage, the team must develop additional skills, 
implement them in an innovative manner, and rapidly leverage advanced 
technologies to swiftly defeat enemies wherever they may be found.1 
 
1. Transformation and ASW 
Seeking to meet this challenge, the Navy embarked on a mission to transform the 
way in which it conducted ASW.  Several organizational and policy changes were made 
to take ASW into the 21st century.  Commander, Third Fleet (C3F) and Commander, U.S. 
Fleet Forces Command (CUSFFC) were tasked to coordinate and focus ASW efforts.  In 
October 2007,  the Naval Mine and ASW Warfare Command was aligned to C3F under 
Commander, Pacific Fleet (CPF) to place the Navy’s ASW strategic and tactical thinking 
under one umbrella.2 ASW was a large part of the Sea Shield pillar of the Sea Power 21 
Strategy and with C3F designated as the Sea Shield Operational Agent; C3F became 
responsible for all ASW efforts.  Sea Shield is one of the pillars established by the Sea 
                                                 
1 Task Force ASW [2004:p. 1] 
2 Waickwicz [2006] 
2 
Power 21 Policy Paper by then CNO, ADM Vern Clark.3  This new alignment allows for 
increased advocacy and emphasis in the ASW mission area.   
The Navy’s long term transformational strategy depends on tactical and 
technological advances in the areas of: 
• Enhanced signal processing 
• Bistatic towed arrays 
• Low frequency arrays 
• Advanced deployable systems 
• Advanced sonobouys 
• Periscope detection systems 
• Common maritime picture 
• Open architecture torpedoes 
• Torpedo countermeasures 
 
2. The Navy’s Task Force ASW Operational and Long-Term Objectives 
These above technologies will enable the Navy to achieve the following two key 
operational level objectives as expressed in the ASW CONOPS for the 21st Century: 
 
“Hold Enemy Forces at Risk: The team will deny enemy submarines an 
offensive capability by maintaining the ability to destroy them, if and 
when required, at a time and place of our choosing. 
 
Secure Friendly Maneuver Area: The team will drive away or destroy 
enemy submarines, thereby protecting maritime operating areas. The team 
will protect US and coalition naval combatants, support ships, and 
merchant shipping from undersea attack within and enroute to vital 
operating areas.”4 
 
Sea Shield and Sea Basing play important parts in achieving these objectives.  
Whether it is holding enemy forces at risk through controlling choke points (Sea Shield) 
                                                 
3 Clark [2002] 
4 Task Force ASW [2004:p.2] 
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or securing friendly maneuver areas through Sea Basing, both are integral parts of 21st 
century ASW.   
The long term policy objectives of the U.S. Navy are also described by Task 
Force ASW.  In order to continue to hold enemy forces at risk, the long-term ASW 
transformation includes use of: 
• Distributed netted sensors 
• Rapid attack the weapons 
• Advanced data relays 
• Integrated weapons systems5 
 
The long term policy also lays out a force that possesses the following attributes: 
• Persistence 
• Pervasive awareness 
• Speed and operational agility 
• Technological agility6 
The development of new technologies is encouraged to follow a prioritization of 
sensors over the weapons and networks over platforms as the battle is carried forward 
into the 21st century. 
3. ASW Operational Principles 
Task Force ASW lays out six operational principles and associated capabilities for 
future ASW system.  This research directly addresses four of them: 
 
“Persistent Detection & Cueing. The networking of rapidly deployable 
and fixed surveillance systems will maximize enemy detections, tracking, 
and engagement opportunities. 
 
“Combined Arms Prosecution. Tracking and engagement of enemy 
submarines will be executed through coordinated and integrated Joint 
Force ASW operations, enhanced by common operational and tactical 
pictures that permit precise targeting and the weapons employment. 
                                                 
5 Task Force ASW [2004: p.2] 
6 Task Force ASW [2004:p.3] 
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“High Volume Search & Kill Rates. Agile technology development will 
maximize search and kill rates, resulting in greater numbers of enemy 
submarines destroyed per unit of time. These advancements will be 
achieved by the combined employment of large area search systems, 
highly accurate localization techniques, and standoff, precise attack 
systems. 
 
“Non-Traditional Methods. New technologies will yield enhanced 
operational agility by employing miniaturized sensors, the weapons, and 
command and control systems, as well as reconfigurable manned and 
unmanned vehicles. Such non-traditional methods will be employed from 
pre to post-hostility operations, generating effects that range from 
influencing threat behavior to destroying enemy forces.”7 
4. ASW Threats 
The operating forces take all aforementioned policy guidance and turn it into 
operational and tactical doctrine.  Scenarios from guarding and surveillance of choke 
points in the littorals to securing a sea base for carrier strike group operations are all 
considered.  Through the use of maritime patrol aircraft, principally the P-3C, to the use 
of nuclear submarines and ASW equipped surface ships, the Navy conducts a variety of 
ASW operations to protect against the current threat. 
The present ASW threat has shifted from the fast, deep-diving, blue water threat 
of the Russian Navy to the slow speed, quiet, and littoral submarine forces used around 
the world.   The end of the Cold War, combined with the collapse of the Russian 
economy caused the once powerful Russian submarine force to atrophy.  Many Russian 
nuclear submarines remain tied up at piers and continue to exist in conditions beyond 
repair.  However the proliferation of diesel powered or Air Independent Propulsion 
submarines around the world continues.  According to Jane’s Fighting Ships, 
approximately 46-48 countries operate submarines; of these, 39 boast what are 
                                                 
7 Task Force ASW [2004:p.5] 
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considered “quiet” submarines.  Fortunately, less than a handful pose significant threat to 
the security of the United States.8 
Today, China operates one of the largest submarine forces and has a significant 
surface force as well.   
 
“The PLA Navy has 70 principal combatants (25 destroyers and 45 
frigates), 55 submarines (50 diesel and 5 nuclear), some 50 medium and 
heavy amphibious lift ships (an increase of over 14% since 2005), and 
about 45 coastal missile patrol craft.”9 
 
By comparison, the U.S. Navy operates a nuclear submarine force of 52 fast 
attack submarines (SSN),10 4 guided missile submarines (SSGN),11 and 14 ballistic 
missile submarines (SSBN).12   Furthermore, China has an aggressive training program in 
an attempt to gain proficiency in submarine operations and tactics.  The People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) under took significant training reforms in 2002 which 
included: 
 
“The old concept of single submarines departing early in the morning and 
returning late on the same day was replaced with the concept of multiple 
submarines conducting navigation training together over multiple days  
throughout the day and night.  The old concept of single submarines 
conducting independent training was replaced with multiple submarines 
attacking as a task force.  The PLAN replaced the old basic training 
method of simple and redundant training with mission-oriented training 
subjects.  The old method of training on single submarine tactics per sortie 
                                                 
8 Janes [2001-2002] 
9 Office of Naval Intelligence [2007:p.122] 
10 SSN Fact Sheet [2007] 
11 SSGN Fact Sheet [2007] 
12 SSBN Fact Sheet  [2007] 
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was replaced with training on several combined-arms tactics 
simultaneously in a combined-arms environment.”13 
 
The PLAN has begun extending both the range for some of its submarines and 
increasing the duration of some training events as evidenced by the events in October 
2006 when a Song-class, diesel-electric submarine surfaced within 5 NM of the aircraft 
carrier, USS Kitty Hawk, in the South China Sea. This single event caused the U.S. Navy 
to refocus its efforts on anti-submarine warfare.  Task Force ASW stated, “The objective 
of 21st century ASW operations is clear:  to secure the battlespace from undersea threats 
by swiftly destroying enemy submarines.”14  However, there are still advocates for “non-
lethal” ASW methods, which for the most part are beyond the classification of this paper 
and therefore not discussed here. 
 
B. PURPOSE 
The focus of the Keyport Cohort of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Masters 
of Science in Systems Engineering (MSSE) project is to examine the use of hybrid 
aircraft technology to see if it has the potential to revolutionize and transform the way the 
U.S. Navy conducts ASW by developing recommendations for an ASW module to be 
carried by a hybrid aircraft. 
At the request of Combatant Commanders (COCOMs), plans are being made to 
develop a 50-ton proof-of-concept demonstrator of a hybrid aircraft called the Hybrid 
Airship Multi-Role (HAMR), conceptually shown in Figure 1.   
                                                 
13 Office of Naval Intelligence [2007:p.37] 








Figure 1. Lockheed-Martin P-791 Demonstrator [2007]. 
 
Hybrid aircraft provide a persistent, survivable, versatile capability that cannot be 
found in any other single asset.  They can take off and land unassisted on land or sea, 
carry large payloads (potentially up to 1,000 tons), stay in the air for days, travel at 
speeds up to 100 knots, and take a remarkable amount of damage before losing lift.   This 
concept and the alternatives that are offered directly address the operational principles 
and associated capabilities for future ASW system as stated by Task Force ASW.  With 
the capability to remain on station for days at a time, a hybrid aircraft can provide a 
platform for persistent ASW detection and cueing.  Alternatives are possible that bring to 
bear the forces of surface, air, and sub-surface ASW platforms in combined arms 
prosecution of enemy submarine forces.  The extraordinary lift capability of the hybrid 
airship allows it to carry many sensors and retain the ability to move over large volumes 
of ocean which will provide high volume search, and when appropriately armed, 
corresponding kill rates.   
The use of hybrid aircraft technology can be considered as non-traditional 
methods and technologies.  New technologies yield enhanced operational agility by 
employing miniaturized sensors, weapons, and command and control systems, as well as 
reconfigurable manned and unmanned vehicles.  Such non-traditional methods will be 
employed from pre- to post-hostility operations, generating effects that range from 
influencing threat behavior to destroying enemy forces.  The use of an ASW module on a 
hybrid aircraft can be considered as a force multiplier.   
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During a recent National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) briefing at the 
Joint Undersea Warfare Technology Conference, a representative for Program Executive 
Office – Integrated Weapons Systems (PEO-IWS 5) stated the single largest challenge for 
them in ASW is to develop or acquire an ASW system that is “tailorable” and scalable 
across many platforms.15  The alternatives presented in this paper can be tailored and are 
in line with those currently in use as well as planned future technologies.  This project is 
easily adapted to use the future open architecture design concept for sensors and the 
weapons.   
At the same conference, the need for a platform to perform mobile, ASW escort 
missions for slow moving ships was discussed.  Some consider this the toughest mission 
for the surface warfare arm of the Navy.  The hybrid aircraft could address this mission. 
The purpose of the demonstrator is to display the capabilities of hybrid aircraft 
technologies and prove technical readiness for the development of the 1,000-ton Hybrid 
Ultra-Large Aircraft (HULA) and ASW module.  This also will pave the way for other 
mission modules unlike the concept of the Littoral Combat Ship.  The future mission 
modules could fulfill a variety of missions ranging from ASW, Search and Rescue 
(SAR), Command and Control (C&C), ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance) or ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and 
Reconnaissance), or others.   These modular payloads could fulfill a variety of missions 
as discussed above.      
 
C. SCOPE 
The Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) Division Keyport team examined 
alternative designs for an ASW module for use on the HAMR demonstrator.  The team 
explored different combinations of existing ASW sensors and weapons systems for the 
ASW mission module and evaluated their different technical, logistical, and fiscal 
considerations using systems engineering (SE) principles.   
The project focused on developing a design for an ASW module with capability 
that optimizes overall primary mission effectiveness and emphasizes the unique potential 
                                                 
15 Benedict, PEO-IWS 5 [2008] 
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of the HAMR platform.  To appropriately bind the scope of this academic effort, the team 
imposed some limitations.  Only existing systems or those that could be realistically 
fielded in the next five years would be considered for use in the ASW module.  This 
would facilitate rapid prototyping as recommended by the stakeholders’ initial 
requirements.  Efforts for this project were concentrated on the ASW capability module 
rather than the HAMR airframe.  Assumptions about the airframe and its capacities are 
outlined in the assumption section of this paper if not specifically described by 
stakeholders and subject matter experts (SMEs). 
The team developed up to three operational scenarios that were obtained from a 
framework of specific, realistic ASW scenarios which are rooted in the following 
concepts.  Given that the U.S. Navy has air superiority and the knowledge of 
regional/local weather conditions throughout deployment of the HAMR, the following 
scenarios could apply: 
 
Standalone HAMR Area ASW—In conjunction with a Carrier Strike Group 
(CSG),  which is tasked to defend the HAMR from air or surface threats, the 
HAMR conducts independent searches and conducts/coordinates ASW 
attacks (by other ASW platforms including other HAMRs) in order to clear 
an area or prevent intrusion by a submarine.   
 
Coordinated HAMR Area ASW—Deployed with other ASW platforms, i.e. 
ships and subs, HAMR provides either in-depth (e.g. outer) ASW defense 
or sector (e.g. flank protection) defense for either a CSG or Expeditionary 
Strike Group (ESG).    
 
Littoral Patrol—Deployed in stand alone mode, protected by either sea 
assets or shore based assets, HAMR conducts just searches or searches and 
attacks on submarines.  Other ASW platforms (i.e. rotary and fixed winged 
aircraft, submarines and ships) can launch attacks if HAMR is only in a 
search mode.  HAMR monitors shipping from in or out of the port, identifies 
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and tracks suspect platforms, provides communications and sensor data 
relay for shore base units, and deploys and monitors sensors. 16 
 
The scope of the project will look at how the HAMR can be used in comparison 
with the current methods employed by Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), principally the P-
3.  The team also considered the airship as a stand alone entity and something the team 
would not be designing.  The HAMR module would be carried by the airship; in similar 
fashion it would carry other mission modules. 
The persistent design of the airship can lend itself well to other missions.  Mine 
warfare is one possible future mission.  As the airship can move slowly and search large 
areas, it can be used to defeat and clear enemy mines.  Other missions are possibilities as 
well such as search and rescue (SAR), intelligence missions, electronic warfare (EW), 
and homeland security.  The efforts of this team will concentrate only on the ASW 
module. 
 
D. METHODOLOGY / APPROACH 
The overall methodology that guided the HAMR team’s approach was the system 
engineering design process illustrated in Figure 2.  The HAMR team performed the steps 
of a systems engineering design process (SEDP), which is described in more detail in the 
following paragraphs.  The problem definition phase of the SEDP phase resulted in a 
descriptive scenario which was refined via the needs analysis and value system design 
phase.  The needs analysis phase resulted in an effective need.  The revised need was 
used as an input into the design & analysis phase.  The HAMR team progressed through 
the alternatives generation and modeling and analysis phases.  The results of the 
modeling and analysis phase yielded recommendations for the decision making phase.  
The alternatives were scored based on quantitative modeling outputs and qualitative 
criteria.  Several alternatives were vetted to determine the best valued solution. 
                                                 














































Desired End State: 
What should be?
1. Problem Definition Phase 
The problem definition is the first and most important phase of the SEDP.  It 
allowed the team to understand and define the problem so that the design fit the solution.  
It consists of two steps, needs analysis and value system design. 
The problem was originally defined as fielding an ASW prototype module for a 
50 lifting ton, lighter-than-air HAMR demonstrator platform.  The module is to be 
















Figure 2. Systems Engineering Design Process. NPS SI4007 [2006].  
 
a) Needs Analysis  
The needs analysis process translates the primitive need into a more 
refined definition of objectives intended to meet the stakeholders’ needs.  The primitive 
need was defined as the need for an ASW mission module for the HAMR platform.  The 
team conducted stakeholder analysis to generate a list of needs and wants from the 
relevant stakeholders.  Information was collected by conducting interviews and through 
the distribution of questionnaires.  Follow-on discussions were conducted when 
necessary to obtain additional details and clarifications.  Initial efforts will be to expand 
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the design space and generate a wide variety of alternatives without regard to constraints.  
Many ASW systems were considered for integration into the HAMR modules using 
many SEDP techniques such as brainstorming, functional flow charts, and morphological 
boxes. 
The team determined the suitability and feasibility of the capabilities for 
incorporation into the HAMR.  The principle objective is to generate alternative 
capabilities in the areas of sensors, processors, and the weapons.  An input-output model 
of the HAMR was generated to properly ‘scope and bound’ the system.  The needs 
analysis phase resulted in an effective need.   
The team conducted research to identify current ASW threats or gaps in 
existing systems, which influenced the development of the HAMR’s concept of 
operations and mission requirements.  Other sources of input for the needs analysis phase 
consisted of SME interviews, printed material, and media.  Operational scenarios were 
proposed to further understand the environmental requirements, system constraints, and 
support infrastructure.   
b) Value System Design 
The value system provides a top-down view of what is to be 
accomplished, the relative value of those accomplishments, and by what means they will 
be measured.  The effective need will be the foundation for the value system. 
c) Objectives Hierarchy 
The objectives hierarchy is divided into systems, functions, and their 
associated metrics.  Building further on the foundation laid by the needs analysis, the 
team developed a value structure consisting of functions, sub-functions, objectives, sub-
objectives, and evaluation MOEs.  This structure, also presented as a hierarchy, is the 
foundational tool of the Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) used to evaluate 




The functions of performance include the ASW capabilities and manning.  
ASW tasking includes objectives such as tracking, engaging, detecting, localizing, 
classifying, as well as communicating proximal targets.  The tracking objective of the 
ASW function was measured by the percent of time it takes for the target to come within 
range.  ASW performance measures of effectiveness (MOEs) used are detection and 
tracking capability and mission duration.  The measurement for integration (another 
function of performance) can be simply evaluated on a pass/fail basis.  MOEs are largely 
based on quantitative analysis.  Objectives were measured based on the operational 
characteristics of the proposed alternatives.  The objectives are measured with 
corresponding MOEs. 
e) Life Cycle Cost 
The categories used to determine the life cycle cost (LCC) are the 
procurement, integration, logistics, operational, maintenance, and disposal costs.  
Procurement and production, operation and maintenance, demilitarization, and disposal 
cost for retiring the ASW modules are included within the LCC analysis.   
f) Weighting 
Using all of the research and inputs provided by the needs analysis, 
weights are assigned to each function, objective, and sub-objective in the value structure.  
The weights can be represented in two different but related ways:  local and global.  
Local weights are presented with each of the categories and subcategories requiring 
values that sum to 1.  In other words, when summed, all of the weights for all of the 
functions, all objective weights under a single function, and all of the sub-objective (if 
applicable) weights of a single objective total 1.  Global weights are the product of the 
local weights of an item and all of its parents—each category (function, objective, and 
sub-objective) in the value structure.  The sum of the global weights for all items is also 
1.  These weights establish the relative importance of each item in the value system and 
are used in the multi-attribute decision analysis to assign the proper weight to the 
outcome of a certain function or objective as it relates to the overall system effectiveness. 
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2. Design & Analysis Phase 
a) Alternatives Generation 
Proposed alternatives were varied to provide the decision maker with 
contrasting alternatives.  Several design analysis iterations yielded various systems 
alternatives designed to perform the functions required by the HAMR CONOPS.   The 
alternatives were composed of existing ASW systems to not only limit risk but to take 
advantage of the Navy’s vast resources.  The functional requirements implied by the 
CONOPS were mapped to physical systems through comprehensive research of current 
ASW functions and systems.  Physical alternatives were vetted based on many factors 
such as integration feasibility, ASW system performance, and operational effectiveness. 
b) Modeling and Analysis  
The proposed alternatives were modeled in different ASW scenarios to 
determine their operational effectiveness.  The alternatives and systems that were deemed 
feasible were given a cost benefit analysis to determine how much capability can be 
provided at what associated cost.  The cost of the system is looked at from multiple 
perspectives.  Unit price, estimated integration costs, and manpower costs were all factors 
in the total system cost.  The key physical specifications are incorporated into some 
models to perform a comparative analysis of a particular system.  The key performance 
specifications of interest are the volumes a system occupies, the weight, and power 
consumption of each system.  These were included in the cost models for comparative 
reasons.  A cost effective system may not be suitable because it occupies too much space 
or consumes an excessive amount of power.  The approach taken was not to duplicate the 
alternatives generation phase but instead to examine the key outputs of the alternatives 
generation phase.  The key outputs space, weight, and power consumption are thus the 
only physical performance specs that are incorporated into cost comparison models.  
SMEs provided unit prices, physical characteristics, and capability estimates.  Unknown 
variables such as integration costs were given best effort analyses to determine 
reasonable cost ranges.  The physical characteristics and system capabilities were 
weighed against their associated costs.  System cost estimates were categorized by 
15 
capability in order to determine what area the focus of monetary investment will be made 
for a particular configuration. 
The modeling phase provided performance baselines for various 
configurations.  Performance simulations were created to compare each alternative 
system under consideration from an operational standpoint.  Physical configurations 
exhibiting the most effectiveness for a given operational scenario were analyzed in more 
detail.  This modeling approach insured more fitting configurations, each of which 
customized for its specific test scenario.  The resulting data from this detailed analysis 
was then reincorporated into the team’s cyclic design analysis process.  The alternatives 
were compared using a cost benefit analysis.  Logistics requirements were considered 
among many other factors that ultimately determined alternative feasibility.  The 
resulting design and analysis iterations produced best fit system proposals. 
Spreadsheet tools were used to capture system data and mathematically 
analyzed and graphically illustrate the relationships and relative costs between systems.  
Absolute cost was used as one factor for future feasibility screening.  Data collection 
required a comprehensive and tedious research effort spanning various Navy facilities as 
well as non-military organizations.  Any information that was available, pertinent, and 
unclassified was collected for possible model inputs.  Actual costs, SME input, confirmed 
specifications, as well as best effort estimates all provided input to the HAMR ASW 
mission module cost models.   
3. Decision Making Phase 
Each alternative was thoroughly analyzed.  Every alternative is made up of 
multiple subsystems.  To generate a cost estimate for a single alternative, the cumulative 
costs of the subsystems were accounted for as accurately as possible.  The cumulative 
weights and power consumptions were also critical inputs that were provided to the 
decision makers.  Weighting techniques were used to score the alternatives.    
4. Implementation Phase 
A recommendation for a practical implementation was made after scoring the 
alternatives.  The ASW mission module project is to provide the stakeholders with a 
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recommendation on a prospective prototype mission package.  Our recommendations will 
be provided to the sponsor for assessment and subsequent implementation. 
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II.  PROBLEM DEFINITION 
A. INITIAL PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The problem which was initially provided by the stakeholders (U.S. European 
Command (EUCOM), Space and Naval Warfare (SPAWAR), U.S. Air Force, NUWC 
Division Keyport, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) 05, Naval Air (NAVAIR) 
Systems, Lockheed Martin)17 includes the stakeholders’ interest in a constant airborne 
presence, an airship with greater lift capabilities, and in tactical modules for hybrid 
aircraft demonstrator.  The problem has been defined as fielding an ASW prototype or 
concept module for a 50-lifting ton, lighter-than-air demonstrator platform.  The module 
is to be removable to allow the host platform to be reconfigurable for various mission 
options.  In addition, power is to be provided by the host platform.   
 
B. NEEDS ANALYSIS 
1. Stakeholder Analysis  
The charter of the Chief of Naval Operations Task Force ASW and the 
stakeholders’ needs statement provided the foundation to the concept of the HAMR 
performing ASW roles. This was also the starting point for the systems engineering 
process.  Numerous stakeholders from the various commands vying for a common goal in 
the advancement of ASW in the 21st century afforded a wealth of knowledge to pool 
from in approaching the surveys for our stakeholders. The purpose of the stakeholder 
survey is to focus the direction of the effort in the problem definition, design analysis, 
and decision making phases of the systems engineering process. The system engineering 
process is an iterative process.  Feedback from the stakeholder surveys help shape the 
needs analysis and the value systems design.  The stakeholder analysis and research 
comprised of the initial surveys, interviews, and research on ASW platforms, combat 
systems, equipment, surface & subsurface sensors, tactics, environment, and doctrine. 
 
                                                 
17Allocca [2007] 
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A complete list of stakeholder questions is located in Appendix A.  Sample survey 
questions include:  
• External considerations 
• How/who will the airship operate with? 
• Is the HAMR part of our engineering effort? 
• System considerations 
• Will the team be developing/considering new or immature technologies? 
• At what technology readiness level (TRL) should ASW systems be 
considered for this project? 
• What secondary missions could this possibly perform? 
• ISR  
• Mine warfare (MW) 
• Electronic warfare (EW) 
• Missile defense 
• Small boat defense 
• Torpedo defense 
• Should the team consider functions outside of ASW in our objectives? 
Stakeholder survey research was done by a series of e-mails, telephone calls, and 
interviews of SMEs.  The team was able to gather information on what questions to ask 
the stakeholders for this project.  Further research enabled the team to create a 
stakeholder questionnaire which helped the team work through the problem definition 
phase.  
Stakeholder analysis was primarily used to discuss the stakeholders’ needs.  From 
the use of the stakeholder survey, the team was able to evaluate common goals, create an 
initial needs statement, and begin the systems engineering process. 
 The feedback from stakeholders David Allocca, Donald Statter, Tim Busch, and 
Scott Rarig provided the problem definition and needs analysis.18  The feedback also 
generates other aspects of the SEDP.   
Stakeholders have unique interests which may not always align with one another.  
This is to be expected when projects span commands and sponsors.  It was the team’s 
task to merge interests in an unbiased way to successfully address the needs of the 
stakeholders. 
For example, one stakeholder felt critical capabilities should be: 
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19 
• 24/7 coverage 
• Keep subs out of torpedo attack zone (Primary) 
• Keep subs out of cruise missile attack zone or provide superb cruise 
missile defense (secondary due to the existence of Aegis escorts) 
• Provide network relay 
• Deep magazines for fighting a high tempo battle19 
In contrast, another stakeholder felt that critical capabilities should be that “…all 
detected objects should be plotted as icons on a moving map display system such as 
FalconView.  Detected object data will be transmitted to remote users in real-time by use 
of data links and IP networks.”20 
2. Current ASW Capabilities and Operations 
a) Fast Attack Submarine 
   The SSN, or fast attack submarine, is often considered the primary 
platform to conduct ASW for the Navy.  However, with shrinking budgets and drastic 
reductions in numbers of submarines and ships combined with the limited flight hours of 
the P-3 Orion, the Navy must explore new and innovative ways to conduct the ASW 
mission. 
   While acknowledged as a first choice to combat enemy submarines, the 
drastic reduction in the number of submarines in the force makes it impractical to place 
such high dependency on them.  Although they can easily operate in the littoral 
environment as well as open ocean, the paucity of their numbers combined with other 
high priority missions may limit the use of the SSN in some theaters.   
b) Surface Ships 
   Surface ships, in combination with embarked helicopters, are another layer 
of the defense of the carrier.  Advances in technology enabled the design of better sonars 
and use of towed arrays for the surface ships.  However, these ships are still needed in 
relatively close proximity to the carrier.  In addition to the ASW mission, the CGs, 
DDGs, and FFGs still play an important role in anti-air warfare and missile defense for 
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the carrier.  This important mission may also prevent proper search techniques or 
positioning for best submarine search.21 
c) P-3 Orion 
   “The P-3 Orion is a peerless airborne hunter.  Its reputation as the ultimate 
submarine finder was earned through more than 45 years of service, from the Cuban 
Missile Crisis to round-the-clock, low-profile patrols throughout the Cold War. The P-3 
remains a relied-upon asset today and has proven to be remarkably well adapted for 
maritime patrol in the post-Cold War world. In fact, no other aircraft is better suited.”22 
    As seen from the quote above from leadership at Lockheed Martin, the P-3 
has been in service for over 4 decades.  This platform is aging and the claim that no other 
aircraft “is better suited” for the maritime patrol mission is debatable.  The 
recommendations presented in this paper will provide alternatives to the P-3 for 
conducting the airborne ASW mission.   
    As the Navy heads toward the use of distributed, networked sensor fields, 
the recommendations presented will be able to play an important part in the mission.  
Whether by placing sensor fields or sonobuoys, tracking or relaying data, or conducting 
attacks, the HAMR is well positioned to meet the ASW mission. 
3. Concept of Operations 
A concept of operations reflects the mission as well as environmental 
requirements.  It will also show how the system is generally intended to be used.  Within 
the concept of operations, different scenarios will be considered.   
The HAMR and ASW module will be used in various environments in which our 
forces maintain control.  Operating at altitudes up to 20,000 feet, it is an all weather 
platform designated to perform the ASW mission.  It will operate day or night in all sea 
states and in 50kt wind conditions.  The airframe has a range of 2,200 NM and can 
operate independently for up to ten days at a time.  HAMR is to be used in areas where 
the U.S. possesses air superiority to prevent attack from enemy forces.   
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The HAMR ASW module is considered in two operational scenarios:  stand alone 
patrol and maintaining a safe operating area for a CSG.  The module provides such 










Figure 3. HAMR Tactical ASW Concept of Operations.  
 
a) Stand Alone Patrol 
The HAMR, equipped with the ASW module, may be used as a single 
patrol asset (Figure 4) against open water or confined threat areas.  This would be 
accomplished by having the HAMR module strategically deploy and monitor sonar 
sensors.  The module would actively process the data returned by the sensors allowing 
the HAMR to aggressively pursue, track, and engage (or call other assets to engage) all 
unidentified submarine contacts.  Other ASW assets may be alerted with the modules 
ability to communicate with various platforms if the situation calls for alternate types of 


























Figure 4. Stand Alone Patrol Concept of Operations. 
  
b) Safe Operating Area 
   The HAMR ASW module may also be used to maintain a safe operating 
area (SOA) for a CSG or ESG (Figure 5).  The ASW module would act as a 
communications hub for all other assets allowing strategic planning using real-time data 
passed between the module and additional assets.  The module would be capable of 
deploying and monitoring sensors within a certain radius, sharing any detections and 
tracks as a result of the data returned by the sensors.  This application would ensure no 
enemy submarines could intercept forces within the SOA.  Upon detection of a threat the 

















Figure 5. Safe Operating Area Concept of Operations. 
 
4. Mission Requirements 
The mission requirements are defined and refined throughout the SEDP.  Mission 
requirements are obtained through stakeholder analysis and research, tying both the 
current and future needs together into a deliverable to meet the effective need.   
The team must base design decisions in fulfilling this gap without compromising 
the effectiveness of the deep water capabilities.  Combat in the littorals pose unique and 
interesting challenges that the ASW module can help overcome if the correct variations 
of alternatives are put together.  Challenges that are faced in the littoral are: 
• Acoustic propagation in shallow water 
• Sea floor characteristics 
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• Proximity to land 
• Limited ship maneuvers due to shallow waters 
• Limited submarine maneuvers due to shallow waters 
• Sensor degradation in shallow waters 
• Use of sonar and towed arrays are limited 
• Munitions’ depth requirements  
These are just a few examples of the challenges faced when architecting a system 
that is both effective in the littorals as well as the deep sea.  The ASW module can be 
designed to fulfill stand alone missions or to act as a centralized unit tying the remaining 
ships in the battle group together.  This will be accomplished by designing a platform that 
is capable of communicating with the various other platforms currently being used in the 
fleet for ASW.  By providing this centralized service and communication capabilities, the 
HAMR ASW module may provide advanced battle space awareness, tracking, and 
engagement capabilities both in the shallow and deep seas.   
The ASW module must also be designed in such a manner that it does not require 
unique support accommodations.  It may very well be possible to utilize current and near 
future technologies incorporated into one package, the ASW module, to fulfill missions 
that would otherwise take multiple platforms to accomplish.  Alternative analysis and 
modeling will be conducted to help define the recommended system.   
5. Threats 
The Navy faces greater challenges with the advancement of propulsion systems, 
sensors, and armor being integrated into smaller, more versatile submarines.  Focus has 
shifted toward influencing the outcome of war closer to the shore where these submarines 
may alter the battle space.  It has become increasingly important to control the sea from 
the deep to shallow waters.  The inability to approach coastal waters may hinder the 
Navy’s effectiveness against threats on- and offshore.  In addition, diesel submarines 
present a significant threat because they are virtually undetectable while operating on 
battery power.23  Combine this with the complications of acoustic signature detection in 
shallow water and the summary equates to the challenges of ASW in the littorals.   
                                                 
23 Kakesako [2008] 
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Discussions with stakeholders indicate that the littoral threat is very real and 
increasing.24  With the advancement of mines as well as submarines, the Navy must take 
action to maintain a formidable position against the shallow water threats.      
6. Disposal and Demilitarization 
The purpose of the disposal effort is to consider the demilitarization and disposal 
of HAMR ASW equipment at the end of its useful life.  The HAMR program must ensure 
that there is sufficient information to enable disposal to be carried out in a way that is in 
accordance with all legal and regulatory requirements relating to safety, the environment, 
and security.   
The Systems Safety Officer (SSO) should ensure that hazards associated with 
disposal and demilitarization of the system are identified and resolved early in the life of 
the system through the application of system safety management and engineering 
principles. While some alternatives may contain small amounts of hazardous materials 
(HAZMAT), they will not expose users under normal conditions.  All HAZMAT 
materials should be identified before the disposal and demilitarization process and will be 
taken into consideration for the appropriate action.  
The HAMR program should maximize environmental protection by specifying 
any alternative that utilizes materials which do not adversely affect the environment.  
Recycling and reprocessing considerations will be considered for all alternatives to 
maximize the best option during disposal and demilitarization.  
All systems that are considered a security risk will take appropriate action upon 
disposal and demilitarization. The primary concern is to prevent the inadvertent 
disclosure of sensitive information stored on computer hard drives or within the related 
equipment.   
Detailed demilitarization and disposal plans will be prepared as the system 
approaches the end of its useful life.  If major subsystems or mission systems become 
obsolete, detailed plans for their demilitarization and disposal will be prepared at the 
appropriate time. 
                                                 
24 Heady [2008] 
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7. System Constraints 
The ASW module is bounded by the limitations of the demonstrator version of the 
HAMR.  Physical attributes such as size and weight and the technology maturity are also 
limitations.  Based on the information provided by the stakeholders, the HAMR is 
capable of lifting approximately 50 tons.25  Throughout the alternatives analysis and 
selection process, the total weight of the subsystem combinations will be considered to 
ensure that the team complies with the weight constraint of the HAMR.   
Given that the HAMR is not intended to have a powerful thrust from its engines, 
the overall drag the module adds to the HAMR is taken into consideration.  The module 
will be designed to fulfill the ASW mission need along with as little added drag as 
possible by selectively going over the alternative combinations that can deliver a 
balanced solution.  Solutions that require the module to have external extremities 
underneath it will inflict the most added drag to the system.  However, the alternative will 
not be ruled out as it may provide the essentials for fulfilling the mission needs.  
In addition to the physical constraints, timing is a critical factor in the 
development of the ASW module.  The prototype is scheduled to be developed within the 
next five years.  The technology maturity of the alternative selections is crucial in 
meeting the time constraint of five years.  To ensure technology maturity, only existing 
technologies and technologies that were “fieldable” within five years were considered.  
TRLs are measured on a scale of one to nine, one – two range being “basic technology 
research,” increasing to “system test, launch and operation” at level nine.  For this 
project, it was determined that only technologies at a TRL level of five or greater (five 
being “technology demonstration”) would be considered. 
8. Assumptions 
Given that the HAMR is a prototype, there are several unknown system 
constraints.  For instance, we are currently designing alternatives with the assumption 
that the HAMR will provide all the electrical power required by the ASW module.  It is 
also assumed that the HAMR will follow conventional Navy power distribution practices.   
                                                 
25Meyers [2007] 
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The mechanical configuration and mating scheme, ASW module to HAMR, will 
be based on the premise that standard mechanical interlocking systems and seals will be 
used.  The same can be said for the mechanical electrical connections.  However, there is 
more focus on the overall performance analysis of the combination of subsystems that 
will best fulfill the effective need.  
Assumptions are also made, but confined to, what has been researched and 
discussed among the stakeholders on the scenarios that would yield the best results 
among the alternatives.  Utilizing the information obtained through the needs analysis, 
requirements, and scenarios, the project’s scope may be limited to the following 
assumptions on what the HAMR and ASW module will be able to provide: 
• Air Superiority – HAMR platform will not have to defend against anti-
aircraft threats. 
• Performance – The HAMR will perform as stated in “White Paper for 
Tactical Support Platform for Overland and Maritime Missions,”26 but 
assume the following: 
 A towed array may be used effectively from airship 
 Dimensions (82x12x10) of the container used for the ASW 
module27 
 HAMR will work in all weather environments28 
 Max ceiling (unloaded/no cargo) 20,000 ft.29 
 Max speed 100 knots30 
 Cruise speed 75 knots31 
 Max Cargo 100,000 lbs.32 
 Fuel burn rate (fully loaded) roughly ~ 25 lbs/mi33 
 Hotel services are addressed by the airship not by the ASW 
module 
9. Support Infrastructure 
Support infrastructure encompasses the concept of providing a level of support 
capability and maintenance for piece parts, software, hardware, and components that are 
integrated into the prime mission-related elements of the system.  This support is 
                                                 
26Allocca [2007] 
27Myers [2007] 
28 Ibid [2008] 
29 Ibid [2008] 
30 Ibid [2008] 
31 Ibid [2008] 
32 Meyers [2007] 
33 Meyers [2007] 
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incorporated throughout the entire lifecycle including response to the maintenance and 
support infrastructure requirements.  The support infrastructure is developed during the 
conceptual design phase, evolving from the definition of the system operational 
requirements and comprises of transportation and handling equipment, test equipment, 
the supply support capability, maintenance facilities, and other applicable elements of 
logistic support all addressed in the designed characteristics.34 
10. Functional Analysis 
Functional analysis is an iterative process of generating system requirements and 
transforming them into increasingly detailed design criteria.  This process identifies the 
functions necessary for the system will be required to perform in order to accomplish the 
ASW mission.   
a) Research 
In order to facilitate the analysis and ensure accuracy and completeness, 
the team used three primary sources to obtain information, stakeholder analysis, existing 
platform functional analysis, and existing Navy policy and procedures. 
As described in section II.B.1 the stakeholder analysis provided valuable 
insight into the expected functions of a HAMR ASW module.   A summary of 
stakeholder feedback is given in Appendix A.  While a great deal of useful information 
was gathered from stakeholders it was immediately clear that many of the functions that 
stakeholders envisioned the module performing did not fall within the ASW mission area.   
Some effort was needed to properly scope the system while at the same time considering 
every possible function. 
 To gain an understanding of current ASW assets and their functions, the 
team performed a functional decomposition on four ASW platforms.  The four platforms, 
a P-3 maritime patrol aircraft, an H-60 helicopter, an AEGIS surface vessel, and a 
submarine were analyzed, and their ASW missions represented in a functional flow 
diagram.  In order to make the best use of the resources available each IPT (see Appendix 
                                                 
34 Blanchard [2005:p.71] 
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B for IPT structure) was responsible for performing the analysis and research for one 
platform.   
b) Affinity Diagramming  
Once the team was comfortable with the research that had been 
accomplished a series of meetings were held to establish the essential functions of the 
system.   The affinity diagramming process, as described by Professor Gene Paulo35 in 
his lecture notes and on the American Society of Quality (ASQ) website,36 was used to 
organize and direct the affinity diagramming effort.  The team first collected all of the 
information that had been gathered during research and listed all functions and sub-
functions that were identified.  After all team members were satisfied that all possible 
functions had been represented the functions where organized into functional categories.  
These functional areas include the following: 
• Detect submarines 
• Classify submarines 
• Engage submarines 
• Track submarines 
• Localize submarines 
• Communicate  
• Air defense 
• Mine warfare   
This list includes many functions that stakeholders expressed an interest in 
incorporating into the system as well as functions that could be considered as secondary 
functions in the main ASW mission.  All functions were evaluated against the primary 
ASW mission with respect to the project scope and the value added by the function to 
that mission.  As a result of this evaluation and discussion among the project team, 
stakeholders, and advisors many functions where eliminated and the following functions 
were determined to be fundamental to the mission: 
Detect:  The ability of the proposed system to search a specified area and 
detect the presence of enemy submarines in that area.  
                                                 
35 Paulo [2006] 
36 “The Quality Toolbox”  [2008] 
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Classify:  The ability of the proposed system to identify detected 
submarines correctly.  
Engage:  The ability of the proposed system to terminate or alter the 
mission of known enemy submarines.  
Track:  The ability of the system to effectively maintain an accurate track 
on an enemy target. 
Localize:  The ability of the system to reduce the area of uncertainty of the 
location of the submarine sufficiently to engage the submarine. 
Communicate:  the ability of the system to effectively and reliably 
communicate with own force and allies. 
Detection can be broken down into sub-functions including queuing, 
search plan (surface & subsurface), environmental planning, surveillance, and loitering.  
Sub-functions of communications include battle group connectivity, airframe and pilot 
communications, over the horizon relay, receiving intelligence, and data transmission.  
The engage function includes the sub-functions to destroy, disable, deceive, or deter.  
Tracking encompasses the sub-functions of data collection, maintain contact, observe, 
and report.  Classify includes data processing, data comparison, determination of contact 
(friend or foe), and the determination of threat level.  Localizing a threat has sub-
functions of positioning of friend or foe and determining a fire solution.  
c) Functional Flow and Functional Hierarchy 
Using the functions and sub-functions identified in the previous section, 
functional flow and functional hierarchy diagrams were assembled.    
The functional flow diagram, shown in Figure 6, represents the flow of 
data or responsibility from one function or sub-function to another.  The functional flow 
diagram is helpful in visualizing and establishing how, were, and when each function fits 
in the ASW mission.  Like all flow diagrams, the functional flow diagram is intended to 
illustrate how a process, or multiple processes, is performed.  The illustration in Figure 6 
includes flow paths represented as lines with arrows, decision points represented as 
circles containing the letters ‘Y’ and ‘N’, logical operators represented by circles 
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containing the words ‘AND’ or ‘OR’, and activities or functions represented by 
rectangular boxes.37  The primary functions are displayed as large green colored 
rectangles and the sub-functions are displayed as smaller, grey-blue colored rectangles.  
The purpose of the functional hierarchy, shown in Figure 7, was to provide 
a logical representation of how functions and sub-functions were related to each other.  
The functional hierarchy also provides a natural basis for the inclusion of objectives and 
the establishment of a value system which will be discussed later. 
                                                 
37 Sage [2000: P.131] 
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Figure 6.  Functional Flow. 
 
33 
Figure 7.   Functional Hierarchy. 
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C. REVISED PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Based on the results of the needs analysis, the team updated the initial problem 
statement and established the following revised problem statement, or effective need for 
the HAMR ASW mission module: 
  
“A persistent airborne asset for detecting, communicating, tracking, 
localizing, classifying and engaging ASW threats.” 
 
This statement captures the functional requirements and objectives of the system. 
 
D. VALUE SYSTEMS DESIGN 
1. Value Structure 
The value structure design methodology and purpose is described by the 
following:  
“The construction of value hierarchies reflects the values of our critical 
stakeholders by expanding the effective need of our system into critical functions, sub-
functions and objectives of our system.  This is the foundation of the Value System 
Design step of the Problem Definition phase of the SEDP…The completed value model 
is the mechanism that we will use is to evaluate how well each alternative meets our 
clients’ needs.”38 
This value structure provides a top down view of what is to be accomplished, the 
relative value of those accomplishments, and by what means they will be measured.  The 
effective need was given earlier and will be the foundation for the value structure. 
For clarity the following definitions will be used when discussing these terms: 
Function:  An activity that the system is designed to perform (i.e. Destroy targets) 
and an evaluation consideration for alternative system designs.39 
                                                 
38 Paulo [2006] 
39 Paulo [2006] 
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Objective:  Preferred direction of attainment of an evaluation consideration, or 
functional capability (i.e. Higher probability of kill).40 
Measure of Effectiveness (MOE):  Scale, or metric, used to measure the degree 
that attains an objective (i.e. Probability of kill).41 
2. Process 
Building the objectives hierarchy began with the functions identified in the 
functional hierarchy.  Stakeholder feedback, team research, and SME interviews were 
used to identify objectives and associate them with high level functions.  The high level 
function of prosecution was added to reflect the relationship between the classify, track, 
localize, and engage functions as well as further emphasize the importance of the 
detection function.  Functions that were not included in the functional analysis were also 
added for suitability items that are essential to the development of the module.  Human 
factors were added to reflect stakeholder interest in reducing system manning.  
Supportability, reliability, maintainability, availability, and survivability are not linked to 
primary objectives to be addressed in this paper.  These suitability items are included in 
the value structure because they represent important functions of the proposed system, 
however due to the limited scope of this paper and direction from stakeholders, detailed 
analysis will not be undertaken for these functions and they will not be considered in the 
multi-attribute decision analysis.   
Once the objectives were identified, MOEs were established for each objective.  
These MOEs were often directly called out in the objective or recommended by 
stakeholders.  A few objectives were subjective by nature and did not have a universally 
agreed upon “best method” for measuring success.  In these cases the team discussed 
known alternative methods and selected the method(s) that seemed most applicable and 
appropriate.  
Maximize Probability of Detection:  It is a primary objective of the system to, 
given a scenario, maximize the probability that an enemy submarine will be detected.  
This was broken down into sub-objectives of “maximizing detections” made while on 
                                                 
40 Ibid [2008] 
41 Ibid [2008] 
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station and “maximizing time on station” to allow more opportunity to accomplish the 
objective.  The MOEs for this objective are the percent of enemy submarines detected in 
relation to the number of total opportunities and the time on station per sortie of the 
system. 
Maximize Detection Range:  Maximizing detection range is fundamental to the 
ability of the system to be effective in operational scenarios.   The unique properties of 
the ocean environment dictate that there are different operational areas that will have 
varying effects on the detection range of the system.  The three primary operating areas 
of a submarine are on the surface, below the surface but above the thermal layer, and 
below the thermal layer.  Each of those operational areas are considered as part of this 
objective.  The MOEs for this objective are the detection ranges when an enemy 
submarine is operating in each of those operating areas. 
Quickly Classify Contacts:  In order to know what action needs to be taken when 
a submarine is detected and to ensure detected submarines, called contacts, are not 
prosecuted unnecessarily, they must be classified as quickly as possible. The MOE for 
this objective is time from first detection to classification. 
Accurately Classify Contacts:  In order to most efficiently use limited assets and 
prevent fratricide it is essential that contacts are correctly classified.  The classification 
MOE is the error rate in all classifications. 
Maintain a Firm Track:  Having a track on a submarine means knowing within a 
reasonable certainty where that submarine is and where it is going, and maintaining that 
knowledge is essential to prosecuting the submarine.  The MOE for this objective is the 
percentage of time that the track is maintained related to the time that the system is 
required to track the submarine. 
Track Multiple Targets:  Tracking multiple targets simultaneously is fundamental 
to the success of the system in all situations where multiple enemy contacts are present.  
The MOE for this objective is the number of contacts simultaneously tracked. 
Reduce Area of Uncertainty:   The area of uncertainty is the area in which you can 
say with confidence where the enemy submarine is.  This objective reflects the need to 
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reduce that area as much as possible.  This is especially important when the ultimate 
objective is to engage the enemy submarine.  The MOE for this objective is the average 
area of uncertainty of enemy submarines at the time of firing point procedures. 
Increase Standoff Distance:  The further the enemy submarine is from the HAMR 
the less likely it will be to detect its presence and take evasive actions.  The MOE for this 
objective is the average distance of the HAMR at the time of firing point procedures. 
Reduce Time from Track to Firing Point Procedures:  In order to transition from 
passively tracking an enemy submarine to beginning firing point procedures and 
conducting engagement activities, the area of uncertainty must be reduced sufficiently.  It 
is important that this process proceeds as quickly as possible.  The MOE for this 
objective is the time from track to firing point procedures. 
Maximize Probability of Kill:  Probability of kill is the MOE that represents a 
systems effectiveness in destroying enemy submarines. 
Maximize Ability to Alter Enemy Mission:  There are situations where the HAMR 
could be called upon to engage an enemy but not seek to destroy it.  In those situations 
the goal is to harass the enemy and force them to alter or terminate their mission.  The 
MOE for this objective is the percentage of enemy missions altered and assumes 
knowledge of the enemy mission. 
Decrease Time to Kill:  Reducing the time required to kill an enemy submarine 
increases the overall effectiveness of the system by reducing the enemy’s ability to react 
and evade and increasing the ability of the HAMR to prosecute more targets in less time.  
The MOE for this objective is the time from when a firing solution is acquired and the 
enemy submarine is destroyed.   
Effectively Communicate with Friendly Forces and Allies:  Communication on 
data and command networks is essential to the effective execution of the mission of the 
HAMR with the ASW module.  This is also identified as an area where the HAMR could 
provide a significant increase in the overall ASW capability of the Navy.  In order to 
effectively communicate it is important that the communication networks be continuously 
available and that the range of be extended as far as possible.  There are a large number 
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of communication formats and systems operating over multiple frequency bands.  The 
MOEs for this objective are the availability of the individual systems, the range of the 
individual systems, and the percentage of systems that the system will include relative to 
the number of systems currently in use by the U.S. Navy and its allies. 
Reduce Required Manning:  Reducing required manning has many advantages 
and benefits, and stakeholders specifically expressed an interest in an unmanned 
alternative.  Reduced manning is especially important for the HAMR ASW module since, 
due to its extended persistence, it will be required to carry multiple crews.  The MOE for 
this objective is the minimum crew size per shift.    
 
Table 1. Value System 
Function/Sub-
Function 
Objective Sub-Objective Measure 





    Maximize 
Persistence 
Time on Station 










    Maximize Surface 
Range 
Detection Range of 
target Periscope on 
Surface 
Prosecute/Classify Quickly Classify 
Contacts 
  Time from First 
Detection to 
Classification 
  Accurately Classify 
Contacts 
  Classification Error 
Rate 
Prosecute/Track Maintain a Firm 
Track on Contacts 
  Percentage of Time 
Track Maintained  
  Track Multiple 
Targets 
  Number of 
Simultaneous 
Contacts Maintained 
Prosecute/Localize Increase Standoff 
Distance 
  Average Distance at 
Time of Firing Point 
Procedures 
  Reduce Area of 
Uncertainty 
  Average Area of 
Uncertainty 
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  Reduce Time from 
Track to Firing Point 
Procedures 
  Average Time from 
Track to Firing Point 
Procedures 
Prosecute/Engage Maximize Probability 
of Kill 
  Probability of Kill 
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Alter Enemy Mission 
  Percent of Missions 
Altered 
  Decrease Time to 
Kill 
  Average Time from 
Firing Solution to Kill 
Communicate Effectively 
Communicate with 
Friendly Forces and 
Allies 


















Supportability        
Maintainability       
Reliability       
Survivability        
Availability       
Human Factors Reduce Required 
Manning 
  ASW Module 
Minimum Crew Size 
 
3. Key Functions 
Key functions, or key parameters, are defined as those functions that most clearly 
define the capabilities and characteristics that are most important to the success of the 
intended mission.42  The stakeholder analysis and research performed earlier revealed 
certain functions that were viewed as being critical to the success of this system in 
performing its mission and meeting the ASW need of the Navy.    
Initially it was unclear what the stakeholders envisioned as being the key 
functions of this system; there were many conflicting opinions about the direction the 
development should take.  As the discussion went on and the scope of the system was 
                                                 
42 CJCSM 3170.01C,  Enclosure B, [2007] 
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more clearly defined, the stakeholders, especially users, began to emphasize a common 
message:  “…we have assets for killing enemy submarines if we know where they are, 
the problem is finding them.”43  It was the opinion of most of the stakeholders that while 
the HAMR could, and perhaps should, be capable of performing attack missions, its true 
potential lay in its persistent search capabilities.  The following statements capture this 
idea: 
“We need to convince the acquisition establishment that aircraft carriers 
cannot be defended against the threat of submarines unless protected by long 
endurance, low altitude, low stall speed aircraft, with large sensor payloads 
optimized for ASW operations.”44  
“A large gap exists between the number of missions that need to be flown 
and the platforms available to execute them.  The hybrid would relieve this 
pressure by taking on the patrol/escort missions that do not require great speed of 
flight but do require long term persistence with 24/7 coverage being the goal.”45 
4. Value Weighting 
Taking into consideration all of the research and inputs provided, weights were 
assigned to each function, objective, and sub-objective, in the value structure.   The 
weights can be represented in two different but related ways:  local and global.  Local 
weights are presented with each of the categories and subcategories requiring values that 
sum to 1.  In other words, when summed, all of the weights for all of the functions, all of 
the objective weights under a single function, and all of the sub-objective (if applicable) 
weights of a single objective total 1.  Global weights are the product of the local weights 
of an item and all of its parents, so for each category (function, objective, sub-objective) 
in the value structure, the sum of the global weights for all items is 1.  These weights 
establish the relative importance of each item in the value structure and are used in the 
multi-attribute decision analysis to assign the proper weight to the outcome of a certain 
function or objective as it relates to the overall system effectiveness.   
                                                 
43 CAPT Kuhlman [2008] 
44 Statter [2008] 
45Allocca [2008] 
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The process for establishing weights included several iterations and revisions.  In 
order to initially establish the weights, the project team met together and assigned values 
based on the understanding they had gained about the desired outcome.  Upon finishing 
the initial weighting of the value structure it was shown to and discussed with several key 
stakeholders.  Changes were made based on the stakeholder feedback, and after the 
structure had been fully revised, it was again submitted to the key stakeholders for 
review.  When the stakeholders were satisfied with the weighted value structure, it was 
considered complete.   Figures 8 through 15 show the value structure functions and 
objectives in a hierarchy with their associated weights in parenthesis (local/global).   
The global weights shown in Figures 8 through 15 reflect the importance of 
detection as the key function and the decision not to include some of the suitability items 
in the decision analysis.  Because of emphasis on the tactical performance and the 
transitional nature of this technology, the opinion of the team, the project stakeholders, 
and advisors was that, except for communication capabilities and reducing manning 
through human systems integration, suitability factors need not be considered in the 
analysis.  As mentioned previously, these suitability items are included here to emphasize 
that.  While they may not have immediate value, they are important and will have 
significant value in future development of this technology.   
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Figure 11.   Classify Branch. 
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Figure 15.   Human Factors Branch. 
 
5. Value Curves 
In order to asses the value of raw data generated from analysis and simulation 
activities and incorporate it into the value structure, value curves are needed.  Value 
curves help show the relative value of data by assigning a value score to the entire range 
of possible outcomes.  Each value curve is represented graphically by plotting the 
possible outcomes on the horizontal axis versus the relative value on the vertical axis.  
The relative value is a decimal value between 0 and 1.    
There are many different methods for establishing value curves presented in 
literature.  The team used a two step approach to elicit value curves for the MOEs to be 
used in the multi-attribute decision analysis.  The first step is selecting endpoints for the 
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value curve and the second is eliciting the relative values of the possible range of data 
points.  Establishing the end values of the curves was done through a process of 
combining data from analysis, simulations, and information from stakeholders and SMEs.  
In most cases, the most simple and verifiable endpoint values represented the two 
extremes that an MOE could obtain, often referred to as the “Ideal Range Method.”46  
Once the endpoints were established, again using the process of combining data from 
analysis and simulations and direct elicitation from stakeholders and SMEs,47 value 
curves were developed and incorporated into the multi-attribute decision analysis.   
Modeling and analysis is performed to generate data for the MOEs in the value 
structure.  Limitations in available information, the classified nature of much of technical 
and performance information, and the fact that the scope of this paper does not include 
any actual hardware design or “man-in-the-loop” simulations meant that obtaining data 
for each of the MOEs would not be practical or feasible.  The simulations, models, and 
analysis were focused on producing MOEs that best captured the broadest range of 
objectives and provided data for those objectives determined to be of the most valuable.  
Ultimately what this means is the MOEs presented in the multi-attribute decision analysis 
will not represent the complete set of MOEs presented in the value structure, but rather 
the decision analysis will include MOEs generated as a result of modeling simulation and 
analysis activities.  Because the value curves are dependent on the data that is produced 
as a result of modeling and analysis, the value curves and the associated MOEs and data 
will be presented and discussed in greater detail in Section IV.   
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47 Sage[2000:p.404-405] 
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III. DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
A. ALTERNATIVES GENERATION 
The alternatives generation phase is when the team begins to answer the question 
‘How is the team going to meet the needs of the customer?’  During this phase, the design 
team did not limit itself to a certain methodology or idea but tried to come up with as 
many unique solutions as possible.  This section discusses some of the proposed solutions 
and then uses the information gathered earlier to identify which of these alternatives are 
viable.  The alternatives that the team finds to be viable will be the recommended 
alternatives discussed in chapter V. 
The project team was tasked to design a system that will utilize existing ASW 
assets to act as a force multiplier in ASW thus expanding the current ASW capability.  
The alternatives generation portion of the project included exploring the ability to utilize 
the current government off-the-shelf (GOTS) systems.  GOTS takes existing ASW 
systems and integrates them into a new HAMR ASW module that will be suspended from 
the HAMR vehicle.  The team evaluated alternatives from ASW systems deployed on 
U.S. Navy submarines, aircraft, and surface ships to determine which systems are suitable 
for integration into the HAMR ASW module. 
Physically, the system is bounded primarily by the capabilities, configuration, and 
interface of the HAMR airframe.  The ASW module is intended to be capable of being 
attached, detached, and stored with relative ease.  
 47
B. DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVES 
Development of alternatives is a process of bringing system alternatives into 
being, which is often referred to as an ideation process, or “the creative mental process of 
producing concepts and ideas in order to solve problems.”48  The design team identified 
the critical functions and sub-functions of the proposed HAMR ASW module using 
brainstorming and Zwicky’s Morphological Box to generate a list of four design 
alternatives.    
The team considered the operational scenarios that the HAMR would be tasked to 
perform.  Current ASW systems were researched and compiled in a master list.  Once the 
master list was complete the systems were divided into five categories: 
• Combat systems/Communications 
• Hard kill (HK) weapons 
• Soft kill (SK) weapons 
• Subsurface sensors 
• Surface sensors 
This capability is intended to be fielded within five years for this purpose.  
Emphasis was placed on fielding an operational unit and less emphasis was placed on 
advanced technology.  The list of criteria used when determining the various alternatives 
is listed in Table 2.  This project is focused on the design of an ASW module, as such any 
hotel accommodations required for the personnel required to operate the module is 
assumed to be accommodated by the HAMR and is outside the scope of this report. 
                                                 
        48  SE 4001  [2008:p.5] 
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Table 2. Criteria Used. 
Criteria Description 
Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 5 The basic technological components are integrated with reasonably realistic 
supporting elements so that the technology 
can be tested in a simulated environment. 
Timeliness System can be fielded in five years. 
The weapon system leaving inventory The weapon system must not be at end of life cycle.  ex: would not consider MK 50 
torpedo since it will be out of the fleet in 
FY12-14. 
Component applicability The component is required to fulfill a HAMR ASW requirement. 
Ineffectiveness Components from other systems that do not apply to the ASW mission. 
Replaced by newer component Assets from the Navy inventory that has 
been replaced by a newer model. 
Once the initial four alternatives were determined, the team performed some 
regrouping of similar functions and put them under the higher level category of combat 
systems.  This allowed the team to plot the four alternatives in a Zwicky’s Morphological 














Figure 16. Zwicky’s Morphological Box. 
 
After much research and discussion the team was able to take the various ASW 
systems and determine four design alternatives to be considered.  
1. Alternative #1 
The first design alternative, ‘Single Platform with Stand Alone Operations’ is 
intended to perform detection, tracking, and prosecution functions.  It is called the “single 
platform” since it does not rely on any other systems external to the HAMR to perform 
the capability.  The detection capabilities that are performed include 1,080 sonobuoys, 
and the prosecution capability is supported with the use of MK-54 torpedo’s, super 
cavitating munitions, smart depth bombs, and RAMICS.  The complete list of systems 
included with this alternative is shown in Table 3.  The quantity of sonobuoys was 
determined by the number required to sustain a tracking mission for the maximum 
duration of 7 days that the HAMR would be able to support, the active lifespan of a 
sonobuoy (8 hrs), the number of sonobuoys deployed (50 ea.) at a time to enable tracking, 
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and onboard spares (30 ea.) in case of failure.  Based on the list of systems included in 
this alternative, it was determined that it will require four people to operate the system at 
any given time.  Assuming an 8 hour shift, there would need to be twelve people onboard 
the HAMR to support this system. This alternative does, however, include 8 lightweight 
torpedoes.  This number was determined since the ASW module utilizes existing systems, 
and the P-3 torpedo magazine is designed to hold 8 torpedoes.  
 
Table 3. Single Platform (Stand Alone Operations) List of Systems. 
Combat Systems Hard Kill The weapons 
Subsurface 
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Sonobuoy Receiver 
(ARR 970)    
Sonobuoy Dispenser 
(Integrated with TIS)    
   
2. Alternative #2 
The second design alternative is the ‘Heavy Weight (HWT) Sensor Platform with 
Towed Array and Cooperative Engagement Operations.’  This alternative is intended to 
use the HAMR for detection and tracking, however it will use external systems such as 
the P3 or H-60 for prosecution.  The combat systems category remains the same as with 
the first alternative.  In the subsurface sensors category the team has added a towed array 
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and dipping sonar to the list.  The complete list of systems included with this alternative 
is shown is Table 4 below.  This alternative has the same number of sonobouys as with 
Alternative 1 and is designed to sustain the same 7 day duration that the HAMR would be 
capable of sustaining.  Even though the design has different systems included, the total 
number of persons required to operate it remain the same (four per shift).   
 
Table 4. Heavy Weight (HWT) Platform List of Systems. 
Combat Systems Hard Kill The weapons 
Subsurface 
























































3. Alternative #3 
  The third design alternative is the ‘Unmanned Light Weight (LWT) Sensor 
Platform with Buoys and Cooperative Engagement Operations.’  This alternative is 
similar to Alternative 2 except that it does not have the towed array or dipping sonar.  
Since there are no prosecution capabilities with this alternative and any towed array or 
dipping sonar, the manning requirements of this solution are very low.  There is the 
possibility since it is primarily a sensing system that the system could be operated 
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remotely and would not require any onboard manning.  The complete list of systems 
included with this alternative is shown is Table 5 below.   Even though this is an 
unmanned alternative and no personnel are required to be onboard the HAMR to operate 
the ASW module, it was determined that the system would still require two people to 
operate this system located on the ground or other Naval vessel. 
 
Table 5. Unmanned Light Weight (ULWT) Platform List of Systems. 
Combat Systems Hard Kill The weapons 
Subsurface 
Sensors Surface Sensors 
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4. Alternative #4 
The fourth design alternative is the current Navy P-3 ASW operations.  With this 
alternative the team would not build an ASW module for the HAMR, rather the ASW 
mission would be performed by the P-3 platform and other current ASW systems.  This 
alternative is shown in Table 6.   This alternative is used as a baseline for comparing the 
various alternatives.  It was determined that the P-3 requires six people onboard the 
aircraft to operate the ASW systems, and it carries one torpedo magazine which holds 
eight torpedoes.   
 
Table 6. P-3 ASW Platform List of Systems.  
Combat Systems 
Hard Kill The 
weapons 

























































C. MODELING AND ANALYSIS 
1. Performance Analysis 
a) Approach and Methodology 
The purpose of modeling the HAMR alternatives was to provide objective 
input into the alternatives selection process of the SEDP.  Therefore, key measures of 
evaluation were selected as desired outputs of the modeling and simulation effort. 
The operational effectiveness modeling effort for the HAMR ASW 
module project first established performance of the existing P-3C Orion ASW system in 
the context of a sample mission accomplishment.  With the results of those scenarios, 
further analysis established the performance of the three various HAMR ASW 
configurations in the context of the chosen mission scenarios.   
The modeling and simulation effort included three major phases:  
modeling, simulation, and analysis.  The modeling and simulation was accomplished 
utilizing the Naval Simulation System (NSS) software package and Microsoft Excel.  
Further analysis was accomplished utilizing Minitab 15.  
Overall, three modeling objectives were established: 
• Develop analytical models of various alternatives 
• Develop quantitative operational scenarios 
• Determine performance characteristics of various alternatives within the 
developed scenarios 
b) Modeling and Simulation Software 
The principal tool the HAMR modeling team utilized for operational 
effectiveness modeling and analysis was the Naval Simulation System (NSS) software 
package, developed by the Space and Naval Warfare Center (SPAWAR) PD-15 and 
Metron Inc.  “The Naval Simulation System (NSS) is an object-oriented Monte Carlo 
modeling and simulation (M&S) software package.  NSS is designed to support 
operational commanders in developing and analyzing operational courses of action at the 
mission, group, or force levels.”49  The HAMR team utilized the platform level modeling 
                                                 
49 Metron [2002] 
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capability of NSS as the primary tool for analyzing the operational capability of the three 
HAMR alternatives.  
c) Modeling and Simulation Measures of Evaluation 
Using the measures of effectiveness and performance that were developed 
in the objectives hierarchy, the HAMR modeling team established evaluation metrics 
which could be obtained utilizing the available modeling resources.  Three of the first tier 
functions on the HAMR ASW functional hierarchy were chosen to be represented in 
performance modeling. The detection function was selected, represented by probability of 
detection.  The engage function was selected to be modeled, represented by time to 
engage.  The track function was also selected and modeled by a time which the system is 
capable of tracking a contact.  Each of these measures encapsulate different 
characteristics of the performance of the system. 
d) Model Input and Assumptions 
The object oriented design of NSS allowed the team to share components 
across models.  A principal design goal of the model object generation was to reutilize 
and leverage existing NSS objects throughout the modeling effort.  The platform details 
for the P-3C Orion were leveraged to build the various HAMR platform configurations.  
Re-utilizing the existing P-3C Orion platform model and sharing sensor objects across 
airframes ensured that each configuration had equivalent component capabilities and 
increased the manageability of the modeling effort.  Table 7 shows key model differences 









Table 7. Model Inputs. 
Platform Key Model Difference Description 
P-3 Baseline 
8 MK-54 torpedoes 
328 NM/hr cruise speed 
100 sonobuoys 
HAMR-1 Slower 
8 MK-54 torpedoes 
75 NM/hr 
1080 sonobuoys 
HAMR-2 Towed Array 
TB-29A towed array 
No torpedoes 
20 NM/hr top speed when using TB-29A 
HAMR-3 More Sonobuoys 
Greater sonobuoy capacity can double 




The command structure for the BLUE forces was represented the same in 
each scenario.  A naval commander is the overall authority for the scenario.  This 
commander has two subordinate objects:  the Naval Air Station and the ASW 
commander.  The Naval Air Station is the container object for the collection of aircraft 
platforms.  The ASW commander is the object which executes the ASW mission, 
drawing on the aircraft as resources.  Figure 17 displays the force structure utilized.  Each 
of the platforms modeled in the scenarios were assumed to have 100% operational 
availability.  This ensured that the ASW mission would be executed as designed rather 
than be impacted by repair and replacement effects.  Mean time between failure (MTBF) 
and mean time to repair (MTTR) are important when evaluating operations, but the study 
of those effects are well beyond the scope of this study.  Additionally, communications 
between the ASW commander and the aircraft were guaranteed to be sent, meaning there 














Figure 17. Scenario Force Structure.  From NSS [2008]. 
 
e) Scenario Overview 
Three operational scenarios were developed to examine the performance 
baseline ASW capability and three HAMR platform variants.  Two of the scenarios were 
modeled in NSS, and the other scenario was examined utilizing spreadsheet analysis.  
Table 8 shows the various operational scenarios.  Scenario ALPHA examines detection 
capability.  Scenario BRAVO examines the effectiveness of the platform’s ability to 
apply lethal force.  Scenario CHARLIE examines tracking effectiveness.  
 
Table 8. Operational Scenarios. 
Scenario Location Description Primary MOE Duration Tool 
ALPHA Korean Strait 
75 NM barrier is laid across Korean 
Strait. One RED submarine is 
operating in the area. ASW platform 
reports detections of RED sub 
Time tracked 7 Days NSS 
BRAVO Korean Strait 
75 NM barrier is laid across Korean 
Strait. Six RED submarines are 
operating in the area. ASW platform 
reports detections of RED sub. 
Armed ASW platform engages RED 
subs. Unarmed HAMR variants call 
for fire from P-3 assets at NAF 
Atsugi 
Time to first shot 7 Days NSS 
CHARLIE Philippine Sea 
ASW platform tracks RED 
submarine from Korean Strait 
through Philippine Sea 
Sorties N/A Excel 
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f) Scenario Alpha 
The purpose of Scenario ALPHA is to measure detection capability.  The 
performance model represented this indirectly by measuring the detection time a track on 
a contact is held.  The ALPHA scenario involves a barrier search in the Korea Strait.  The 
mission objective is to detect hostile submarine contacts (described herein as RED 
FORCES) that may be transiting the area.  The barrier search region (Figure 18) is 
formed approximately 75 NM in length between the landmasses of the Republic of Korea 
and Japan by the aircraft under test (BLUE alliance).  Air platforms are operating from 
Naval Air Station Atsugi.  The BLUE asset is directed only to report detections of RED 
FORCE contacts to the ASW commander located at NAS Atsugi.  The scenario is 
simulated for a period of 7 days.   
      
Figure 18. Map of Barrier Search Region. After NSS [2008]. 
 
Each of the four alternatives (P-3, HAMR-1, HAMR-2, and HAMR-3) 
was exercised in the ALPHA scenario.  Most aspects of the operational characteristics of 
the alternatives remained constant across all platforms.  Differences are shown in the 
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inputs on Table 9 shown below.  Platform launch occurs only one time for the HAMR 
aircraft.  The P-3’s rotate on station for 14 hour periods.  The sensor coverage and 
performance was the same for P-3 and HAMR-1, with a difference in buoy field 
deployment time.   The simulated P-3 is capable of deploying a 30-buoy, 3-column, 10-
row field in 1 hour 15 minutes.  This deployment time is repeated by follow-on P-3 
aircraft when the platform comes on station.  The HAMR-1 and HAMR-2 deploy the 
same field in 2 hours.  The HAMR-2 utilizes the additional towed array passive sonar 
sensor with a simulated max range of 10 NM.  The HAMR-3 utilizes a larger sonobuoy 
search field due to its capacity to carry more buoys.  The advantage of the 5 column, 10 
row field is offset by a longer (5 hour) deployment time.  For all platforms, buoy 
replenishment is implicit in the model and not tracked by NSS. 
The RED submarine which is operating in the ALPHA scenario has active 
and passive acoustic vulnerabilities.  The submarine also has additional “snorkel” 
vulnerability at 24 hour intervals for 30 minute durations.  The motion plan specifies the 
RED submarine to operate in a fixed region, annotated by the red square (Figure 19), of 
approximately 15,000 NM2.  
 
Figure 19.  Map of Scenario Fixed Region. After NSS [2008]. 
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The input parameters shown in Table 9 were utilized in the NSS 
simulation to determine values for detection and maintaining a track on the RED 
submarine.  The description of the MOPs given in NSS is shown in Table 10. 
 
Table 9. Scenario ALPHA Input Parameters. 





Aircraft Used 1 1 1 2 
Sonobuoy MDR 5 NM 5 NM 5 NM 5 NM 
Sonobuoy Coverage 75 x 15 NM 75 x 15 NM 75 x 30 NM 75 x 15 NM 
Towed Array None TB-29A None None 
Sonar Type Passive Passive Passive Passive 
Buoys per Field 30 30 50 30 
Ingress Time ~2 hrs ~2 hrs ~2 hrs ~1.5 hrs 
Time to Deploy Field 2 hrs 2 hrs 5 hrs 1.25 hrs 
Time on Station 160 hrs 160 hrs 160 hrs 14 hrs 
Egress Time n/a n/a n/a 1.5 hrs 
Maintenance/ 
Refuel Time n/a n/a n/a 4 hrs 
Scenario Runs 100 35 100 100 
 




Records the total time that tracks are held by tracking sensors. 
This means that for multiple tracks held simultaneously, the time 
recorded is the total length of time there is a track held. This total 
time is recorded at each point for which loss occurs for the last 
such track held or at the end of the scenario, whichever applies in 
that instance. 
 
The results of scenario ALPHA shown in Table 11 indicated that the 
larger sonobuoy field afforded by the HAMR-3 greater carrying capacity increased its 
ability to detect and hold a track on the RED submarine.  However, the doubling in size 
does not double the detection opportunity duration.  This indicates that the RED 
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submarine operated outside of the barrier region for a majority of the scenario.  It is 
important to note also that the difference in sonobuoy field deployment time did not 
appear to negatively impact HAMR-3’s ability to detect a particular target.  A slight 
increase in total tracking time is shown in HAMR-2’s performance over HAMR-1.  This 
slight difference can be attributed to the additional detection capability of the towed 
array.  An even larger increase could be seen with HAMR-2 if the mission were tailored 
to utilize the towed array exclusively along the perimeter of the barrier region, rather than 
overlapping the existing coverage of the sonobuoy field.  This would be a good candidate 
for further analysis in future runs of the scenario.  Figure 20, tracking time intervals, 
shows the 95% confidence intervals for the mean tracking time. 
 
Table 11. Scenario ALPHA Results. 




P-3 16.62 16.3 
HAMR-1 18.08 16.1 
HAMR-2 18.49 16.9 




























Figure 20. Tracking Time Intervals. 
 
g) Scenario Bravo  
Scenario BRAVO occurs in the same geographical region as scenario 
ALPHA.  The mission objective was to engage RED FORCE subsurface contacts with 
lethal force. The various platforms search area was the same 75 NM barrier region 
specified in scenario ALPHA.  When the RED submarine was detected, the platform 
began its engagement sequence if in range. The P-3’s that were assigned to patrol the 
barrier region engaged the RED targets.  Similar to the P-3, the HAMR-1 was afforded 
the ability to maneuver into position and engage directly when the submarine was 
identified.  HAMR-2 and HAMR-3 utilized P-3’s deployed from NAF Atsugi in order to 
prosecute targets.  
Scenario Bravo was run multiple times in various configurations.  This 
was done in order to examine the effect of varying numbers of RED submarine targets 
operating in within the region.  Table 12, scenario bravo trials, summarizes the various 
trials that were conducted.  
The MOP for scenario Bravo is the “Time to First Shot.”  This is defined 
as the difference in time from the first detection of an individual RED submarinei, and the 
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time at which the first the weapon is launched against a submarinei.  As an example, in 
any given trial, any RED submarine will be detected once and only once.  That same 
RED submarine will then be fired upon by the engaging asset.  The times at which these 
events occur are then subtracted from one another to derive the “Time to First Shot” 
MOP.  For each trial, j, as shown in Table 12, there will be i j× data points for that 
particular alternative and target combination.  Table 13 shows the NSS description of 
MOP’s used in the BRAVO scenario. 
 
Table 12.     Scenario BRAVO Trials.   
RED SUBMARINE 
Count i 
Scenario Trials j Data Points 
6 100 600 
2 100 200 
1 248 248 
 
Table 13. NSS Description of MOP’s Used in BRAVO Scenario. 
MOP Description 
First Detection  Records the time of the first detection event simulated to occur against the object identified. 
First Weapon 
Launch 
Records the time of the first the weapons launch events against a 
target. 
 
The intention of utilizing the “Time to First Shot” MOP is to capture the 
various delays in engagement time of the different alternative platforms, particularly the 
difference of having the weapons onboard the air platform and having to call for fire from 
secondary assets.  There are a number of concerns associated with this MOP, which will 
become evident as the data gathered through the various trials of the scenario are 
analyzed.  The first concern is that detection does not necessarily begin the engagement 
sequence. For instance, if the RED submarine moves beyond the sensor coverage area 
and is sufficiently far from the air platform to evade further detection, that submarine 
may not be detected again for several days over the course of the seven day scenario.  
However, the “Time to First Shot” clock is still ticking.  This effect can be seen in the 
extreme 4th quartile outliers for each of the platforms under examination.  Further trials 
of this scenario would include more granular data elements to derive the “Time to First 
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Shot” MOP, which would better evaluate the performance of the various platforms 
engagement capability. 
The P-3 and HAMR-1 are assigned to the fixed barrier region and do not 
pursue the target beyond that region.  The HAMR-2 and HAMR-3 simply pass contact 
information to the air ASW commander at NAS Atsugi.  The air ASW commander then 
alerts and launches engagement assets (P-3’s).  At this point, the engaging P-3’s can 
pursue the target RED submarine outside of the assigned barrier region.  The results of 
the Bravo scenario appear to be skewed in favor of the HAMR-2 and HAMR-3 platforms 
because of this capability.  Further trials of this scenario would include either the 
restriction of responding assets to the assigned Barrier region, allowing the HAMR-1 and 
P-3’s to leave the assigned barrier region, or perhaps pass contact data along to a 
simulated third party responsible for the area in which the RED submarine has taken 
refuge. 
The input parameters listed in Table 14 were utilized in determining 
probabilistic values for detection and maintaining a track on an undersea contact.  
 
Table 14. Scenario “BRAVO – 6 Red Subs” Input Parameters. 
Parameter HAMR-1 HAMR-2 HAMR-3 P-3 
Aircraft Used 1 1 1 2 
Primary Attack 
The weapon 8 x Mk 54 2 x P-3 2 x P-3 8 x Mk 54 
Ingress Time ~2 hrs ~2 hrs ~2 hrs ~1.5 hrs 
Time on Station n/a n/a n/a 14 hrs 
Egress Time n/a n/a n/a 1.5 hrs 
Pursue Beyond 
Region N Y Y N 
RED Submarines 6 6 6 6 
 
Tables 15-17 show processed results from the scenario runs.  Average 
detect-to-engage time is the time in minutes from the first detection of a target until the 
time at which a weapon is fired at that same target.  For all platforms, there appears to be 
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a long interval (~10 hrs.) from initial detection to first weapon release.  This can be 
explained by the tactics that the various platforms are utilizing.  
During the scenario, the sonobuoy field is laid across the straight.  The 
platform monitoring the sonobuoy field may be at any physical location within that area 
of coverage.  The result is that the RED submarine may be detected, yet the air platform 
is not within range of the RED submarine or the Area of Uncertainty (AoU) is too large 
to begin an engagement sequence.  The initial detection is noted, and the “Time to First 
Shot” interval clock begins.  At this point in the scenario, the RED submarine may leave 
the area of coverage.  The ASW platform (P-3 or HAMR variant) continues to monitor 
the field but does not investigate or pursue the detected RED sub.  Instead, the ASW 
platform continues its search pattern without regard for the distant detection.  
The two platforms which have a self engagement capability also have the 
highest median “Time to First Shot” measures.  The result is most likely due to the fact 
that these two platforms carry only 8 MK-54 torpedoes on each sortie.  As a result, these 
two platforms are forced to return to base when the weapons’ stores are exhausted.  The 
cooperative engagement platforms (HAMR-2 and HAMR-3) have the benefit of calling 
fully armed P-3s each time an engagement occurs.  
 
Table 15. Scenario BRAVO Basic Statistics - 6 RED Submarines. 
Measure (N=600) P-3 HAMR-1 HAMR-2* HAMR-3 
Median Time to first 
Shot (minutes)  176 593 80 80 
Engagement Events 589 570 580 594 
No Shots 11 30 8 6 
 










Table 16. Scenario BRAVO Basic Statistics - 2 RED Submarines. 
Measure (N=200) P-3 HAMR-1 HAMR-2 HAMR-3 
Median Time to first 
Shot (minutes)  303 461 81 81 
Engagement Events 198 195 198 200 
No Shots 2 5 2 0 
 
Table 17. Scenario BRAVO Basic Statistics - 1 RED Submarines. 
Measure (N=248) P-3 HAMR-1 HAMR-2 HAMR-3 
Median Time to first 
Shot (minutes)  181 517 80 80 
Engagement Events 240 239 242 245 
No Shots 8 9 6 3 
 
The HAMR-2 and HAMR-3 configurations which employ P-3’s as the 
weapons delivery platform have a lower “Time to First Shot” than the armed ASW 
platforms (Figure 21).  This can be explained by the nature of target prosecution utilized 
in the scenario.  For each of the armed platforms, only one target will be engaged at a 
time, that is, targets are engaged in a serial fashion.  The HAMR-2 and HAMR-3 
platforms are free from the burden of tracking a target to be engaged, they can continue 
to search the area for additional targets in parallel with the engagement of the first target.  
Upon the destruction of the first target, the weapons platform that was called to engage 
the first target can be re-directed to engage a second target immediately.  Whereas the P-3 
and HAMR-1 platforms would have to search or re-acquire the second target, the 
HAMR-2 and HAMR-3 platforms can simply direct the responding the weapons platform 
to the second target post-engagement. 
The results for scenario Bravo reveal much about the performance of the 
various platforms in an engagement scenario, however further analysis is required to fully 
understand the value of the engagement measure. 
Further graphs of the Scenario BRAVO data set show not only a non-
normal sample distribution but an extremely high variance as well.  Table 18 displays 





Figure 21. Scenario Bravo Median “Time to First Shot.” 
 
 
Table 18. Scenario BRAVO Basic Statistics.  
Measure (N=1048) P-3 HAMR-1 HAMR-2 HAMR-3 
Median Time to 
first Shot (minutes)  214 51 80 80 
Engagement Events 1027 1004 1020 1039 
No Shots 21 44 16 9 
 
The measurement system utilized in scenario Bravo should be examined 
for further improvement. A suggestion for this would be to set criteria for minimum AOU 
to begin the engagement interval clock.  The extreme values for the 4th quartile 
distributions can be attributed to the measurements used in the BRAVO scenario.  The 
time measurement begins when a RED submarine is first detected, not at the start of an 
engagement sequence.  It is conceivable that a first detection could occur at hour zero at 
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the beginning of the scenario.  That same submarine could then exit the search region and 
not be detected again for several days or possibly never seen again for the duration of the 
scenario (as occurred with “No Shots” in Table 17 scenario BRAVO results, which 
assume no shot opportunity existed for that detection). 
h) Scenario Charlie 
Scenario CHARLIE occurs over a larger geographical region in the Pacific 
Ocean east of Japan.  The mission objective is to track and trail a RED FORCE 
submarine contact from Atsugi, Japan to Guam.  This scenario was analyzed by 
spreadsheet computations using Microsoft Excel.  The RED FORCE submarine is on 
transit from Atsugi, Japan to Guam.  The BLUE FORCE HAMR or P-3 squadrons are 
based in Atsugi, Japan.  The HAMR and P-3 squadrons always take off and return to 
Atsugi Air Base in Japan.  The input parameters and assumptions in Table 19 were 
utilized. 
 
Table 19. Scenario CHARLIE Input Parameters. 





Speed 75 NM/hr 75 NM/hr 75 NM/hr 328 NM/hr 
Persistence  
(max flight time) 168 hrs 168 hrs 336 hrs 14 hrs 
Speed of RED 
SUB 5 NM/hr 5 NM/hr 5 NM/hr 5 NM/hr 
Distance from 
Atsugi, Japan to 
Guam 
1341 NM 1341 NM 1341 NM 1341 NM 
 
The following is the derivation of the main equation used in the 
spreadsheet analysis.  It determines the distance the RED submarine will travel in the 
maximum flight time that the aircraft being analyzed is assumed to have.  As the 
submarine gets farther away from the start, the P-3 or HAMR will need to travel farther 
out to the submarine and have less time on station tracking the submarine.    
• T1 is the total time the aircraft takes to get to the submarine 
• T2 is the total time the aircraft is tracking submarine 
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• T3 is the total time the aircraft takes to get back to base 
• D1 is the total distance the aircraft needs to travel to get to the submarine 
• D2 is the total distance the submarine will travel while the aircraft is 
tracking it on that sortie 
• D3 is the total distance the aircraft needs to travel back to base 
• S1 is the speed of the aircraft traveling to get to the submarine 
• S2 is the speed of the submarine, constant 5 NM/hr 
• S3 is the speed of the aircraft traveling back to base 
In this case the equation was calculated for a P-3, the maximum flight time 
being 14 hours and the speed of the P-3 being 328 NM/hr.  For the alternate HAMRs the 
appropriate maximum flight time and speed were substituted.   
1 2 3 14T T T Maxflighttime hours+ + = =  
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D  This is the main formula  
 
The results of the spreadsheet analysis are summarized in Table 20 below.  
The P-3 needed the most number of sorties to track the RED submarine from Atsugi, 
Japan to Guam, which was a total of 29 sorties.  HAMR-1 and 2 configurations came in 
next with a total of 2 sorties needed, a shorter persistence time of 168 hours as compared 
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to the HAMR-3.  The HAMR-3 configuration needed only 1 sortie to complete the 
mission as the HAMR-3’s maximum flight time exceeded the total transit time of the 
RED submarine.   The main factor that contributed to the difference in sorties needed to 
complete the mission was the estimated persistence time of the aircraft.   
 
Table 20. Scenario CHARLIE Results Summarized. 





Sorties Needed 2 2 1 29 
 
i) Conclusions 
The performance modeling and simulation effort resulted in a greater 
understanding of the various alternative configurations and their utility in various 
scenarios.  As with any research project, the activity raised more questions than were 
answered.  Foremost, what tactics will maximize the performance of the various 
configurations?  It is suggested that follow-on research be conducted to determine the 
optimal tactical operation of the proposed alternative HAMR platforms. 
2. Risk Analysis Overview 
This section covers the methodology, tools, and strategies that were employed to 
manage the risks of the HAMR mission module at a global level.  The objectives that 
guided our risk analysis are early identification of risks, reduction of impact and/or 
likelihood of negative consequences, and ensuring adequate attention is given to high-risk 
items.  This risk analysis also provides valuable lessons learned and critical risk 
information for decision makers prior to milestone decisions.  Risk reduction was the 
primary goal of these risk analysis activities and early identification of risk items is 
critical.  Several risks were identified in the key areas of cost, schedule, and technological 
capability.   
The risk management process for the HAMR mission module is to assess risk, 
mitigate risk, and reassess.  Figure 22 provides a graphical illustration of the integration 
process and Figure 23 demonstrates its cyclic nature.  The process of risk identification 
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was an iterative process that began with a close examination of the nature of HAMR 
craft.  Risks were examined continuously throughout the SEDP process as new issues 
arose.  Continual communications were conducted via teleconference, phone, and e-mail 
to discover and clarify possible risks.  White paper and test articles also provided 
definitive risk information.  These white papers are typically the product of a thorough 
analysis of some specific problem or issue.   
For in-depth risk analysis, formal tools were employed.  These include statistical 
risk analysis concepts, and methodologies.  Risk matrices, cost, reliability models, and a 
fault tree analysis proved valuable for developing risk mitigation plans.  The severity of 
each risk determined if a mitigation plan was necessary, what kind of mitigation plan was 
needed and when the plan should be implemented.  In some cases of low risk items, a 
mitigation plan was deemed an unnecessary expenditure of resources.  These risk items 























• Phase II: Risk Control































Figure 22. Risk Management Hierarchy. 
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a) Risk Prioritization 
  The HAMR team has instituted an iterative prioritization process.  The 
risk matrix was the key tool in our prioritization process.  The probability of occurrence 
and severity of the consequence of each risk items is illustrated graphically by Figure 24 
below.  The risk matrix the team chose consisted of five levels of severity and five levels 
of frequency.  Numbers 1 through 5 were used in place of text descriptions.  The levels of 
risk severity used ranged from negligible (1) to catastrophic (5).  Risk severity was 
reached by group consensus after evaluating factors such as initial requirements, 
availability of information, technological maturity, and external factors.  The 
probabilities of occurrence used were improbable (1), remote (2), occasional (3), 












Figure 24. Risk Matrix. 
 
   Best and worst case scenarios were evaluated based on potential impacts to 
the capability, cost, and schedule of HAMR program.  A predetermined risk mitigation 
and management plan was developed for most of the risk items.  The process for risk 
mitigation is also iterative to allow for flexibility to deal with emergent risks.  These risk 
management practices implemented by the project team have made the inherent risk of 
the integration more manageable.   
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b) Technical Risk 
  Technical risk is always a risk factor in any system.  This technical risk is 
defined different ways but is generally characterized by technological maturity.  The 
HAMR ASW mission module has unique technical risks due to the numerous systems 
aboard.   The first step to mitigating the technical risk is to set project boundaries so there 
are few technological changes to the HAMR that effect the payload module.  Secondly, 
the payload itself is made up of existing ASW systems.  Using proven technologies has 
greatly reduced the likelihood of failures and unexpected risk.   
   In many cases the ASW systems that are being incorporated into the 
HAMR mission module have not been grouped together on a single platform.  It is not 
known how all these sensors and systems will interoperate.  Until they are all together on 
a single platform there is an inability to predict possible interferences between the 
systems.  Interoperability and integration risk are undoubtedly one of the most difficult 
risks to mitigate.  There is no precedence for this variety of systems on a platform of this 
type.  Nevertheless, the HAMR team has verified system estimates with SMEs and 
continues to research possible interoperability and integration problems.  The integration 
risk has been reduced by following models of existing integrated ASW systems.  The 
question remains whether these systems can be integrated without incurring excessive 
costs.    
   System integration and interoperability were determined to risk items for 
the system specific reasons such as: 
• Will the submarine systems talk to TIS in a controlled and universal way?  
The integration with the tactical support systems is a risk that can be resolved 
with software interfaces.  The software interfaces can provide the critical links 
that are needed to maintain situational awareness among a myriad of sensors 
suites. 
• There is no known precedence of using a towed array on an air platform.  
Typical air platforms like the P-3 require too much speed to maintain their lift.  
Too much speed would severely damage a towed array.  A helicopter on the 
other hand could travel at a slower speed but would have to be specifically 
designed to handle the weight and signal processors of the towed array.  This 
 75
would render the helicopter useless for any other purpose.  Although there is 
no precedence of using the towed array on an air platform, the HAMR is not 
the typical air platform.  It can handle the weight, signal processors, and speed 
requirements of towed arrays.  Therefore, it is theorized that the HAMR could 
successfully deploy a towed array. 
• There is no precedence for deploying dipping sonar on an Airship.  Can 
the team maintain the steady position required by the dipping sonar?  Given 
the large surface area of the HAMR it is unknown how much deviation would 
be caused by specific wind forces.  The ability of the HAMR to quickly 
counter unexpected wind forces with its steering mechanisms is unknown.  
However, the team does have data from a smaller demonstrator model.  The 
team can use this data as a basis and scale it accordingly to the dimensions of 
the much larger proposed demonstrator. 
  To mitigate the technical risks above, continued research is being 
conducted to fully understand the technical complexity of these integrated systems.   
c) Modeling and Simulation  
   Accurately estimating cost, reliability, and performance of the many 
systems the team intends to model may prove to be difficult.  Typically, each ASW 
system would have a team of dedicated professionals to accurately log and track costs 
and reliability issues for that system.  The HAMR team attempted to acquire this 
information for over 20 ASW systems.  It is likely that our modeling and simulations fail 
to capture all of this data.  Some data may be unknown or unavailable due to security 
classifications.  This is especially true of data such as the maximum operational ranges of 
sensors.  The difficulties of accurately modeling are resolved with increased manning, 
increased communications with subject matter experts, establishing a policy to deal with 
classified information, and using “best effort” estimations in place of unavailable data. 
d) Scope Creep  
   Another common risk among acquisition programs is the tendency for 
scope creep, meaning that requirements may change and even increase in number.  Scope 
creep was noted as a risk early on in the process in order to deliver a reliable and 
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manageable system.  Scope creep was managed using tools such as stakeholders’ 
questionnaires, which help to solidify requirements.  Project scope and boundaries were 
agreed to by stakeholders early, and the requirements were locked in after a designated 
period. 
e) Schedule Risk 
  Schedule risk is present in every program and the HAMR mission module 
is no exception.  The HAMR group is paying special attention to this particular risk item 
to avoid schedule overruns, as the project is not focused on systems development, but 
rather the conceptual design of a system. 
f) Accuracy of Alternatives 
  The capabilities of a suite of sensors may not operate as advertised.  
Likewise a conglomerate of systems may not achieve their intended result.  It is 
important to consider the possibility of inaccurate assessment of systems’ capabilities.  
This concern can be partially addressed in the modeling and simulation risk area, as well 
as sensitivity analysis regarding important assumptions with respect to specific 
alternative system capabilities.   
g) Risk Calculations 
    To perform risk calculations a number was estimated for each of the risks 
described previously.  This risk factor was created to represent the risk items’ impact and 
effects.  It is used to calculate the overall risk factor of the alternative under analysis.  
Risk items are categorized into technical and non-technical risks.  Technical risks such as 
system integration and interoperability vary greatly between alternatives.  The risk factor 
of a risk item is essentially the probability index multiplied by an impact factor of the 
specified risk.  The probability index ranges from 1 to 5 and are enumerated (as 
mentioned earlier) as improbable (1), remote (2), occasional (3), probable (4), and 
frequent (5).  Each of the probability indicesand impacts were estimated for the risk 
categories for each alternative.  The risk factor product is totaled for all risk items and 
averaged to yield the overall risk of the alternative.  The result is plotted on a risk matrix 
to compare all alternatives against one another.  This process was repeated for each of the 
alternatives.  The results of this analysis are illustrated in Tables 21 – 23.   
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Table 21. Alternative 1 Risk Scoring. 
  Probability Impact Product 
Interoperability 3 5 15 
System Integration 3 5 15 
Modeling and Simulation 3 4 12 
Accuracy of Alternatives 4 4 16 
   
Technical 
Total 58 
     
Scope Creep 2 4 8 
Schedule 3 4 12 
Classification of Information 3 3 9 
  Common Total 29 
    
  
Alternative 1  
Total 87 
  Average 12.42857 
  Whole number 12 
 
Table 22. Alternative 2 Risk Scoring. 
  Probability Impact Product 
Interoperability 5 5 25 
System Integration 5 5 25 
Modeling and Simulation 5 4 20 
Accuracy of Alternatives 4 4 16 
   
Technical 
Total 86 
     
Scope Creep 5 4 20 
Schedule 4 4 16 
Classification of Information 5 3 15 
  Common Total 51 
    
  Alternative 2 Total 137 
  Average 19.57143 






























Table 23. Alternative 3 Risk Scoring. 
  Probability Impact Product 
Interoperability 1 5 5 
System Integration 2 5 10 
Modeling and Simulation 2 4 8 
Accuracy of Alternatives 1 4 4 
   
Technical 
Total 27 
     
Scope Creep 1 4 4 
Schedule 2 4 8 
Classification of Information 2 3 6 
  Common Total 18 
    
  Alternative 3 Total 45 
  Average 6.428571 
  Whole number 6 
 


















3. Logistics Analysis  
The OPNAV Instruction 4000.85 on the Navy Logistics System provides 
guidance for the fielding of Navy logistics.  The instruction recommends Navy logistics 
system should be comprised of three elements:  acquisition logistics, in-service support, 
and operational logistics.   
a) Acquisition Logistics 
  The HAMR ASW process, by design, first assessed capabilities from 
existing, or fielded Navy systems and programs of record.  To fill remaining gaps in 
technology or capability, the process then assessed other commercial off-the-self (COTS) 
or yet un-fielded technology.  Current Navy, or DOD fielded technology offers an 
obvious acquisition advantage by leveraging the existing logistics categories, including 
acquisition, currently in place and previously funded.  This strategy also includes 
utilization of the current supply system (Naval Inventory Control Point, NAVICP), on-
board sparing, and existing intermediate and depot maintenance which are in both 
organic and private sectors. New technology will be procured using the acquisition 
process. 
b) In Service Support 
  Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) will consist of two components:  in-
service engineering and the associated life cycle support.  As previously noted, the 
support strategy is to leverage existing support infrastructure in use by the system 
donating each of the selected capabilities.  This will significantly reduce the time; 
logistics support footprint in acquisition cost, engineering resources, and ILS is required 
to field the HAMR ASW module.  In-service engineering also will provide hardware 
documentation and the fusion of existing manuals into an integrated HAMR technical 
package describing the HAMR mission module operation, associated systems integration, 
interaction, and module maintenance requirements.  New ILS documents will be created 
to support new capability alternatives and shall be consistent and comply with Navy 
standards for technical documents.  
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c) Operational Logistics 
   The HAMR ASW module is designed to be a user maintained system.  By 
the nature of the extended mission, users will be qualified to maintain the systems within 
the operational environment.  Per NAVICPINST 4441.15, a consolidated shipboard 
allowance list (COSAL) will be established to support maintenance and mid-mission 
repair.  Operational logistics beyond user maintenance and repair are to be supported at 
the intermediate maintenance level currently utilized by the fleet in support of the 
existing ASW enterprise.  This process will take advantage of the existing fleet sparing 
(COSAL). 
4. Integration 
As each alternative is procured, installation and integration of the subsystems will 
begin.  The cost for integrating each of the systems onto the overall platform is dictated 
by the amount of labor required to install each subsystem.  The integration cost estimates 
have been provided by SMEs and include the amount of labor required, the number of 
workers needed, their salary, and the number of man hours for each task.    
5. Logistics Support and Supply Chain 
As previously stated, the logistics support is provided by current programs of 
record where applicable. On-site logistics support for technology unique to the HAMR 
module will be provided by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) under service 
level agreement, performance based logistics contract, or the equipment provider for 
maintenance or repair.  Sparing for on-ship deployment (COSAL) and ongoing mission 
requirements are to be provided by the supply system.  Funding for the supply chain 
repairable and associated logistics process will be from mission operations funding 
(OPTAR), which is a standard fleet practice for these services. 
6. Operational (Manpower) 
This analysis has estimated training and other operational costs for the ASW 
operation requirements based on ASW SME assessments.  The scope of this project does 
not include support for items such as manning, lodging, fuel, or operational aspects of the 
HAMR platform itself.  Size and weight of these items are excluded as well. 
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The HAMR is a complicated system and requires trained war fighters to handle, 
coordinate, repair, maintain, and make vital tactical decisions in an ASW combat 
environment.  The crew is expected to be much smaller than that of a normal sea-going 
vessel.  SME’s estimates indicate a two to four man crew is needed to man the various 
ASW system alternatives on a shift-by-shift basis.  Other supervisory crew members and 
ground crewing for recovery are not included in the manpower assessment.  Funding for 
the training are accounted for in the LCC estimates which include increases in hourly 
manpower training costs for the operators.   
The unmanned alternative provides a potential to further reduce the manning costs 
and enhance capability.  Elimination of manning will require a reduced number of 
operators on the ground to support a 24-7 mission capability and provides higher risk 
hostile mission capability not attainable with a manned platform. 
7. Disposal and Demilitarization 
The cost analysis and plans to dispose and demilitarize alternatives will be 
provided several years prior to implementation.  The workload to uninstall alternatives 
and the actual disposal and demilitarization make up the majority of these costs.  
Additional costs may include declassification of information and the disposal of 
HAZMAT materials depending on the alternative.  Asset reutilization for future use in 
other systems may provide cost savings.  SME input is the basis for disposal and 
demilitarization cost estimates. 
The PM and technical warrant holders (TWHs) for the HAMR program provide 
oversight of the technical decisions to ensure compliance with overarching disposal 
requirements and regulations.  TWHs support the HAMR PM and addresses alternatives, 
risks, and trade-offs as appropriate.  The TWHs also have the authority to make decisions 
on technical matters, engineering processes, and practices related to the disposal and 





8. Cost Analysis 
a) Initial Costs 
  Each platform provides alternatives that need to be initially purchased 
from existing programs of record.  Costs are derived from either SMEs or published 
documents found from the respective programs or logistics support agencies.  Some costs 
were obtained by researching the National Item Identification Number (NIIN) and the 
Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) Asset Visibility System.  Initial costs cover the 
current market costs of each alternative.  Procurement of future alternatives to replace 
that item is done through the acquisition strategy using an incremental, technical refresh 
process.  The initial procurement costs comprise the majority of funding for each 
platform.  
   A statistical analysis of future year spending provides a way of 
determining where and when funding should be applied.  Inflation rates have been 
estimated to establish out year costs, and expected costs are in current year dollars.  
Overall costs of the ASW module can be reduced by procuring the alternatives as soon as 
possible and from existing program office assets versus buying new.  After the first two 
years of procurement, funding for the alternatives will decline dramatically as the assets 
will have been purchased.  Spikes in the procurement will come later in the life cycle, 
when the acquisition of new technology is required.   
b) Cost Assumptions 
  At the direction of NAVAIR sponsors, the HAMR aircraft costs and 
lifecycles were defined as out of the scope of the ASW module research.  All costs are 
per unit for each HAMR module.  The HAMR aircraft has not yet been fielded, thus its 
procurement, hotel amenities for personnel, and other operational life cycle costs are not 
yet available for analysis.  As a direct result, all cost analysis focused exclusively on the 
systems within the HAMR ASW mission module.  
   During modeling, the P-3 is used for comparison or as support for the 
engagement component of the HAMR ASW mission.  Complete P-3 life cycle costs 
would be valuable to make cost comparisons on LCC or components of the ASW 
mission, however, researching helped obtain limited data which consists of an hour for 
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hour cost estimate for the P-3.  Additionally, the P-3 is a multi-mission maritime aircraft 
(MMA) which makes isolating its ASW specific mission costs exceptionally complex.  
The P-3 will be the main hard kill weapon for Alternatives 2 and 3.  The calculated cost 
of P-3 support was derived by a given cost from a P-3 specialist at NAVAIR.  SME 
estimates suggests that there would be eight flights by a P-3 per year, either during 
wartime or training, at three hours a flight, and at $4,500 per flight in operation costs.50    
   The technical alternatives of the HAMR ASW module focused, by design, 
on existing mature technology and the strategy adopted an existing means to support the 
technology.  The fielding of technology extracted from existing programs allows 
utilization and leveraging of the Navy’s existing supply and maintenance infrastructures.  
It also simplifies the components of training and facilitating technical design agents 
(TDA) roles.  Alternately, COTS technology will be supported by the vendor’s repair and 
maintenance processes. 
    Specific consumables, torpedoes, and sonobuoys, were not included in the 
cost assessment as they are procured as a result of specific threats and provided to users 
to carry as a payload.  Costs to train personnel to fire or use these devices are included in 
our analysis as they are actually consumed as in war-shot torpedoes or in water as 
exercise torpedoes.  Sonobuoys which are consumed in any training scenario are included 
in the life cycle costs as a component of integration and disposal. 
c) Cost Analysis and System Specification Methodology 
   The rendered alternatives that were deemed feasible were given a 
comparative cost benefit analysis to determine how much capability can be provided and 
at what cost.  The cost of each alternative is examined from multiple perspectives.  Unit 
price, estimated integration costs, manpower costs, and many other cost components were 
used to determine relative alternative costs.   
   Extensive research was conducted to find the SME of each subsystem.  
Data collection consisted of a comprehensive and tedious research effort spanning 
various Navy organizations as well as non-military organizations.  The data collected was 
comprised of any pertinent information that was available and unclassified.  Actual costs, 
                                                 
50 NAVAIR [2008] 
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SME input, confirmed specs, as well as best effort estimates provided inputs to the 
HAMR ASW mission module cost models.  By finding the SMEs for each subsystem, 
more accurate estimates of subsystem costs were made.  Brainstorming was used to 
identify which organizations and points of contact (POCs) have oversight of the systems 
under examination. After each organization was identified, SMEs were sought out by e-
mail, phone, personal interviews, and researching efforts on the internet.  A list of SMEs 
for each alternative’s systems can be found in Appendix C.  
    Once the SME was identified, the model name and number for each 
system became apparent.  SMEs provided unit prices, NIINs, system specifications 
(including size, weight and power), and capability estimates based on current systems of 
record.  The SME was able to either provide documentation for exact costs and system 
specifications or a rough estimate for the respective system.  Unknown variables such as 
integration costs were given best effort analyses to determine reasonable cost ranges.  
    Spreadsheet tools were used to capture system data and analyze both 
mathematically and graphically the relationships and relative costs between systems.  
Each alternative was thoroughly analyzed from many angles.  System cost estimates were 
categorized by capability to determine in what area the focus of monetary investment will 
be made for a particular configuration.  In order to generate a cost estimate for a single 
alternative, the cumulative costs of the subsystems were accounted for as accurately as 
possible.  A 20 year life cycle cost (LCC) analysis was performed for each of the three 
alternatives.  A spiral and incremental procurement strategy was employed and included 
as an acquisition cost category within the LCC analysis.  In 2017 and 2022 an 
incremental technical refresh occurs with a 25% and 30% respective funding increase.  
The comprehensive approach taken by the cost and logistics team provided a substantial 
amount of cost information to the decision makers.  This important data and analysis 
enabled the decision makers to make more educated and informed decisions later in the 
SEDP.   
    Each alternative is made up of multiple functional objectives.  Each 
functional objective is broken down into subsystems.  Reference numbers for each 
subsystem is shown in Table 24.  Graphs which display the individual subsystem costs 
will associate numbering systems as a reference. 
 85
 
Table 24. Reference Number and System for Each Alternative. 
System 
Reference # Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 
1 
Manual Torpedo Preset System 
– MK437 TIS – SAAS & SPS TIS - SAAS & SPS 
2 TIS - SAAS & SPS Comms – JTRS (PRC-148) Comms - JTRS  (PRC-148) 
3 GCCS-M (USQ-119 ) GCCS-M (USQ-119 ) GCCS-M (USQ-119 ) 
4 
Comms – SATCOM            
(PRC-117F) 
Comms – SATCOM            
(PRC-117F) 
Comms – SATCOM (PRC-
117F) 
5 
Comms - Link 16 -          
AN/URC-107 (V) 
Comms - Link 11 -          
AN/USQ-125 
Comms – Link 11 -        
AN/USQ-125 
6 
Comms - Class I Common Data 
Link (CDL) 
Comms - Class I Common Data 
Link (CDL) 
Comms – Link 16 -           
AN/URC-107 (V) 
7 
Automated Digital Network 
System (ADNS) 
Automated Digital Network 
System (ADNS) Comms – Link 22 
8 
Sonobuoy Dispenser 
(Integrated with TIS) 
Sonobuoy Dispenser 
(Integrated with TIS) 
Comms – Class I Common 
Data Link (CDL) 
9 Sonobuoy Receiver (ARR 970) Sonobuoy Receiver (ARR 970) 
Automated Digital Network 
System (ADNS) 
10 LW Torpedo – MK54 P-3 
Sonobuoy Dispenser 
(Integrated with TIS) 
11 
Super Cavitating Munitions – 
MK258 Towed Array - Thin Line Sonobuoy Receiver (ARR 970) 
12 
Smart Depth Bomb (Modified 
JDAM) MK 82/BLU-111 
Towed Array - Handler          
(OA-9070B) P-3 
13 RAMICS Synthetic Aperture Sonar SSQ 53F Passive Sonobuoy 
14 SSQ 53F Passive Sonobuoy Dipping Sonar SSQ 62E Active Sonobuoy 
15 SSQ 62E Active Sonobuoy SSQ 53F Passive Sonobuoy SSQ 101 ADAR Sonobuoy 
16 SSQ 101 ADAR Sonobuoy SSQ 62E Active Sonobuoy 
SSQ-110 Extended Echo 
Ranging Sonobuoy 
17 
SSQ-110 Extended Echo 
Ranging Sonobuoy SSQ 101 ADAR Sonobuoy MAD AN/ASQ 233 
18 MAD AN/ASQ 233 
SSQ-110 Extended Echo 
Ranging Sonobuoy 
Radar - APY-10            
(Surface Search Periscope) 
19 
Radar - APY-10            
(Surface Search Periscope) MAD AN/ASQ 233 
EOIR – HD Telescope Camera 
(StarFire 3) 
20 
EOIR - HD Telescope Camera 
(StarFire 3) 
Radar - APY-10             
(Surface Search Periscope) ESM (AN/ALQ-217) 
21 ESM (AN/ALQ-217) 
EOIR – HD Telescope Camera 
(StarFire 3) LIDAR - April Showers 
22 LIDAR - April Showers ESM (AN/ALQ-217)  
23  LIDAR - April Showers  
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d) System Costs 
    Each HAMR alternative will procure systems according to the assessment 
made in the Alternative Analysis section.  A thorough examination of procurement costs 
is addressed due to its high impact on the total LCC.  Procurement is the largest cost 
contributor in each of the three alternatives and plays a significant role as to when and 
how much funding should be appropriated.  Costs are displayed in four functional 
objective areas:  combat systems, hard kill the weapons, subsurface sensors, and surface 
sensors.  All of the alternatives will hold similar costs in the surface sensor area, while all 
other functional objectives will have distinct different costs.  Procurement costs were 
totaled and broken down by each system as well as their respective functional objective.  
A further analysis will show where individual costs occur.  Appendix F provides a 
complete listing of all initial procurement costs for each system including one delivered 
ASW module. 
1. Alternative #1 
The total procurement cost of Alternative 1 is nearly $12.8 million.  The 
weapons-rich platform is the only alternative that incurs costs within the hard kill 
functionality.  Most of the hard kill costs come from the RAMICS system, which also 
includes the MK258 cavitating munitions.  The program office for MK54 torpedoes 
(PMS 404) is funded to provide the fleet with as many assets as needed.  At this time, it is 
not known if the HAMR program will increase the need for torpedoes or reduce it by 
offsetting other platforms.  It is assumed that there will be no additional procurement 
costs of lightweight torpedoes for the HAMR program beyond the Navy’s normal usage.  
Costs for Alternative 1 also include funding for combat systems, 
subsurface sensors, and surface sensors.  Combat systems include command and control 
consoles as well as communication devices.  Subsurface sensors are sensors which detect 
threats under sea level while surface sensors are sensors that detect threats above sea 
level.   Procurement for surface sensors is the largest expense to consider in Alternative 
1.  Figure 26 shows that the surface sensors account for 63% of the total costs.  While the 
subsurface sensors show a small amount of the procurement cost, combat systems and 
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hard kill systems split the remaining costs with 19% and 25% respectively going to each 
functional objective. 
 





Combat Sys Hard Kill Sub Sen. Surf Sensors
 
Figure 26. Pie Chart of Alternative 1 Procurement Costs. 
 
Individual system costs provide insight in determining if there are any 
outliers within a functional objective.  A cost breakdown for each system in Alternative 1 
is seen in Figure 27.  The numbering system for Figure 27 is correlated to the numbering 
system provided in Table 24 and shows that there are 22 systems to procure.  The 
distribution of combat system costs in Alternative 1 is divided asymmetrically throughout 
the first nine systems.  There are no real outliers for the combat systems, although the 
sonobuoy receiver is seen to be the largest expense.  The cost of the RAMICS system is 
roughly 14 times larger than all other hard kill costs combined for Alternative 1.  






































Figure 27. System Procurement Costs for Alternative 1. 
  
Procurement of the subsurface sensors functional objective for Alternative 
1, which is made up of sonobuoys and MAD, comes at very little cost.  Sonobuoys are 
similar to torpedoes in the manner that all costs come from a sponsored program office.  
The program office has already appropriated funding to the development of sonobuoys to 
ensure the needs of the fleet are met at no additional cost.  Procurement of the MAD 
system is quite small compared to the overall procurement with a cost of $100k.      
For all alternatives, the cost to procure surface sensors is identical.  All 
platforms have the same radar, EO/IR, ESM and LIDAR capabilities, thus will all have 
the same cost.  The bulk of the costs come from three of the four systems.  The 
procurement costs of the radar, ESM, and LIDAR systems are expensive, however each 
system is indispensable.  In return, a large amount of funding for procurement costs on 
each alternative will be devoted to surface sensors.  The difference in procurement costs 
for all of the alternatives will come from the three other functional objectives.  
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2. Alternative #2 
Procurement costs for Alternative 2 consists of only three functional 
objectives.  Figure 28 shows that subsurface sensors and surface sensors make up 87% of 
the costs while the combat systems cover the remaining costs.  This is the only alternative 
in which the funding for surface sensors is outspent by a different functional objective.  
Because of the additional subsurface sensors on this platform, the total procurement costs 
make this alternative the most expensive procurement option.  
 




Combat Sys Hard Kill Sub Sen. Surf Sensors
 
 
Figure 28. Pie Chart of Alternative 2 Procurement Costs. 
    
The total cost to initially procure Alternative 2 is roughly $19 million.  A 
cost comparison of the different systems in Alternative 2 is displayed in Figure 29.  There 
are no outliers within the combat systems while the subsurface and surface sensors 
provide multiple outliers within each functional objective.  The numbering system for 
Figure 29 is correlated to the numbering system provided in Table 24 and shows that 
there are 23 systems to procure.  System reference number 10 is P-3 aircraft for and will 
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not be procured but will be used for hard kill purposes. All sonobuoys (reference 
numbers 15 through 18) will be procured but at no additional cost.  





































Figure 29. System Procurement Costs for Alternative 2. 
 
Funding is dominated by the three surface sensors and two systems within 
the subsurface sensor functional objective.  The thin line towed array and the towed array 
handler are separate subsystems that combine to produce one towed array system.  The 
funding for the towed array system comes to just over $3 million.  Along with the $4.2 
million dipping sonar, the two combine to be the most expensive assets to procure.  The 
dipping sonar is the highest cost item in all the alternatives.  Almost 23% of the total cost 
of Alternative 2 comes from the dipping sonar.  This system is comprised of five 
components: the reel and cable, transducer assembly, reeling machine, reeling machine 
interface unit, reeling machine control unit, and the sonar transmitter and receiver.  These 
are the only assets in which the costs were researched by using the associated NIIN for 
each component and then further researched for an exact price on the NAVICP website. 
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3. Alternative #3 
Alternative #3, or the sensor light alternative, is intended to be a reduction 
of size, weight, and cost.  Since Alternative 3 is an unmanned system, hard kill the 
weapons and enhanced subsurface sensors are not fitted for this system, which will reflect 
in a reduction in costs.  The total procurement cost of Alternative 3 is $11.1 million.  
Additional communication systems are incorporated, which will slightly increase the 
combat systems functional objective.  Figure 30 reveals that the majority of costs will 
come from surface sensors.  
 
 
Procurement Cost by Functional Objective
26%1%
73%
Combat Sys Hard Kill Sub Sen. Surf Sensors
 
Figure 30. Pie Chart of Alternative 3 Procurement Costs. 
 
One feature that Alternative 3 provides is an increased amount of 
sonobuoys.  Since these are procured from another source of funding, there will not be 
any additional procurement costs charged to the HAMR program.  Figure 31 shows that 


































Figure 31. System Procurement Costs for Alternative 3. 
 
e) Life Cycle Costs 
   Each alternative presents a unique challenge to both acquire and field 
subsystems throughout the life cycle of the alternative.  The total cost of each alternative 
over a period of time is determined through a LCC analysis.  It provides an estimate of 
how much funding will be required per year to ensure the alternative is fully operational.  
The entire profile of the LCC is categorized in six different costs: total procurement, 
integration, logistics, operational, maintenance, and disposal costs.  Each of the three 
alternatives has an individual LCC profile that is examined in further detail. 
    The length of the alternative’s life cycle was a result of several underlying 
factors.  The entire life cycle can be broken down into two phases with the first phase 
seen as the system acquisition.  This depends on how quickly the assets can be procured 
and integrated, as well as how much funding will be logically appropriate during that 
time period.  The second phase was the actual life cycle of the systems.  This includes the 
logistics, operational, maintenance, and disposal costs associated with fielding the 
systems.  During each year of the life cycle it is assumed that there will be on average 
eight missions per year, providing 24 hour persistence for a seven day mission.  A 
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detailed analysis of how much is spent in each of these categories for each alternative is 
found in Appendix D.  Each year provides an analysis of the costs appropriated to the 
respective cost category.  After thorough evaluation, it was determined that 20 years 
would be the appropriate time frame to accomplish the goal to acquiring, fielding, and 
disposing the systems. 
1. Alternative #1 
The life cycle of each alternative shows an initial spike in funding with a 
gradual increase of funding throughout the fielding process.  The total LCC of 
Alternative 1 comes to nearly $50.4 million and is shown in Figure 32.  The acquisition 
phase will take place within the first five years.  The largest amount of funding 
throughout the entire life cycle will come during the second year with nearly $7.5 million 
appropriated towards 50% of the total initial procurement costs and 20% of the initial 
installment costs.  Accumulation of funding in the following year will lead to the second 
largest amount with approximately $5.8 million but with 50% of the total integration 
costs and 20% of the total initial procurement costs.  
The fielding phase will begin in year 2012 with just over $1.3 million 
appropriated to logistics, maintenance, and operational costs.  Each year beyond that, 
costs in each area will gradually increase until 2024 with a total cost just over $1.7 
million.  The subsequent year will see a decrease in operational cost due to a reduction in 
training needs.  The year 2026 will be the first year that maintenance costs are cut, but it 
will also be the first year that disposal costs are applied.  The final year will consist of 
disposal and logistics costs.  Throughout the entire fielding phase of the life cycle, the 
logistics costs will increase at a constant rate. 
Two additional spikes will come during the technical refresh installments.  
Nearly $3.1 million in technical refresh costs will be spent during the first year of 
installment and almost $3.7 million will be spent during the second installment.  A 25% 
and 30% budget of the total initial procurement costs was respectively estimated for the 
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Figure 32. LCC of Alternative 1. 
 
Costs for the acquisition phase and fielding phase in Alternative 1 are 
quite close even though one phase is five years and the other is 16 years.  A distribution 
of cost categories for LCC is displayed on the left side of Figure 33.  The acquisition 
phase is 51% of the costs while the cost for the fielding phase accounts for the remaining 
49%.  Initial procurement and the procurement for the technical refresh integration is the 
largest cost with nearly $19 million in expenses.  Logistics makes up almost one third of 
the total cost and is the other large cost with almost $15.8 million allocated toward this 
cost category.  Funding for the integration and operational costs are very close with 
roughly $6.7 million going toward each category.  Requirements for manning the system 
will consist of five men for each shift for a total of three shifts.  The maintenance and 
disposal costs are relatively minor compared to the other four costs, but still need to be 
considered when determining the overall LCC.       
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The functional objective breakdown for the LCC is slightly different from 
that of the procurement breakdown.  Distribution of the total LCC by the functional 
objective of Alternative 1 is displayed on the right hand side of Figure 33.  Surface 
sensors remain the largest functional objective with 49% of the total costs.  Distribution 
of the remaining costs will weigh heavily on combat systems where a majority of the 
funding will come from logistics and operational costs.  Just over 60% of the costs for the 
hard kill functional objectives will come by way of the RAMICS.  Costs for subsurface 
sensors is still dominated by MAD, however the sonobuoys do incur some integration 
costs.      
 
 
Figure 33. Alternative 1 LCC and Functional Objective Analysis. 
 
Individual system costs reveal what systems supply the largest costs 
throughout the entire life cycle.  The spikes in systems within the LCCs closely follow 
the spikes in the systems within the Alternative 1 procurement cost analysis.  The total 
costs for each system is seen in Figure 34 with the numbering system associated to Table 
24.  The only new outlier appears in system 2, which is the TIS system.  RAMICS, radar, 
ESM, and LIDAR continue to dominate the amount of funding for the entire alternative.  
These five systems range in a magnitude of $3.8 million to $8.3 million and account for 
63% of the total costs.  
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Secondary cost categories play a significant role in the LCC.  Funding for 
a particular system may require attention in one cost category and very little in another.  
All surface sensor systems appear to be heavy in logistic costs as well as TIS and 
RAMICS.  Integration and operational costs are essential to the total, but are not favored 
to any particular system or functional objective.  
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Figure 34. Alternative 1 Total LCC Cost for Each System. 
2. Alternative #2 
The LCC for Alternative 2 is the largest of the three alternatives with a 
total cost of just under $69 million.  A breakdown of costs for each year is shown in 
Figure 35.  The second and third years of the acquisition phase accounts for the two 
largest funding years during the life cycle.  Allocation of funding in 2009 will come to 
just over $11.1 million while costs in 2010 will come to just over $8.2 million.  The 
fielding phase will begin in year 2012 with $1.7 million appropriated to logistics, 
maintenance and operational costs.  Each year beyond that, costs in each area will 
gradually increase until 2024 with a total cost just over $2.1 million.  The subsequent 
year will see a decrease in operational cost due to a reduction in training needs.  The year 
2026 will be the first year that maintenance costs are cut, but it will also be the first year 
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that disposal costs are applied.  The final year will consist of disposal and logistics costs.  
Throughout the entire fielding phase of the life cycle, the logistics costs will increase at a 
constant rate.   
Two additional spikes will come during the technical refresh.  Nearly $4.7 
million in technical refresh costs will be spent during the first year of installment and 
almost $5.6 million will be spent during the second installment.  A 25% and 30% budget 
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Figure 35. LCC of Alternative 2. 
 
Alternative 2 costs for the acquisition phase are much greater than that of 
the fielding phase.  A distribution of cost categories for LCC is displayed on the left side 
of Figure 36.  The acquisition phase is 55% of the costs while the cost for the fielding 
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phase accounts for the remaining 45%.  Initial procurement and the procurement for the 
technical refresh integration is the largest cost with nearly $29 million in expenses.  
Logistics is the second largest cost with almost $20 million allocated towards this cost 
category.  Funding for the integration and operational costs roughly come to $9 million 
and $5.9 million respectively.  Requirements for manning the system will consist of four 
men for each shift for a total of three shifts.  The roles of the two remaining costs are 
relatively minor, but are still vital to the overall LCC breakdown.            
The functional objective breakdown for the LCC is very similar to the 
procurement breakdown.  Distribution of the total LCC by the functional objective of 
Alternative 2 is displayed on the right hand side of Figure 36.  Subsurface sensors remain 
the largest functional objective with 40% of the total costs.  Just over 62% of the costs for 
subsurface sensors will come by way of the dipping sonar and towed array.  Surface 
sensor costs are closely behind the subsurface sensors in total costs at 36%.  Distribution 
of the remaining costs will weigh heavily on combat systems at 22% where a majority of 
the funding will come from logistics and operational costs.  Hard kill weapon costs from 
P-3 will make up 3% of the costs.  
 
Figure 36. Alternative 2 LCC and Functional Objective Analysis. 
 
Multiple outliers for individual system costs are present within Alternative 
2.  The total costs for each system is seen in Figure 37 with the numbering system 
associated to Table 24.  While most spikes in systems within the LCCs closely follow the 
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spikes in the systems within the Alternative 2 procurement cost analysis, there are a few 
outliers that are unexpected.  The TIS system is the only combat system that is an outlier 
for that functional objective. The towed array, towed array handler, synthetic aperture 
sonar system, and the dipping sonar are additional outliers that appear in the Alternative 
2.  Radar, ESM, and LIDAR continue to dominate the amount of funding for the entire 
alternative.  These eight systems range in a magnitude of $3.8 million to $9.7 million and 
account for 76% of the total costs.  
Secondary cost categories play a significant role in the LCC.  Funding for 
a particular system may require attention in one cost category and very little in another.  
All surface sensors systems and the subsurface outliers appear to be heavy in logistic 
costs as well as TIS.  Integration and operational costs are essential to the total but are not 
favored to any particular system or functional objective.  
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Figure 37. Alternative 2 Total LCC Cost for Each System. 
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System reference number 10 shows the costs of the P-3 at $1.75 million 
over the course of 20 years.  Both Alternative 2 and 3 provide the same operation costs 
for the P-3, while no other costs are applied to the hard kill option.  However, the P-3 
hard kill option in Alternative 3 is system reference number 12.   
3. Alternative #3 
The LCC for Alternative 3 is the smallest of the three alternatives with a 
total cost of nearly $44.4 million.  A breakdown of costs for each year is shown in Figure 
38.  The second and third years of the acquisition phase accounts for the two largest 
funding years during the life cycle.  Allocation of funding in 2009 will come to $6.5 
million while costs in 2010 will come to $5 million.  The fielding phase will begin in year 
2012 with $1.2 million appropriated to logistics, maintenance, and operational costs.  
Each year beyond that, costs in each area will gradually increase until 2024 with a total 
cost just over $1.5 million.  The subsequent year will see a decrease in operational cost 
due to a reduction in training needs.  The year 2026 will be the first year that maintenance 
costs are cut, but it will also be the first year that disposal costs are applied.  The final 
year will consist of disposal and logistics costs.  Throughout the entire fielding phase of 
the life cycle, the logistics costs will increase at a constant rate.   
Two additional spikes will come during the technical refresh installments.  
Nearly $2.7 million in technical refresh costs will be spent during the first year of 
installment and $3.2 million will be spent during the second installment.  A 25% and 
30% budget of the total initial procurement costs was respectively estimated for the first 
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Figure 38. LCC of Alternative 3. 
 
The cost of the acquisition phase of Alternative 3 is slightly greater than 
the fielding phase.  A distribution of cost categories for the LCC is displayed on the left 
side of Figure 39.  The acquisition phase is 50% of the costs, while the cost for the 
fielding phase accounts for the remaining 50%.  Initial procurement and the procurement 
for the technical refresh integration is the largest cost with nearly $16.6 million in 
expenses.  Logistics is the second largest cost with just over $14.5 million allocated 
towards this cost category.  Integration cost make up for $5.7 million of the total costs 
and are spread out throughout all functional objectives.  Operational costs roughly come 
to $5.1 million and are somewhat less in comparison to the three other alternatives since 
Alternative 3 is an unmanned system.  Requirements for manning the system will consist 
of two men for each shift for a total of three shifts.  The two remaining costs are 
relatively minor, however they still play an important role in the overall LCC.       
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The functional objective breakdown for the LCC is very similar to the 
Alternative 3 procurement breakdown.  Distribution of the total LCC by the functional 
objective of Alternative 3 is displayed on the right hand side of Figure 39.  Surface 
sensors remain the largest functional objective with 55% of the total costs.  Just over 61% 
of the costs for subsurface sensors will come by way of the dipping sonar and towed 
array.  Distribution of the remaining costs will weigh heavily on combat systems where a 
majority of the funding will come from logistics and operational costs. 
 
 
Figure 39. Alternative 3 LCC and Functional Objective Analysis. 
 
Multiple outliers for individual system costs are present within Alternative 
3.  The total costs for each system is seen in Figure 40 with the numbering system 
associated to Table 24.  While most spikes in systems within the LCCs closely follow the 
spikes in the systems within the Alternative 3 procurement cost analysis, there is one 
outlier that is unexpected.  The TIS system is an outlier that is not an outlier for within 
procurement cost analysis.  Radar, ESM, and LIDAR continue to dominate the amount of 
funding for the entire alternative.  These four systems range in a magnitude of $3.8 
million to $8.1 million and account for 60% of the total costs.  
Secondary cost categories play a significant role in the LCC.  Funding for 
a particular system may require attention in one cost category and very little in another.  
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All surface sensors systems and combat system outliers appear to be heavy in logistic 
costs. Integration and operational costs are essential to the total but are not favored to any 
particular system or functional objective.  
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Figure 40. Alternative 3 Total LCC Cost for Each System. 
 
f) Alternative Comparison 
   Each alternative has unique capabilities and a cost breakdown by 
functional objective that provides useful information to decision makers.  The total 
procurement expenditures based on capability are summarized in Figure 41.   
   In all three alternatives a significant and equal investment is made to the 
surface sensor area.  Roughly $8 million dollars is allocated for this purpose for each 
alternative.  This investment is made primarily in sonobuoy technology as they are 
critical to most ASW activities.  Likewise, an equal amount of combat system funding 
was dedicated to each alternative for the same reasons.  These combat systems are also an 
ASW necessity because they provide situational awareness to the HAMR platform.  The 
combat systems also include the communication capability for transmitting tracks to 
other platforms.  Communication is the primary offensive the weapon for both 
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Alternatives 2 and 3 as they do not engage the target directly but instead they track 
coordinates and communicate the information to existing fleet platforms to initiate a hard 
kill.  Alternative 1, however, does allocate approximately $2.1 millions dollars toward 
hard kill systems such as light weight torpedoes and smart depth bombs. 
   In Alternatives 1 and 3 a cost reduction is reflected in the total cost since 
these are considered to be light subsurface sensor platforms.  The cost reduction is an 
effect of program offices having sonobuoys readily available.  This is in contrast to the 
heavy weight subsurface sensor platform, Alternative 2, which requires a large amount of 
initial funds.  A large portion of this funding is allocated for the procurement of the 
synthetic aperture sonar, dipping sonar, towed array, and the towed array handler.  The 
capability and functional objective cost break down illustrates to decision makers where 
investments are being made.  This information is used later in the SE design process to 
influence future configurations.  
Procurement  





Alternative 1 $2.45 M $2.14 M $100 K $8.08 M $12.8 M 
Alternative 2 $2.53 M $  - $8.43  M $8.08 M $19.0 M 













Figure 41. Alternative Match-up of Procurement Costs. 
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    The total LCC for each alternative is quite different.  Figure 42 shows the 
total cost (in millions) for each alternative and is broken down by its functional objective.  
Since Alternative 3 is the only unmanned system, it is appropriate that it is the least 
expensive.  Alternative 3 does not have extra subsurface sensor nor does it have any hard 
kill the weapons.  This will dramatically reduce the costs compared to the other systems.  
Alternative 1 is the second most expensive option due to its funding expenses for hard 
kill the weapons.  Additional subsurface sensors make Alternative 2 the most expensive 
alternative.  Because of the extra subsurface sensors, a difference of almost $25 million is 
applied to Alternative 2.     
    Surface sensor costs are slightly different due to the incremental technical 
refresh.  More technical refresh funding is applied to the alternative that has a higher 
procurement cost.  A percentage of the alternative’s technical refresh expenses will be 
divided proportionally to each system. 
 
Procurement  





Alternative 1 $14.6 M $9.08 M $1.8 M $24.9 M $50.4 M 
Alternative 2 $15.2 M $1.75 M $26.8 M $25.1 M $68.8 M 














Figure 42. Alternative Match-up of the LCCs. 
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g) System Specifications 
    System specifications provide information needed to determine 
requirements and constraints for modules on each alternative for storage and handling 
purposes.  This will help stakeholders determine which alternative module is suitable for 
their needs and provide information for future estimates for the physical module.  
Specifications for each system include the size (in cubic feet), weight (in tons), and 
power (in kilo watts).  SMEs found in the costs analysis section were able to provide 
some input on specifications for some systems.  Research of system documentation was 
the most widely used method of determining the specifications.  Confirmed system 
specifications as well as best effort estimates provided inputs to the HAMR ASW 
mission module data tables.  SMEs for each system were able to substantiate and 
supplement system requirements. 
    Specifications for each of the systems are broken down into total size, 
weight and power as well as the respective percent consumed or required for each 
alternative.  A table of system specifications for each alternative can be found in 
Appendix G.    
   Derivations of the system specifications for each alternative were found in 
order to analyze differences in functional objectives.  Individual system analyses for each 
alternative provide data on which systems are outliers.   
1. Alternative #1 
Alternative 1 includes various ASW components which utilizes systems 
that consume a large amount of space and power and requires a module can hold a 
substantial amount of weight.  Systems that use at least 10% or more of the size, weight 
and power are considered outliers.  The outliers within Alternative 1 include the Tactical 
Integrated Sensor (TIS) combat system, MK-54 light weight torpedo, various sonobuoys, 
surface search radar, RAMICS, and smart depth bombs.  Alternative 1 will require a total 
power of approximately nine thousand watts (9 kW) in order to operate the systems.   
Figure 49 provides a comparison of the various systems which make up 
Alternative 1.  The system specifications seen in Figure 43 are associated with the 
numbering reference system in Table 24.  The weapons and sonobuoys contribute greatly 
to the total weight Alternative 1 with 28.9 tons, while it occupies 795 cubic feet and 
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consumes 8.9 kW of power.  The ASW module also contains two smart bombs, item 
number 12, each weighing in excess of 2,000 pounds, and the sonobuoy load of 1,080 
units, item number 14, accounts for 26% of the weight and 33% of the cubic footage.  
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Figure 43. Alternative 1 Specifications of Each System. 
 
   The functional objectives represented in Alternative 1 are combat systems, 
hard kill the weapons, subsurface sensors, and surface sensors.  Figure 44 displays the 
three specifications for the respective functional objectives.  Subsurface sensors provide 
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Figure 44. Alternative 1 Distribution of Functional Objectives for Each Specification. 
 
2. Alternative #2 
While Alternative 2 reduces ASW capabilities by removing the weapons 
and adding enhanced additional subsurface sensing provides a different specification 
outlook.  Outliers for this alternative include the TIS system, the towed array, the towed 
handler, sonobuoys, SAS, and radar.  Figure 45 displays the break down of individual 
system and their respective specification.  
Subsurface sensors continue to be a major contributor to the overall 
weight of roughly 26.9 tons, occupying 763 cubic feet, and consuming 9.4 kW of power.  
This is due to the vast amount of size and weight required for sonobuoys.  The thin line 
towed array, item 12, and its retracting handler represent 20% of the total with the 
sonobuoy load of 1,080 units, item 15, at 28% of the total.  Power requirements for the 
alternative are slightly over 9.4 kW and continue to be divided mainly between the TIS 
































Figure 45. Alternative 2 Specifications of Each System. 
 
Specifications for Alternative 2 are reduced to three functional objectives.  
Subsurface sensors take up nearly 83% of the total size and nearly 95% of the total 
weight.  Figure 46 displays the three specifications and their respective functional 
objectives.  Combat systems and surface sensors do not play a large role in size and 
weight constrains, however they do require 43% and 42% of the power respectively.  
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Figure 46. Alternative 2 Distribution of Functional Objectives for Each Specification. 
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3. Alternative #3 
Alternative 3 is also a non-prosecutorial capability ASW Module with 
subsurface sensors limited to 2,160 sonobuoys.  Outliers for this alternative include the 
TIS system, the towed array, the towed handler, sonobuoys, SAS, and radar.  Figure 47 
provides a comparison of the various systems that make up Alternative 3.  The system 
specifications seen in Figure 47 are associated with the numbering reference system in 
Table 24. 
The total weight, size, and power specifications are the smallest of the 
three alternatives.  The total weight of Alternative 3 comes to 19.4 tons total with a size 
of 675 cubic feet and consuming 8.6 kW of power.  The extensive sonobuoy load, item 
13, represents 43% of the total weight and 42% of the space requirements for the 
platform.  The power requirements for all systems come to 8.6 kW with the TIS Combat 
System, item 1, consuming 22% of the power and the surface search radar at 43%.  
Alternative 3 affords both the lowest power consumption and lowest weight of the three 
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Figure 47. Alternative 3 Specifications of Each System. 
 
Specifications for Alternative 3 are reduced to three functional objectives.  
Subsurface sensors take up nearly 82% of the total size and nearly 92% of the total 
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weight.  Figure 48 displays the three specifications and their respective functional 
objectives.  Combat systems and surface sensors do not play a large role in size and 
weight constrains, however they do require 47% and 51% of the power respectively. 
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Figure 48. Alternative 3 Distribution of Functional Objectives for Each Specification. 
 
All three alternatives meet weight requirements set by the stakeholders.  
No constraints were set for the size and power specifications by the stakeholders.  Table 
25 shows the weight, size, and power specifications of the three alternatives and their 
differences.   When comparing the three system specifications it shows that Alternative 1 
is the biggest and heaviest alternative, while Alternative 2 requires the most amount of 
power and Alternative 3 requires the least amount of size and power, and weights the 
least. 
 
Table 25. Alternatives 1 – 3 System Specifications. 





Alternative 1 814 28.9 8.9 
Alternative 2 763 26.9 9.4 
Alternative 3 677 19.4 8.6 
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h) Cost-Related Research Recommendations 
Based on the cost analysis, several opportunities for subsequent research 
should be addressed.  Cost savings should be expected in the process of using a HAMR 
as an ASW platform.  Our modeling yielded a 6:1 ratio in P-3 aircraft to HAMR 
platforms.  SMEs have noted that this is likely a conservative estimate with the number 
being closer to 6:1 ratio.51  Research on this topic might further justify the use of the 
HAMR and the ASW module based on total costs. 
Additional research on the LCCs of the P-3 and upcoming P-8 may 
provide a cost justification for the use of the HAMR and the ASW module when actual 












                                                 
51 Boensel [2008] 
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IV. DECISION MAKING 
A. ALTERNATIVE SCORING 
The evaluation of alternatives to determine their overall performance in relation to 
the objectives established by stakeholders was performed using multi-attribute decision 
analysis techniques.   There are three main components of the multi-attribute decision 
analysis, value scoring, the raw data matrix containing data generated in the modeling 
and analysis of alternatives, and the decision matrix. 52   
1. Value Scoring 
In the modeling and analysis phase there were three simulation scenarios and an 
analysis of logistics considerations performed, each of these produced a single 
performance measure considered valid in the decision analysis.  The multi-attribute 
decision analysis will use the data generated for the following four decision measures and 
their associated value scores as the basis for the alternative scoring. 
Average Total Time of Detection:  The data for this measure was derived from 
Scenario ALPHA.  It represents the average time that an enemy submarine was detected 
while it was within the blue asset area of operation during the simulations.  Because of 
the nature of scenario ALPHA, the measure of total time of detection represents the 
performance of the various systems in the objective of increasing the probability of 
detection better than the probability of detection measure given in the value structure.  
The probability of detection in this scenario is a measure based almost entirely on the 
performance of sonobuoys rather than the unique capabilities of the alternatives, whereas 
the total time detected reflects the size of the sonobuoy field the asset is capable of 
maintaining and to a smaller extent, the persistence of the asset.  The value curve for this 
data, shown in Figure 49, is an s-curve with endpoint values between 0 and 31 hours.  
The endpoints were selected based on the range of outcomes in the simulation.  The s-
curve is formed to reflect that the relative value gained per hour of detection time is not 
equal for all possible outcomes.  There is a range of values representing the greatest 
                                                 
52  Paulo [2006] 
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increase in value per hour.  These values are represented by the linear portion of the 
curve.  .  
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Figure 49. Scenario Alpha Value Curve. 
 
Median Time to Prosecute:   The data for this measure was derived from scenario 
BRAVO.  It represents the median time required for a blue force asset to fire a shot 
measured from the time of first detection during the simulation.  The median was used in 
this case because a number of extremely high special cause outliers skewed the average 
time to prosecute data.  This measure encompasses the time from first detection to 
classification, percentage of time track maintained, average time from track to firing 
point procedures, and average time from firing solution to kill measures of the value 
structure as it was impossible to measure or derive meaningful data for the measures 
individually.  The value curve for this data, shown in Figure 50, is an s-curve with values 
between 0 and 600.  Like time of detection, the endpoints were selected based on the 
range of outcomes in the simulation. The s-curves were created to reflect that the relative 
value lost per minute of time spent prosecuting is not considered equal for all possible 
outcomes.  There is a range of values representing the greatest increase in value for each 
minute not spent prosecuting.  These values are represented by the linear portion of the s-
curve. 
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Figure 50. Scenario BRAVO Value Curve.  
 
Total Number of Sorties Required:  The data for this measure was derived from 
the results of scenario CHARLIE.   It represents the total number of sorties that were 
required to be flown to accomplish the mission.  This measure corresponds directly to the 
time on station measure of the value structure.  The benefit of using the number of sorties 
rather than the total time on station is that it better represents the operational performance 
of the asset and provides a better basis for comparison to the P-3 in this scenario.  The 
value curve for this data, shown in Figure 51, is linear with values between 30 and 1 
sortie.  The endpoints were selected based on the outcomes of the simulation and the 
curve reflects a risk neutral approach assigning equal value to each sortie. 
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Figure 51. Scenario CHARLIE Value Curve. 
 
ASW Systems Manning per Watch:   The estimates for the systems requiring 
manning was generated in the logistics analysis and was based on the capabilities of the 
TIS system and known manning requirements for other systems.   The value curve for 
this data, shown in Figure 52, is a curve with values between 0 and 6 individuals.  The 
endpoints were selected based on the preference of stakeholders and the current manning 
of the P-3 with the curve indicating a “risk prone”53 approach to increasing value on 
reduced manning and emphasize the desire of the stakeholders to have an unmanned 












                                                 
53 Sage [2000:p.403] 
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Figure 52. ASW Systems Manning per Watch Value Curve. 
  
Because the four decision measures discussed above do not correspond directly to 
the measures and weights that were established in the value structure, nor do they 
represent the complete value structure, the weighting of these measures needed to be re-
evaluated.  In order to more directly match measures with functions and objectives the 
functions of classify, track, localize, and engage were rolled into the higher level function 
of prosecution.  The four measures above were then assigned, or re-assigned weights 
based on the original value structure, stakeholder input, and the relative importance of the 
key function of detection established earlier.   Table 26 contains a breakdown of how the 
updated measures match up with the primary functions of the system and the updated 










Table 26.     Updated Measures. 
Detection 60%  
 Total Detection Time 40% 
 Number of Sorties 20% 
Prosecution 25%  
 
Median Time 
to Prosecute 25% 
Human Systems 
Integration 15%  
 Manning 15% 
 
2. Raw Data Matrix 
The data generated for each of the four decision measures was compiled and 
entered into the raw data matrix, shown in Table 27.   
 
Table 27. Data Generated for Each of the Four Decision Measures. 
Alternatives 
Measures 




18.08 18.49 30.57 16.62 
Median Time to 
Engage (minutes) 537 80 80 214 




4 4 2 6 
 
3. Decision Matrix 
The decision matrix is a graphical tool used to combine value scores, global 
weights, and raw data and produce total value scores for each alternative based on Multi 
Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT).54   The MAUT function, given below in Equation 1, is 
used to calculate the total value score (U) of a given alternative (ai). 
 
                                                 
54 Sage [2000:p.403] 
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In this function, wj represents the global weight of a given measure and Uj(ai) 
represents the value score for the measure for a given alternative.  Table 28 shows the 
individual value scoring of each measure for each alternative, the global weights 
associated with each measure, and the total value score calculated using the MAUT 
function. 
Table 28.     Individual Value Scoring. 
Alternatives 
Measure Global Weights ALT 1 ALT 2 ALT 3 P-3 ALT 
Average Total 
Detection Time  0.4 0.54 0.55 1 0.45 
Median Time to 
Prosecute  0.25 0.02 0.93 0.93 0.63 
Number of Sorties  0.2 0.96 0.96 1 0.03 
ASW Systems 
Manning/Watch 
(w/o flight crew) 
0.15 0.36 0.36 0.64 0 
Total Value Score 1 0.47 0.70 0.93 0.34 
 
4. Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis of the weighted criteria was performed for the three 
recommended alternatives “to ensure that the weightings are not distorted.”55  Because 
“weights can make a difference between choosing one alternative over another,”56a 
decision analysis process was conducted on the sensitivity of global weights with respect 
to each recommended alternative depicted in Appendix E (Sensitivity Analysis Data).  
The sensitivity test will provide information as to how a change in our weighting or data 
for each factor in our decision matrix will affect the outcome.  A graphical method was 
                                                 
55 Forsberg [1996:P.154] 
56 Paulo, [ 2006] 
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also used in this process with the focus on the four primary evaluation measures that have 
the greatest impact on the decision.  The four evaluation measures that were evaluated are 
average total detection time, mean time to engage, number of sorties, and ASW systems 
manning and watch.   The rule of thumb for determining whether an evaluation measure 
is considered sensitive is “if the Point of Indifference is within 0.1 of the original global 
weight.”57   
Average total detection time was the first evaluation measure conducted in this 
analysis.  The original global weight of this evaluation measure and the corresponding 
total utility score was plotted as shown in Figure 53.  The point of indifference for this 
evaluation measure was determined to be 1.027 which is approximately 0.627 different 
than the original evaluation measure global weight of 0.40.  This evaluation measure is 
considered as not sensitive since the point of indifference is not within 0.1 of the original 
global weight. 
 Average Total Detection Time 
y = 0.1217x + 0.4183
y = -0.2475x + 0.7975
y = 0.1192x + 0.8808























Figure 53. Sensitivity Analysis (Average Total Detection Time). 
                                                 
57 Paulo [2006] 
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The mean time to engage was the second evaluation measure conducted in this 
analysis.  The original global weight of this evaluation measure and the corresponding 
total utility score was plotted as shown in Figure 54.  The point of indifference for this 
evaluation measure was determined to be 1.0 which is approximately 0.750 different than 
the original evaluation measure global weight of 0.25.  This evaluation measure is 
considered as not sensitive since the point of indifference is not within 0.1 of the original 
global weight.  
Mean Time to Engage
y = -0.596x + 0.616
y = 0.3087x + 0.6213
y = 0.002x + 0.928























Figure 54. Sensitivity Analysis (Mean Time to Engage). 
 
The number of sorties was the third evaluation measure conducted in this 
analysis.  The original global weight of this evaluation measure and the corresponding 
total utility score was plotted as shown in Figure 55.  The point of indifference for this 
evaluation measure was determined to be 1.17 which is approximately 0.968 different 
than the original evaluation measure global weight of 0.20.  This evaluation measure is 
 122
considered as not sensitive since the point of indifference is not within 0.1 of the original 
global weight. 
 
Number of Sorties 
y = 0.6163x + 0.3438
y = 0.3269x + 0.6331
y = 0.0894x + 0.9106


























Figure 55. Sensitivity Analysis (Number of Sorties). 
 
The ASW systems manning/watch was the last evluation measure conducted in 
this analysis.  The original global weight of this evaluation measure and the 
corresponding total utility score was plotted as shown in Figure 56.  The point of 
indifference for this evaluation measure was determined to be 1.0 which is approximately 
0.850 different than the original evaluation measure global weight of 0.15.  This 
evaluation measure is considered as not sensitive since the point of indifference is not 
within 0.1 of the original global weight. 
The results shown in the above figures show that none of the evaluation factors 
are considered sensitive.  This indicates that the assumptions that were made regarding 
the weighting of evaluation measures will not have an effect on our results.  As such, if 
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the weights were not as accurate as initially thought and a change was required, the 
outcome of our study would not change.  This provides more stability and confidence that 
our recommendations are correct. 
ASW Systems Manning/Watch 
y = -0.1259x + 0.4859
y = -0.3982x + 0.7582
y = -0.3394x + 0.9794



























Figure 56. Sensitivity Analysis (ASW Systems Manning/Watch). 
 
 
B. COST-VALUE ANALYSIS  
Cost-value analysis was performed to consider the overall value, with respect to 
performance, and cost of that value in relation to the other alternatives.  By plotting the 
total value score obtained from the decision matrix against the net present value obtained 
from the cost analysis it can be determined what relationship exists between cost and 
performance of the alternatives.  When an alternative has a higher net present value and a 
lower total value score than another alternative it is considered “dominated” by that 
alternative.   The P-3 was not included in this analysis because the purpose of the analysis 
was only to compare the proposed HAMR alternatives. 
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The results of the cost value analysis are presented in Table 29 and show the net 
present value (NPV) and total value score for each alternative.  Figure 57 shows a graph 
of that data with the horizontal axis representing net present value from “best” to “worst” 
going left to right and the vertical axis representing total value score from “worst” to 
“best” going bottom to top.  When interpreting the graph a rule of thumb is that 
alternatives closer to the bottom right corner of the graph perform more poorly in the 
cost-value analysis than alternatives closer to the upper left hand corner.  The results 
show that Alternative 3 dominates all of the other alternatives, providing better overall 
performance and lower costs.  
 
Table 29. Cost vs. Value Data. 
Alternative NPV (Mil) Total Value  Score 
ALT 1 50.4 0.47 
ALT 2 68.8 0.70 
ALT 3 44.4 0.93 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Conclusions 
a) Modeling Conclusions 
After the evaluation of alternatives, all three meet the stakeholders’ 
minimum requirements and are suitable for the HAMR ASW mission module.  Upon 
analysis of the modeling data, it became apparent that Alternative #3, the unmanned 
alternative, provides the best solution under the scenarios used.  That is in part from its 
extensive sonobuoy capacity and the utilization of agile P-3 aircraft as its means to 
engage the targets.  The modeling data clearly shows in the barrier scenario the HAMR 
ASW module carrying more sonobuoys has shorter time to detect than either a single P-3 
or the other HAMR ASW module configurations.  Due to the importance placed on 
barrier protection in the modeling scenario used, the HAMR was less effective than the 
P-3 in prosecution.  However, in the given barrier scenario, the HAMR ASW solutions 
which direct P-3s for prosecution provide a statistically significant force multiplier.  
Based on this research, Alternative 3, HAMR ASW module is an effective force 
multiplier due to its suitability in loitering, detecting, and queuing of P-3 aircraft.  
The model used in scenario C results in fewer sorties required for the 
unmanned HAMR ASW mission module compared to either a P-3 or all other HAMR 
module configurations.  In the model scenario used, an ASW asset tracks a contact 
submarine approximately 1,300 NM.  This model demonstrates, with greater persistence, 
a larger number of sonobuoys and greater capacity to carry fuel; Alternative 3 requires 
fewer sorties to complete the mission.  Based on the model parameters, the results of this 
analysis yield the following sortie ratios:  one sortie for Alternative 1, two sorties for both 
Alternatives 2 and 3 and twenty nine sorties for the P-3.  
b) Manpower Conclusions 
Manning was a key factor in the value structure defined by the 
stakeholders.  With the Navy’s clear trend toward reducing manpower, new weapon 
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systems must consider lower manning options.  The P-3 crew performing ASW mission 
tasks totals six.  In comparison all three HAMR ASW mission module alternatives 
require less manning.  Alternative 1 requires four watch standers for ASW mission 
tasking to accommodate the launching of torpedoes.  Alternative 2 also requires a crew of 
four in part to operate the towed array, while Alternative 3 only requires two operators in 
a remote station for ASW.  
c) Decision Matrix Conclusions 
The total value scores given in the decision matrix, shown earlier, 
represent the overall performance of each of the three HAMR ASW module alternatives 
and the P-3 platform.  Alternative 3 clearly excelled in the simulations and analysis that 
was used to evaluate the alternatives with a score of 0.23, or 33% greater than Alternative 
2.  Looking at the value scores presented in the decision matrix there are two MOEs that 
Alternative 3 far exceeded all other alternatives, total time of detection and minimum 
crew size.  For total time of detection the performance gain is a product of the increased 
sonobuoy field size Alternative 3 is capable of maintaining.  The expanded sonobuoy 
field gave Alternative 3 greater detection range and more opportunity to detect enemy 
submarines transiting the barrier region.  The crew size reduction for Alternative 3 was a 
result of removing complex and high maintenance systems requiring on site personnel 
and adding remote command systems allowing the module to be completely controlled by 
two operators on the ground.  
In addition to the clear superiority of Alternative 3 in the simulations were 
performed, it is worth noting that all three HAMR platforms exceeded the total value 
score of the P-3.   When comparing the P-3 to the alternative with the nearest total value 
score it is interesting to note that its greatest advantage over the P-3 was its persistence.  
The extended persistence of the HAMR platform allows it to spend more time in its 
primary mission and less time in transit.  The effects of this are evident in the value 
scores of the total detection time and total number of sorties MOEs. 
d) Cost and Logistics 
Cost and logistics data was collected on the various components of the 
alternatives.  This information was obtained by various means of collaboration with 
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program office, SMEs, technical manuals, and Navy Supply System.  Once the collected 
information was compiled, an analysis was performed which allowed a roll up of weight, 
power, space, LCCs, and manning estimates for analysis. 
Component footprints were estimated and totaled to establish a physical 
size for each alternative.  The size estimate was used by stakeholders with an estimate of 
the module’s outline for HAMR aircraft construction considerations.  Likewise, weight 
was totaled to ensure the lift capability envelope was not exceeded by the alternatives 
under consideration.  Power requirements were summarized to provide the stakeholders 
with an estimate to guide the design of the HAMR power system.  Life cycle costs were 
estimated for the life of the module of 20 years.  It includes acquisition of the systems, 
integration into the system, ongoing technical support, two technical insertions, and 
ultimate disposal at the end of life.  The overview of the life cycle cost and logistics data 
is shown in Table 30.  Alternative 1’s cost total of $50.4M per unit is largely impacted by 
the hard kill components.  Alternative 2 contains a thin line towed array, which is the 
single largest impact of cost to any of the alternatives.  Alternative 3 is the lowest cost 
alternative at $44.4M.  Alternative 3 is the smallest, lightest, consumes the least amount 
of power, and is the least cost leader. 
 
Table 30. Overview of Alternative Details. 
  Size (ft3) 
Weight 
(tons) Power (kW) 
Life Cycle 
Cost ($M) Manning
Alternative 1 814 28.9 8.9 $50.4 4 
Alternative 2 763 26.9 9.4 $68.8 4 
Alternative 3 677 19.4 8.6 $44.4 2 
 
e) Cost Value Analysis Conclusion 
Examining the cost-value analysis presented earlier it is immediately clear 
that Alternative 1 and Alternative 2 are both dominated by Alternative 3.  This is an 
interesting outcome because it seems to indicate that the costly systems used in 
Alternatives 1 and 2 for detection and engagement added little value in our analysis.  It is 
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difficult to determine whether our analysis simply did not use the full capability of these 
systems or that simply using sonobouy fields and focusing on detection above all else is 
the most effective and cost efficient way for the HAMR to conduct airborne ASW.  This 
is an area that should be examined in future research. 
f) Risk Conclusions 
Many of the systems used in Alterative 1 have previously been integrated 
into the P-3 and provide a minimum of risk.  Inserting new technology in the form of the 
tactically integrated sensor combat system (TIS) into a unique airborne application like 
Alternative 1 yields medium risk. While TIS is fielded on all of the Navy’s aircraft 
carriers, it has not been applied to an airborne environment.  Some of the other 
technologies considered in the ASW modules, have not been fielded from an airborne 
platform.  Alternative 2 applies the use of a thin line towed array which is currently used 
in both shipboard and submarine applications, but airborne use of this system is unproven 
and affords a higher level of risk.  The balance of the technology selected for Alternative 
3 is adapted from other airborne platforms that are currently fielded, hence presenting 
marginal risk in application to an ASW airship platform.  
g) Summary 
Based on our analysis, the unmanned ASW mission module offers the 
lightest weight, lowest cost, lowest risk, and best performance.  For these reasons, the 
recommendation is Alternative 3. 
 
2. Recommendations 
a) Recommended Systems 
The following recommendations are based on research utilizing the SEDP 
as presented in the value systems design, alternative generation, modeling and simulation, 
decision analysis and conclusion sections of this paper.  All research was the result of 
stakeholder’s effective need for a persistent airborne asset for detecting, communicating, 
tracking, localizing, classifying and engaging ASW threats.  The subsequent 
recommendation of Alternative 3, the unmanned lightweight sensor platform meets these 
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requirements while providing the overall best performance, lowest cost with the minim 
number of operators. 
As previously noted the hybrid airship is not within scope of project as it 
is simply the host for the module and only power and weight of the module are the two 
platform constraints defined. This alternative uses the P-3 or other platforms for 
prosecution. Alternative 3 is comprised of a tactically integrated sensor combat system 
(TIS).  TIS is comprised of a COTS based hardware platform with government owned 
software and is the center of the combat and control system of the module. A derivative is 
currently fielded on every USN Aircraft Carrier as part of the ship defense system.  It 
provides the ability to collect and correlate numerous sensor inputs from internal sensors, 
buoys, and other sensor platforms in theater and present them on a remote display for the 
operators; offering a common operating picture.. It employs tactical decision aids (TDAs) 
to automate and improve the decision making process for the remote platform operators.  
It is fully capable of communicating raw date, rendered data, tracks and all associated 
metadata over the communications alternatives options selected for the module. It can be 
fielded in either a classified or unclassified version as needed.  
All sensing in this alternative is leveraged from currently fielded Navy 
capabilities, in part, to ensure technical maturity and to simplify training and logistics 
supportability. The capabilities begin with millimeter surface scanning radar for mast 
detection LIDAR for shallow water detecting and ranging of targets. Magnetic Anomaly 
Detecting for submarine sensing at depths which exceed LIDAR capability. The electro-
optical visual light and infrared camera system provides a visual component to the 
modules sensing systems. All sensing inputs, whether visual, tracks, contacts or 
information provided from other contributing assets can be correlated with the buoy 
fields providing a common operating picture.. Platform location, direction, altitude and 
ground speed information is provided via GPS and integrates the map information 
contained within the TIS mapping module. Acoustic monitoring is acquired by standard 
COTS sonobuoys currently deployed by the Navy. The ASW module has an enhanced 
capability to carry up to 2160 sonobuoys and  is equipped with two 120-channel remotely 
operated receivers and directional antennas which permit simultaneous monitoring more 
than one buoy field, significantly contributing to the 24/7 persistence offered by this 
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solution.  Preset sonobuoys will be dispensed via two modified P-3 buoy launcher 
systems operated by a COTS computer providing remote operators the ability to select 
the sonobuoy types needed for a mission. Automatic in-flight placement is accomplished 
by uploading the required field coordinates via LINK 16 communications or satellite 
communications to the COTS launcher computer. The system will automatically dispense 
the pre-selected buoys, based on the GPS derived coordinates.  Pre-set templates may be 
selected, if desired, to simplify or expedite placement. 
To comply with stakeholders limitations of weight limits, Alternative 3 
weight is estimated at 19.4 tons; easily meeting the 50 ton lift capacity constraint given 
by stakeholders. While there were no limits on package size, the selected alternative will 
require approximately 677 cubic feet within its enclosure. 
b) Recommended Area of Future Research 
The in-depth analyses of the systems and HAMR platform have answered 
many questions about the HAMR craft and ASW mission module.  However, there still 
exist unknowns which have not been resolved.  The HAMR ASW mission module has 
several unique capabilities that provide many areas for future research.  Several of these 
research topics have been categorized into operational and technical areas in the 
following paragraphs.  Increased manpower and funding for future research in these areas 
will provide strategic information to decision makers and will contribute greatly to the 
HAMR ASW mission module. 
 
Operational Areas  
The operational areas of future research focus on the operational elements and 
specific strategies that are provided by the HAMR ASW mission module.  The 
advantages of the HAMR platform must be thoroughly understood as well as the 
disadvantages.  The data that results from these operational research topics will provide 




• A standard ASW scenario that would provide a baseline for a comparative 
analysis is desired.  The scenario would be provided by the Navy’s ASW 
taskforce and may be a situation within which the HAMR platform could be 
dropped into.  This standard scenario would provide a basic reference point for 
comparison. 
• Additional littoral scenarios are desired to fully understand the operational 
capability and overarching strategies that can be employed using the persistent 
HAMR craft.  There are many questions in the littoral realm that require answers.  
For instance, given the air born nature of the HAMR what considerations must be 
made for detection in a littoral area.  What is the increase risk of detection due to 
the proximity of land?  What are additional active search capabilities that could be 
utilized by the HAMR in littoral areas?    
• Address new operational capabilities of P-8 and how it can complement the 
HAMR.  The additional capabilities of the new P-8 may be leveraged to provide 
increases functionality to the HAMR platform for force multiplication purposes.  
One example of this is that the hard kills which are delegated to the P-3 by the 
HAMR would instead be handled by the P-8.  Increases in speed and payload of 
the new P-8 would need to be factored into a new set of models and simulations. 
• Analyze how decreases in habitability of unmanned solutions provide 
increased space savings.  How can these space savings be utilized effectively?  
Which systems should fill these spaces?  Also a more detailed analysis of the 
process changes required for the unmanned solutions should be undertaken.  
Specifically, what kinds of safeguards should be employed to ensure automation 
does not result in unintended effects. 
• For the unmanned solution determine what increase of mission hostility is 
acceptable due to the decrease of personnel?  Given that there are no human lives 
at stake in the unmanned solution what types of increase mission risks are 
permitted and how deep into enemy territory may a HAMR travel?  This raises 
important issues that can significantly alter the HAMR’s CONOPs. 
• How can the unmanned solution provide increased mission endurance?  
Without local manning requirements several teams of remote pilots and sensor 
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operators could remotely control the craft from a base hundreds of miles away.  
Consequently, there is a significant potential for increased mission endurance, the 
extent of which could be better understood through future simulations. 
• Additional open water scenarios for simulation and modeling the HAMR 
ASW module are needed.  In an effort to know more about the operational 
capability of the HAMR ASW mission module, a myriad of open water scenarios 
should be considered and the HAMR’s performance in these situations should be 
collected.  Testing the performance of the HAMR in all types of situations would 
further define both its strengths and limitations. 
• There should be a detailed examination into specific strategies which could 
take advantage of the HAMR’s out of water detection capability.  The persistent 
and airborne nature of the HAMR provides several advantages in ASW warfare.  
Since the HAMR does not traverse through the water it will not be creating 
vibrations through the water medium via propeller rotation, movement of engine 
components, nor from a hull colliding with waves.  Therefore, the conventional 
method of detection by listening passively for vibrations in the water is not 
applicable to the HAMR.  It may theorize that a submarine would have to extend 
its periscope to visually identify the HAMR.  If so, an attack solution would most 
likely already be enroute to deal with this submersible.  This is one of several 
advantages that may be found if this research topic is pursued. 
• A detailed analysis of probable counter measures to the HAMR’s capabilities 
that will likely be used by the enemy provides an interesting research topic that 
could be explored.  The technologies and strategies of war are always evolving 
and it is necessary to anticipate what possible counter measures might be 
employed.  In doing so we will better understand how to counter these enemy 
strategies and identify strategic weaknesses of the HAMR and its methods of 
operation.   
 
Technical Areas of Future Research 
There are several areas of technical research that could be given a closer analysis.  
Technical areas of research are primarily system specific topics.  Many questions were 
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answered by the analysis performed by the HAMR ASW team, however continued 
analysis may be given to the areas specified below. 
• Additional research should be given to understanding the automation 
interfaces necessary for unmanned systems.  The unmanned solution consists 
mostly of sonobuoys which can be automated with a sonobuoy dispenser attached 
to the bottom of the air frame.  However, the control interfaces that are required to 
initiate deployment of sensors would need to be designed.  Likewise, the 
automation control interfaces for the previously manned systems such as the 
EO/IR, LIDAR and MAD systems will require further research. 
• Conduct research on how much bandwidth is needed for multiple system 
transmissions.  One technical question which could be given attention is the 
amount of bandwidth necessary to use all of the systems simultaneously.  How 
will this bandwidth be relayed back to headquarters and how much performance 
degradation in wireless bandwidth is expected under varying weather conditions? 
• What technical considerations should be made to incorporate the HAMR 
ASW mission module into the LCS architecture?  What interfaces would need to 
be developed to affectively integrate the HAMR into the LCS architecture and 
how could the unmanned solution (Alternative 3) best be utilized within this 
structure? 
• Examine the functionality and communication interfaces that may be provided 
by the P-8.    How does the new functionality of the P-8 factor into our models in 
terms of delivering the Mk-54 on target.  What integration interfaces should be 
developed to communicate with the new P-8?  What additional technological 
innovations of the P-8 can be incorporated into the HAMR ASW mission 
module? 
• Various risks which were assumed to be of minimal priority could be more 
closely examined.  For instance, the interference or lack thereof of multiple 
sensors suites and auxiliary systems on a single air born platform should be 
analyzed.  The operational environmental and persistent characteristics of the 
HAMR craft expose some interesting concerns as well.  For example, how will 
transmitters and receivers function when the HAMR is engulfed in a 
 136
thunderstorm?  These previously unmitigated risks provide an excellent area for 
observation. 
 
B. PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE/COMPONENT DETAILS 
The focus of the component detail section is to provide system and component 
descriptions from a general standpoint.  An analysis of each system provides an overview 
of its capability and thus the overall potential of the HAMR.  Included within some of the 
system descriptions are the subsystems and the external components needed to operate 
the system.  Appendix H reflects systems that are centered on the unmanned solution 
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Draft Mission Statement: Develop an Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Mission 
Capability for the HAMR 50-ton demonstrator. 
 
Questions for Stakeholders: 
 
• Below is a short list of systems that have been proposed as candidates to 
for inclusion in the HAMR ASW Mission Capability (HAMC), for all of the 
systems that you have knowledge of, could you provide a point-of-contact 
(POC) who could provide technical information about that system? 
 
 Dipping Sonar 
 Sonobuoys Sensors  Mitch Haggard 5-2237 
 Magnetic Anomaly Detection (MAD) sensor system 
 Anti-Torpedo Sensor/Weapons 
 Mk 54 Torpedo Weapons System 
 Surface Search Radar 
 Periscope Detection 
 Thin Line Towed Array   
 Sensor Processing    Corey Countryman  5-7708 
 ASW Combat System   Corey Countryman  5-7708 
 
o Are there any other systems that you would recommend for 
consideration in an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA)? AIS receivers, 
UAVs, net-torp, heavy-weight torps, environmental sampling & 
analysis, IR sensors, Specific Emitter Identification (SEI), 
SAR/ISAR, Video Imaging, self defense counter measures (chaff, 
jamming, etc),  
 
• What do you see as the critical functional capabilities this module should 
have in order to be successful?  Self contained sensors, analysis 
capabilities, communications (to/from sensors, responders), 
response capability, and associated infrastructure support (crew 
habitability, power, space) 
 
• Roughly, how much procurement money do think will be available for the 
design and deployment of the HAMC?  $5M sensor integration, $15M 
analysis/C2 suite, $5M comms integration, $15M weapons suite, and 
$15M infrastructure (crew space, magazine, power, etc.) 
 
• With what networks/data links should the HAMC have connectivity?  Link 




o Which of those networks or data links should be provided by the 
Airship?  HAMR would be a node for Link and sonar channels, 
potentially on the UAV control/data channels would be organic 
to HAMR, TCDL. 
 
• Should the HAMR Payload Module be capable of being disassembled for 
transportation and storage (e.g., two 25-ton sections that can go on 2 
trucks)? Yes, two may be wrong number though. 
 
• In what ways could the HAMC potentially increase, or fill gaps, in ASW 
operational capability?  Improved persistence/loitering, increased 
search speed, more integrated capability (more sensors, more 
analysis capability), quicker response, greater stealth, and more 
ASW related payload (equipment, sensors, weapons, personnel) 
 
• What do you see as the major hurdles to employing HAMC?  
Establishing the platform due to perceived competition with existing 
platforms, initial cost for fielding the platform, initial cost for fielding 
HAMC (and other mission packages), facilities, hanger space, 
manning, training, identifying an “owner”, overcoming the resistance 
to change and embracing innovation.  
 
• From what you currently know or envision about the HAMC, please 
provide a brief description of an operational scenario or concept of 
operations (CONOPS).  Given Blue Force air superiority and 
knowledge of regional/local weather conditions throughout 
deployment of HAMC, the following could apply: 
 
• Stand alone HAMC Area ASW – in conjunction with a CSG (with 
an appropriate stand-off for safety from submarine attack, say a 
couple hundred miles) which is tasked to defend the HAMC from 
air or surface threats, HAMC conducts independent searches and 
conducts/coordinates ASW attacks (by other ASW platforms 
including other HAMCs) in order to clear an area or prevent 
intrusion by a submarine.   
 
• Coordinated HAMC Area ASW – deployed with other ASW 
platforms, i.e. ships and subs, HAMC provides either in-depth 
(e.g. outer) ASW defense or sector (e.g. flank protection) defense 
for either a CSG or ESG.    
 
• Littoral Patrol – deployed in stand alone mode, protected by 
either sea assets or shore based assets, HAMC conducts 
searches or searches and attacks on submarines.  Other ASW 
platforms (e.g. helos, fixed wing, subs, or ships) can launch 
attacks if HAMC is only in a search mode.  Monitors shipping 
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in/out of port; identifies/tracks suspect platforms; provides 
communications/sensor data relay for shore base units; 
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System # System 
Organiza
tion Contact Info 
1 Manual Torpedo Preset System - MK437 NUWC Keyport John Kenney 
2 TIS - SAAS & SPS NUWC Keyport Mike Newberry 
3 Comms - JTRS (PRC-148) SPAWAR 
4 GCCS-M (USQ-119 ) SPAWAR 
5 Comms – SATCOM (PRC-117F) SPAWAR 
6 Comms - Link 11 - AN/USQ-125 SPAWAR 
7 Comms - Link 16 – AN/URC-107 (V) SPAWAR 
8 Comms - Link 22 SPAWAR 
9 Comms - Class I Common Data Link (CDL) SPAWAR 
10 Automated Digital Network System (ADNS) SPAWAR 
11 Sonobuoy Receiver (ARR 970) SPAWAR 
Dr. Ken Boyd 
Code 552 - RF Comms & 
Systems Division 
Phone: (619) 553-6801 
Email: ken.boyd@navy.mil 
12 Sonobuoy Dispenser  (Integrated with TIS) NUWC Keyport  
13 LW Torpedo - MK54 PMS 404 John Kenney 
14 Super Cavitating Munitions - MK258 NSWC Dahlgren  
15 Smart Depth Bomb (Modified JDAM) MK 82/BLU-111  NAVAIR  






17 Towed Array - TB29A Thin Line NUWC Newport 
18 Towed Array - Handler (OA-9070B) NUWC Newport 
Robert “Bud” Bretz 
Phone: (401) 832-3350 
Email: 
bretzrj@npt.nuwc.navy.mil 
19 Dipping Sonar NAVAIR 
Paul H. Davis 
MH-60R Acoustics Engineer / 
ALFS Engineer  
Phone: (301) 995-7339 / (301) 
342-2115 
Email: paul.h.davis@navy.mil 




21 SSQ 53F Passive Sonobuoy NSWC Crane 
22 SSQ 62E Active Sonobuoy NSWC Crane 
23 SSQ 101 ADAR Sonobuoy NSWC Crane 
Christopher Sumner 
Phone: (812) 854-2008 
Email: 
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Phone: (301) 342-2552 
Email:  omar@raytheon.com 
25 MAD AN/ASQ 233 
Polatomic Inc. 
Gary Kuhlman 




26 RADAR - APY-10 (Surface Search Periscope) Raytheon 
Omar Lozano 
Phone: (972) 952-5303 
Email:  
william.gelatka@navy.mil 
27 EOIR - HD Telescope Camera (Star Safire 3) NAVAIR/ FLIR 
Jeff Nicholas  
(360) 921-9660  
Jeff.nicholas@flir.com 
NAVAIR  
28 ESM (AN/ALQ-217) 
Lockheed Martin – 
Owego 
Charles Finnigan 









29 LIDAR - April Showers 
Kaman 
Aerospace Corp. 
William P. Elkins 








System # Function Procurement Integration Logistics Operational Maintenance Disposal Total 
1 CS $32,657 $0 $75,358 $194,427 $17,561 $8,500 $328,503 
2 CS $719,942 $500,000 $1,661,291 $583,280 $399,123 $4,250 $3,867,886 
3 CS $296,883 $100,000 $685,069 $583,280 $159,649 $17,000 $1,841,881 
4 CS $148,442 $500,000 $342,534 $583,280 $79,825 $12,750 $1,666,831 
5 CS $296,883 $75,000 $685,069 $583,280 $159,649 $12,750 $1,812,631 
6 CS $296,883 $75,000 $685,069 $583,280 $159,649 $12,750 $1,812,631 
7 CS $59,377 $35,000 $68,507 $583,280 $15,965 $12,750 $774,878 
8 CS $593,767 $100,000 $85,634 $48,607 $31,930 $8,500 $868,437 
9 CS $1,187,534 $50,000 $342,534 $0 $15,965 $1,700 $1,597,733 
10 HK $0 $400,000 $856,336 $583,280 $0 $0 $1,839,616 
11 HK $148,442 $30,000 $342,534 $0 $0 $1,700 $522,676 
12 HK $59,377 $400,000 $137,014 $583,280 $0 $3,400 $1,183,070 
13 HK $2,968,834 $250,000 $1,541,404 $583,280 $159,649 $34,000 $5,537,168 
14 SBS $0 $100,000 $0 $0 $0 $6,800 $106,800 
15 SBS $0 $100,000 $0 $0 $0 $6,800 $106,800 
16 SBS $0 $100,000 $0 $0 $0 $6,800 $106,800 
17 SBS $0 $100,000 $0 $0 $0 $6,800 $106,80 
18 SBS $148,442 $600,000 $342,534 $194,427 $79,825 $8,500 $1,373,727 
19 SRFS $2,968,834 $1,000,000 $2,860,162 $194,427 $159,649 $34,000 $7,217,072 
20 SRFS $705,098 $200,000 $1,627,038 $194,427 $79,825 $8,500 $2,814,887 
21 SRFS $3,859,484 $800,000 $1,712,672 $194,427 $41,509 $25,500 $6,633,591 
22 SRFS $4,453,251 $1,200,000 $1,712,672 $388,853 $478,947 $42,500 $8,276,223 





System # Function Procurement Integration Logistics Operational Maintenance Disposal Total 
1 CS $735,156 $500,000 $1,636,203 $583,280 $399,123 $4,250 $3,858,012 
2 CS $151,579 $10,000 $337,361 $388,853 $79,825 $12,750 $980,368 
3 CS $303,157 $100,000 $674,723 $583,280 $159,649 $17,000 $1,837,809 
4 CS $151,579 $500,000 $337,361 $583,280 $79,825 $12,750 $1,664,795 
5 CS $303,157 $25,000 $674,723 $583,280 $159,649 $12,750 $1,758,559 
6 CS $303,157 $75,000 $674,723 $583,280 $159,649 $12,750 $1,808,559 
7 CS $60,631 $35,000 $67,472 $583,280 $15,965 $12,750 $775,099 
8 CS $606,314 $100,000 $84,340 $48,607 $31,930 $8,500 $879,691 
9 CS $1,212,629 $50,000 $337,361 $0 $15,965 $1,700 $1,617,655 
10 HK $0 $0 $0 $1,749,840 $0 $0 $1,749,840 
11 SBS $3,789,464 $1,000,000 $1,686,807 $388,853 $39,912 $85,000 $6,990,037 
12 SBS $817,009 $750,000 $1,818,378 $0 $860,509 $34,000 $4,279,896 
13 SBS $1,515,786 $500,000 $1,686,807 $194,427 $159,649 $12,750 $4,069,419 
14 SBS $6,499,942 $1,200,000 $1,686,807 $194,427 $63,333 $20,400 $9,664,909 
15 SBS $0 $100,000 $0 $0 $0 $6,800 $106,800 
16 SBS $0 $100,000 $0 $0 $0 $6,800 $106,800 
17 SBS $0 $100,000 $0 $0 $0 $6,800 $106,800 
18 SBS $0 $100,000 $0 $0 $0 $6,800 $106,800 
19 SBS $151,579 $600,000 $337,361 $194,427 $79,825 $8,500 $1,371,691 
20 SRFS $3,031,572 $1,000,000 $2,816,969 $194,427 $159,649 $34,000 $7,236,616 
21 SRFS $719,998 $200,000 $1,602,467 $194,427 $79,825 $8,500 $2,805,217 
22 SRFS $3,941,043 $800,000 $1,686,807 $194,427 $41,509 $25,500 $6,689,286 
23 SRFS $4,547,357 $1,200,000 $1,686,807 $388,853 $478,947 $42,500 $8,344,465 





System # Function Procurement Integration Logistics Operational Maintenance Disposal Total 
   1 CS $723,305 $500,000 $1,661,291 $291,640 $399,123 $4,250 $3,579,610 
2 CS $149,135 $10,000 $342,534 $194,427 $79,825 $12,750 $788,671 
3 CS $298,270 $100,000 $685,069 $291,640 $159,649 $17,000 $1,551,628 
4 CS $149,135 $500,000 $342,534 $291,640 $79,825 $12,750 $1,375,884 
5 CS $298,270 $25,000 $685,069 $145,820 $159,649 $12,750 $1,326,558 
6 CS $298,270 $75,000 $685,069 $145,820 $159,649 $12,750 $1,376,558 
7 CS $298,270 $25,000 $685,069 $437,460 $159,649 $12,750 $1,618,198 
8 CS $298,270 $75,000 $685,069 $437,460 $159,649 $12,750 $1,668,198 
9 CS $59,654 $35,000 $68,507 $437,460 $15,965 $12,750 $629,336 
10 CS $596,541 $100,000 $85,634 $97,213 $31,930 $8,500 $919,817 
11 CS $1,193,081 $50,000 $342,534 $0 $15,965 $1,700 $1,603,280 
12 HK $0 $0 $0 $1,749,840 $0 $0 $1,749,840 
13 SBS $0 $100,000 $0 $0 $0 $6,800 $106,800 
14 SBS $0 $100,000 $0 $0 $0 $6,800 $106,800 
15 SBS $0 $100,000 $0 $0 $0 $6,800 $106,800 
16 SBS $0 $100,000 $0 $0 $0 $6,800 $106,800 
17 SBS $149,135 $600,000 $342,534 $97,213 $79,825 $8,500 $1,277,207 
18 SRFS $2,982,703 $1,000,000 $2,860,162 $97,213 $159,649 $34,000 $7,133,727 
19 SRFS $708,392 $200,000 $1,627,038 $97,213 $79,825 $8,500 $2,720,968 
20 SRFS $3,877,514 $800,000 $1,712,672 $97,213 $41,509 $25,500 $6,554,407 
21 SRFS $4,474,054 $1,200,000 $1,712,672 $194,427 $478,947 $42,500 $8,102,600 


















System # Function Total Size (Cubic Ft) Total Weight Total Power % Size (Cubic Ft) % Weight % Power 
1 CS 2 55 275 0.25 0.10 3.09 
2 CS 75 800 2000 9.22 1.39 22.46 
3 CS 3 66 95 0.37 0.11 1.07 
4 CS 0.3 15.9 400 0.04 0.03 4.49 
5 CS 1.56 125 200 0.19 0.22 2.25 
6 CS 3 15.5 165 0.37 0.03 1.85 
7 CS 0 40 70 0.00 0.07 0.79 
8 CS 3 80 40 0.37 0.14 0.45 
9 CS 7 338 576 0.86 0.59 6.47 
10 HK 74.4 4968 0 9.14 8.61 0.00 
11 HK 27.5 9375 0 3.38 16.25 0.00 
12 HK 10 4000 0 1.23 6.93 0.00 
13 HK 27.3 820 500 3.36 1.42 5.61 
14 SBS 270 15660 0 33.19 27.14 0.00 
15 SBS 108 8424 0 13.27 14.60 0.00 
16 SBS 81 5508 0 9.96 9.55 0.00 
17 SBS 81 5832 0 9.96 10.11 0.00 
18 SBS 3.3 60 254 0.41 0.10 2.85 
19 SRFS 7.5 408 3991 0.92 0.71 44.81 
20 SRFS 0.5 23 200 0.06 0.04 2.25 
21 SRFS 5.2 190 100 0.64 0.33 1.12 
22 SRFS 23 900 40 2.83 1.56 0.45 




System # Function Total Size (Cubic Ft) Total Weight Total Power % Size (Cubic Ft) % Weight % Power 
1 CS 75 800 2000 9.83 1.49 21.26 
2 CS 1.3 30 40 0.17 0.06 0.43 
3 CS 3 66 95 0.39 0.12 1.01 
4 CS 0.3 15.9 400 0.04 0.03 4.25 
5 CS 1.56 125 200 0.20 0.23 2.13 
6 CS 3 15.5 165 0.39 0.03 1.75 
7 CS 0 40 70 0.00 0.07 0.74 
8 CS 3 80 40 0.39 0.15 0.43 
9 CS 7 338 576 0.92 0.63 6.12 
10 HK 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
11 SBS 0 2400 506.7 0.00 4.46 5.39 
12 SBS 68 10055.3 516 8.91 18.70 5.48 
13 SBS 21.3 600 164 2.79 1.12 1.74 
14 SBS 0 2200 50 0.00 4.09 0.53 
15 SBS 270 15660 0 35.39 29.12 0.00 
16 SBS 108 8424 0 14.16 15.67 0.00 
17 SBS 81 5508 0 10.62 10.24 0.00 
18 SBS 81 5832 0 10.62 10.85 0.00 
19 SBS 3.3 60 254 0.43 0.11 2.70 
20 SRFS 7.5 408 3991 0.98 0.76 42.42 
21 SRFS 0.5 23 200 0.07 0.04 2.13 
22 SRFS 5.2 190 100 0.68 0.35 1.06 
23 SRFS 23 900 40 3.01 1.67 0.43 





System # Function Total Size (Cubic Ft) Total Weight Total Power % Size (Cubic Ft) % Weight % Power 
1 CS 75 800 2000 11.08 2.06 23.33 
2 CS 1.3 30 40 0.19 0.08 0.47 
3 CS 3 66 95 0.44 0.17 1.11 
4 CS 0.3 15.9 400 0.04 0.04 4.67 
5 CS 1.56 125 200 0.23 0.32 2.33 
6 CS 1.56 125 200 0.23 0.32 2.33 
7 CS 1.56 125 200 0.23 0.32 2.33 
8 CS 3 15.5 165 0.44 0.04 1.93 
9 CS 0 40 70 0.00 0.10 0.82 
10 CS 3 80 40 0.44 0.21 0.47 
11 CS 7 338 576 1.03 0.87 6.72 
12 HK 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
13 SBS 270 15660 0 39.89 40.40 0.00 
14 SBS 108 8424 0 15.96 21.73 0.00 
15 SBS 81 5508 0 11.97 14.21 0.00 
16 SBS 81 5832 0 11.97 15.04 0.00 
17 SBS 3.3 60 254 0.49 0.15 2.96 
18 SRFS 7.5 408 3991 1.11 1.05 46.56 
19 SRFS 0.5 23 200 0.07 0.06 2.33 
20 SRFS 5.2 190 100 0.77 0.49 1.17 
21 SRFS 23 900 40 3.40 2.32 0.47 




Tactically Integrated Sensor (TIS) 
The TIS combat system is a derivative of the aircraft Carrier Vessel—Tactical 
Support Center (CV-TSC) currently deployed on all U.S. aircraft carriers as an integral 
component in the ships defense system (SDS).  The TIS system provides the Naval 
Expeditionary Costal Command (NECC) and Maritime Expeditions Security Force 
(MESF) with a common operating picture (COP) by integrating and correlating the 
various sensor inputs.  
The HAMR ASW module will use the TIS to merge sensor information provided 
by acoustic sensors, RADAR, EO/IR or optical camera, and global positioning system 
data into a single tactical operating picture.  TIS is capable of correlating track 
information, displaying range, speed and other target metadata, and providing potential 
firing solutions.  It also provides a number of integrated and user definable tactical 
decision aids (TDA) and cannot export this information to other systems. 
Operating on standard rack mounted COTS PCs, the TIS software is written in 
JAVA and was developed by NAVSEA Keyport.  The operating system runs on a suit of 
COTS, ruggedized PC compliant computers and one additional PC computer running 
UNIX to accomplish its mapping function.  An advantage to the HAMR ASW module 
includes the utilization of the source code at no cost.  The TIS system is designed to be 
SOA compliant, transportable, scalable, and IA compliant and interfaces with secure 
communications like Link 11, 16, and ultimately Link 22 when fielded.  Because TIS is 
able to render numerous inputs to tracks and distribute the tracks, it is well suited for an 
unmanned ASW alternative. 
 
AN/USQ-119E (V) GCCS-M   
The AN/USQ-119E (V) Global Command and Control System - Maritime 
(GCCS-M) is one of the U.S. Navy’s primary command and control system for 
communications capabilities.  GCCS-M is comprised of four main variants:  ashore, 
afloat, tactical and mobile, and multi-level security (MLS).  It uses the command, control, 
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communications, computers, and information (C4I) technology to support the warfighter 
mission needs.  Tactical information will be passed to warfighters by using a secure and 
non-secure internet protocol router network.   
Its integrated command, control, and information system provides the U.S. and 
allied commanders with the capability to “receive, process, display and maintain data on 
the readiness of neutral, friendly and hostile forces and geo-location data on friendly, 
hostile and neutral land, sea and air forces.”58  For the purposes of HAMR missions, it 
will not use the display console.  The display technology will be used via the TIS system. 
Instead, the GCCS-M processor will be the main component needed for command and 
control capabilities.   
 
Communications 
One of the major functions of this ASW mission module is the combat 
communication systems.  The communication systems considered for the HAMR module 
are the AN/USQ-125 Link 11, AN/URQ-107 Link 16, Link 22, AN/PRC-117 Satellite 
Communication (SATCOM) System, Common Data Link Class I System, AN/PRC-148 
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), and the Automated Digital Network System.  These 
communication systems are critical in supporting the HAMR ASW missions.  The 
primary purpose of these communication systems is to pass message traffic information 
and data to the fleet and to ensure real-time tactical information and data are available at 
moments needed.  
 
AN/USQ-125 Link-11 System 
The Link-11 communications system is the common tactical data link used by all 
U.S. Navy and allied ships to provide “high-speed, computer-to-computer exchange of 
digital tactical information among ships, aircraft, and shore installations.”59  The Link 11 
communications system is seen in Figure 58 has the capability to operate at either high-
frequency (HF) or ultra-high-frequency (UHF) radios with the switch of a button.  The 
HF system is the long-range communications system while the UHF communications is 
                                                 
58 Sumner [2008] 
59 “AN/USQ-125(V) Link-11/TADIL-A Data Terminal Set/Link-22 SPC” [2008] 
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limited to line of sight.  The HF band allows the HAMR module to transmit and receive 
signals in all directions with coverage up to 300 NM from the transmitting site.  The UHF 
band of the Link-11 system can transmit and receive signals in all directions with 
coverage up to 150 NM for ship-to-air links. 
 
 
Figure 58. Link 11 System. 
 
The AN/URQ-107 Link-16 System 
The Link 16 is a digital data transmission system that broadcasts information at a 
high rate over the secure networks.  The Link 16 system has the capability to support the 
exchange of data information which includes surveillance data, control data, electronic 
warfare data, mission tasking, weapon information, and assignments.  The HAMR ASW 
mission module allows for command and control of combat environment providing a 
“real-time and jam-resistant, secure transfer of combat data, voice and relative navigation 
information to a variety of aircraft, ships, and other platforms that are equipped with 
Link-16.”60  Link 16 increases the ability of the combatant commander in maintaining 
situation awareness and exchanging critical targeting and threat information.   
 
Link-22 System 
Link-22 is the next-generation NATO tactical data link.  It is a more economical 
data link communication system that is capable of replacing the aging Link-11 and can be 
interoperable with Link-16 networks.  The Link-22 is a data link communication system 
which uses radio frequency media to communicate with air, surface, subsurface, and 
ground-based tactical forces.  Its time division multiple access (TDMA) architecture 
                                                 
60 “JAM-resistant Link-16 radios bring communications versatility to the battlefield.” [2006] 
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design has proven to increase flexibility and decrease net management overheads by ten 
folds.  It offers the dynamic TDMA protocols where “a single Link-22 participant can 
operate on up to four independent networks simultaneously.”61   
The Link-22 system is not yet used by any coalition forces.  The plan to replace 
Link-11 was determined by numerous countries, however the DoD does not plan to 
employ the Link-22 system in the near future.  The Link-22 system is included in the 
system analysis, cost, and modeling incase the United States decides that it is necessary 
to use this technology.  If U.S. armed forces decide to utilize the Link-22 technology, it 
will not cease using Link-11 since it is not backwards compatible.62  Many countries will 
continue to use Link-11 and the need to communicate with them is imperative.   
 
Common Data Link (CDL) Class I System 
Common Data Link (CDL) Class I was considered on the HAMR ASW mission 
module for it will operate at an operating speed of less than Mach 2.3 with an altitude of 
less than 80,000 ft.  CDL system has been proven to be a “better, faster, and cheaper 
communication system that provides seamless communications between multiple 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection systems.”63  CDL permits the 
uplink, downlink, and jam resistant that captures imagery and signals intelligent and 
provides timely tactical data link information to the fleet.   
The main advantage of CDL is its ability to upload and download information at 
high rates. The uplink operates at a range of 200 kbps and possibly up to 45 Mbps, while 
the downlink can operate at a range from 10.71 Mbps to 234 Mbps. 
 
AN/PRC-117 SATCOM System  
AN/PRC-117 is the Navy’s current satellite system and is a fully integrated with 
multi-band and multi-mission handheld radio communications capability.  It has coverage 
from 30 to 512 MHz frequency spectrum and offers the most advance security and 
performance features demanded for the HAMR ASW mission module.  AN/PRC-117 has 
                                                 
61“Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence” [2008] 
62 Boyd [2008] 
63 “Common Data Link [CDL]” [2008] 
 160
the High Performance Waveform (HPW) which “ensures error-free data delivery using 
high-speed, over-the-air data rates.”64  It also has the capability for wireless radio cloning 
with the Radio Programming Application to ensure swift establishment of critical 
communications when needed.   
 
Joint Tactical Radio System-Maritime (JTRS-M) 
The Joint Tactical Radio System-Maritime (JTRS-M) is a “multi-mode, multi-
band system that provides adaptive communications capability satisfying the existing and 
future communication waveform.”65  It satisfies both narrowband and wideband 
networking waveforms that include the UHF Line of Site (LOS) and Single Channel 
Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), HF, VHF, and UHF SATCOM.  
Figure 59 shows this system. 
 
 
Figure 59. JTRS System. 
 
JTRS employs the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) capability as a 
subsystem for improved ground force communications.  MUOS uses narrowband tactical 
satellite communication technology and will replace the Ultra High Frequency Follow-




                                                 
64 Kaman [2001] 
65 “Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence” [2008] 
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Automated Digital Network System (ADNS) 
The Automated Digital Network System “provides ship and shore internet 
protocol (IP) connectivity, facilitating the merging of ‘stove-piped’ information-exchange 
systems and increasing the effective throughput of existing radio frequency (RF) 
circuits.”66  It is capable of automatically routing and switching the tactical and strategic 
data through the Internet Protocol networks.  This network has the capability to link 
deployed battle groups with each other and with the Defense Information Systems 
Network ashore via multiple radio frequency (RF) paths.  ADNS uses COTS, Non-
Developmental Items (NDI), Joint Tactical Architecture (JTA)-compliant hardware 
(routers, processors, and switches), and commercial-compliant software in a 
standardized, scalable, shock-qualified rack design. 
 
ARR 970 Sonobuoy Receivers 
The ARR 970 is a 64 acoustic channel sonobuoy receiver system with 64 
simultaneous receivers.  It is a highly capable receiver with 99 standard RF channels 
allowing for a total of 495 sub-channels.  The fully modularized system consists of three 
modules: the R-624(V)1, R-624(V)2 and the radio frequency distribution (RFD) unit.  
The difference between the R-624(V)1 module and the R-624(V)2 module is that the R-
624(V)1 provides the sonobuoy position system (SPS) while the V2 does not.  Both R-
624 modules each have 32 acoustic signal processing channels allowing for a combined 
64 channel receiver for the entire ARR 970 system.  The picture of the system is shown 
in Figure 60.  The fully modular design of the ARR 970 gives the operator flexibility due 
to the interchangeable modules.  This makes the system “logistics friendly” in cases of 
failures and other maintenance issues. 
 
                                                 




Figure 60. Three Subsystem Modules. 
 
Integrated Sonobuoy Launching Management System (ISLMS) 
The integrated sonobuoy launching and management system ISLMS, is designed 
by NUWC Keyport.  It utilizes multiple cannibalized P-3 sonobuoy racks and integrates a 
launcher design and operates by a single rack COTS IBM compatible computer. The 
ISLMS is integrated with a GPS and TIS mapping component to provide an on screen 
display.  The operator will locally or remotely create a pattern by selecting from a library 
of pre-established buoy patterns or templates to overlay in the existing environment.  As 
the delivery platform flies over the targeted area, the ISLMS system will dispense the 
buoys from the ASW module to the operator’s choice of pattern.  This allows the types 
and modes of the buoys to be entered into the system providing unattended placement of 
type and frequency specific buoys desired by the operator. 
 
Sonobuoys 
One of the primary ASW detecting, localizing, identifying, and tracking systems 
that the HAMR will deploy is the sonobuoy.  It can be produced in large quantities for 
deployment and are relatively cheap to manufacture because they are expendable non-
repairable.  The HAMR will not require maintenance actions to be performed at the 
organizational, intermediate, or depot maintenance.  All sonobuoys are heavily reliable in 
operation and are able to transmit information back to the aircraft for processing and 
display with a rapid response time.  The HAMR will use 30 internal racks on alternatives 
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1 and 2 and 60 internal racks on Alternative 3 to hold up to 36 sonobuoys on each rack 
for a total of 1080 and 2160 sonobuoys respectively. 
The HAMR will deploy four basic types of sonobuoys; passive, active, special 
purpose, and extended echo ranging (EER).  Passive sonobuoys detect noises from 
submarines.  Active sonobuoys detect acoustic pulses (echos) bounced off submarine 
hulls.  Special purpose sonobuoys are used to measure the ocean water temperature 
profile or to communicate with submarines.67  EER uses energy pulses to retrieve 





Figure 61. Sketch of Various Sonobuoys. 
 
AN/SSQ-53 DIFAR Series Sonobuoy 
The AN/SSQ-53 series is the Navy’s premier passive sonobuoy.  The receiver 
uses Directional Frequency and Recording (DIFAR) for listening to determine the 
bearings associated to underwater sounds.  The sonobuoy will wait for any noise and at 
that point acoustic information will then be transmitted to the HAMR so that it may be 
processed.  Fields, with at least two sonobuoys, are set up to triangulate submarines.  
                                                 
67 NSWC Crane [2008] 
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Because it does not transmit signals through the water, the ASW threat will be unaware 
of the DIFAR sonobuoys.  
 
AN/SSQ-62E DICASS Series Sonobuoy 
The AN/SSQ-62E series is the Navy’s premier active sonobuoy.  The transmitter 
and receiver will use the Directional Command Activated Sonobuoy System (DICASS) 
in junction with a UHF downlink radio.  An acoustic pulse is transmitted from the 
sonobuoy, by using a ping, and then reflected off any obstructions in its path for 
detection.  Reflections from the transmitted signal will be sent back to the HAMR.  
 
AN/SSQ-101 ADAR Series Sonobuoy 
The AN/SSQ-101 series is the Navy’s special purpose sonobuoy.  It uses Air 
Deployable Active Receiver (ADAR) technology to advance transmitting and receiving 
tactics.  The ADAR system is an acoustic data receiver that is capable of beamforming.  
Transmission of received real-time acoustic signals will be returned to the HAMR in a 
rapid response time.  Some features of the ADAR sonobuoy includes a horizontal planar 
array sensor, horizontal aligned hydrophones, the use of 40 precisely fixed hydrophones, 
and the capability to receive active echoes reflecting off submarine hulls.  The ADAR 
can significantly help ASW forces in detecting submarines operating in both shallow and 
deep water while rejecting spurious non-submarine related reflections.  
 
AN/SSQ-110/A Extended Echo Ranging Sonobuoy 
The AN/SSQ-110 sonobuoy will be deployed from the HAMR to approximately 
fifteen to twenty feet below the surface. It will then transmit a signal via VHF back to the 
HAMR on a pre-assigned RF channel to indicate a successful launch.68  Once the 
sonobuoy is in the water it will transmit “an acoustic energy pulse until it is reflected off 
natural and man-made objects.  When it strikes the hull of a submarine, the pulse forms 
                                                 
68 NSWC Crane [2008]  
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an echo which is detected by a passive receiving sonobuoy.  The EER sonobuoy provides 
long-range, active detection of submarines.”69 
 
MAD (Magnetic Anomaly Detection) 
Submarines act like large magnets, and its magnetic field causes a localized 
change in the Earth’s magnetic field, which can be measured by MAD.  The AN/ASQ-
233 system for MAD is seen in Figure 62 and consists of three subsystems: a computer 
power supply, control display, and a sensor.  In order to use this system, the sensor must 
be towed below the HAMR to avoid noise due to magnetic interference. The 
recommended towing length is approximately 250 feet below the HAMR.   
 
   
 
 
Figure 62. Subsystems within MAD. 
  
Systems such as the SH-60B aircraft with ASQ-81 systems currently use a non-
magnetic tow body which is towed away to escape the magnetic noise from the aircraft.70  
This is the same approach taken in dealing with the HAMR aircraft.   However, “current 
state of the art towing reels, tow cables, and tow bodies designed for the AN/ASQ-233 
                                                 
69 NSWC Crane [2008] 
70 Kuhlman [2008] 
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magnetometer are too large, too heavy and too unstable…”71  The goal is to create a 
towing system that meets the proper requirements as well as the MAD’s performance 
specifications in order to properly detect threats. 
 
ALQ-217 Electronic Support Measures (ESM) System 
The ALQ 217 ESM system was considered necessary on the HAMR module for 
use to passively detect “friend or foe” radar systems and transmit precise targeting 
tactical picture over to command centers for aid in decision making.  The system consists 
of one receiver processor unit with active front-end amplifiers and four antenna arrays as 
illustrated in Figure 63.  The system has a high mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) rate 
of over 2000 hours reliability in littoral environment performance.  The module “employs 
open systems architecture (VME) and COTS processing to ensure additional long-term 
supportability and growth.”72  With the five available spare slots for future the scalable 
receiver processor unit requires modifications.  The receiver has selectable wide, 
medium, narrow bandwidth for full frequency range coverage.  Proven military digital 
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Figure 63. Entire EMS System. 
 
AN/APY-10 RADAR  
The AN/APY-10 RADAR system shown in Figure 64 is a multi-mission maritime 
and overland surveillance RADAR.  It is capable of performing long-range surface search 
and target tracking, periscope detection, ship imaging and classification using synthetic 
aperture radar and inverse synthetic aperture radar.  This next generation radar system has 
high mean-time-between-failure of 475 hours video outputs/interfaces and a color 
weather mode capable of detecting in all weather conditions.  The performance of the 
maritime target detection capability has a RADAR cross section ranging from 1 to 10,000 





Figure 64. APY-10 RADAR System. 
 
Electro Optical / Infrared (EO/IR) Imaging Sensor 
Electro-optics (EO) is a branch of technology of the generation, modulation, 
detection and measurement, or display of optical radiation by electrical means.  The term 
"Electro-optic" in its popular definition is often used mistakenly as a synonym for the 
sub-fields of optoelectronics and photonics.  Optoelectronics is the study and application 
of electronic devices that source, detect and control light, usually considered a sub-field 
of photonics.  Photonics is the science of generating, controlling, and detecting photons, 
particularly in the visible and near infra-red (IR) spectrum.  For the purposes of this paper 
the team followed the popular definition of “EO/IR” system to be defined as a sensor 
system that converts photons in the visible and infrared spectrum into electrical signals.   
The HAMR team decided that it may be useful for the HAMR ASW module to 
have an EO/IR imaging capability to help increase the probability of visual detection of a 
submarine periscope or surfaced submarine.  In addition the EO/IR imaging sensor would 
also provide improved intelligence and surveillance capability.  The HAMR team 
investigated current EO/IR systems in use by militaries using open source resources.  The 
team opted to further research the imaging system suites from FLIR Systems Inc. as they 
are the market leader for EO/IR systems. 
A representative from FLIR systems recommended the AN/AAQ-21 Star 
SAFIRE III system as an appropriate candidate for the HAMR ASW module research 
project.  The StarFire III is a high resolution camera that eliminates the need for visual 
detection.  The Star SAFIRE III is currently used onboard multiple airborne platforms 
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(particular platforms that are classified), and should give an appropriate representation of 
an EO/IR imaging system for the HAMR ASW module.  The Star SAFIRE III consists of 
an IR Imager, and several optional payloads including: Color Zoom Camera, Spotter 






Figure 65. Image of Star Safire III EO/IR System. 
 
The major advantage of Star Safire III is the capability to detect a floating wire 
antenna or communications buoy attached to an ASW threat that is near periscope depth. 
Other capabilities include detection of a change in temperature of the water, gas 
emissions from a diesel powered submarine or cavitations. 
 
LIDAR (light detection and ranging) 
Airborne LIDAR is a means of tracking enemy threats and can be implemented 
on the HAMR.  Essentially, a laser pulse from the sensor pod penetrates through the 
water in order to detect the threat.  A unique concept of LIDAR is the use of its receivers 
which provide both 2-D and 3-D images of the water column.  “The combination of these 
receivers has the sensitivity and range resolution to discriminate the submarine’s multiple 
signatures from noise and the many degrading optical effects of sea water and waves.”73   
An upgrade to the LIDAR is the April Showers Upgrade.  The April Showers 
Upgrade contains five sections as shown below in Figure 66.  Although each section 
                                                 
73 Kaman [2008] 
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serves its own, important function, the receiver section contains the vast portion of what 
the LIDAR can do.  In essence, the receiver section uses two cameras:  the intensified 




Figure 66. April Showers Upgrade LIDAR. 
 
The ICCD detects targets in the littorals as well as classifies them.  The ITRR is 
the 3-D camera referred to earlier.  The key to the LIDAR’s success is the amount of hull 
reflection.  Even though the hull does not reflect very much, enough laser light will be 
reflected to create a flash picture in the receivers. 
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